Nathan Duenas v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 26, 2024
DocketSF-0752-18-0215-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Nathan Duenas v. Department of Defense (Nathan Duenas v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nathan Duenas v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

NATHAN S. DUENAS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-18-0215-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: February 26, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Paul E. Carreras , Esquire, Roseville, California, for the appellant.

Christine J. Yen , Stockton, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed his removal. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the agency failed to prove the charge of Lack of Candor because the circumstances do not reflect that he intended to deceive the agency on his 2015 Electronic Questionnaire for National Security Positions, SF-86. He reasserts his claim that the agency committed a prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

(10). Finally, he disputes the administrative judge’s weighing of the Douglas factors and argues that she abused her discretion when she denied several of his witnesses. Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (providing a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to penalty determinations and observing that the Board’s review of an agency-imposed penalty is essentially to assure that the agency conscientiously considered the relevant factors and struck a responsible balance within tolerable limits of reasonableness ). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED as to the reason for denying the appellant’s prohibited personnel practice claim and to incorporate the Board’s findings in its decision in Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, we AFFIRM the initial decision. The appellant alleged below and on review that the agency violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) by discriminating against him based on his July 2017 arrest. Petition for Review File, Tab 4 at 13; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 14 at 8-9. He argued that this violated the prohibition against agency discrimination for non-performance related conduct in section 2302(b)(10). The administrative judge denied this claim because the appellant did not claim that he engaged in whistleblowing activity. IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID) at 12. This was error 3

because the statute does not require such allegations. Nevertheless, because we agree with the administrative judge’s finding of a nexus between the appellant’s misconduct and the efficiency of the service, that determination negates his section 2302(b)(10) claim. See Middleton v. Department of Justice, 23 M.S.P.R. 223, 228 (1984) (finding that a clear and specific finding of nexus negates a claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10)), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table). To the extent that the administrative judge erred in requiring the appellant to allege retaliation for whistleblowing, an adjudicatory error such as this one that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984). In addressing the appellant’s claim of disparate penalties, the administrative judge cited Lewis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 657, ¶ 15 (2010), for the proposition that an appellant alleging disparate treatment must show that there is enough similarity between both the nature of the misconduct and other relevant factors to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the agency treated similarly situated employees differently but that the Board will not have hard and fast rules regarding the “outcome determinative” nature of those factors. ID at 17-19. In the Board’s recent decision in Singh, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 14, the Board overruled Lewis to the extent it is contrary to Facer v. Department of the Air Force, 836 F.2d 535, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1988), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the proper inquiry is whether the agency knowingly treated employees “differently in a way not justified by the facts, and intentionally for reasons other than the efficiency of the service.” The Board also reaffirmed the standard set forth in Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305, which limits similarly situated employees to those who engaged in the same or similar offenses, Singh, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 17. Specifically, the Board determined that the universe of potential comparators will vary from case to case, but it should be limited to those employees whose misconduct and/or other 4

circumstances closely resemble those of the appellant. Id., ¶ 13. In addition, the Board reiterated that consistency of the penalty with those imposed on other employees for the same or similar offenses is only one of many factors to be considered in determining an appropriate penalty and is not necessarily outcome determinative. Id., ¶ 18. For the same reasons the administrative judge found the appellant did not meet his burden under Lewis, ID at 18-19, we conclude he did not meet his burden under the standard set forth in Singh.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Related

Christian Facer v. Department of the Air Force
836 F.2d 535 (Federal Circuit, 1988)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Harinder Singh v. United States Postal Service
2022 MSPB 15 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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Nathan Duenas v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nathan-duenas-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2024.