Nathan Crandall v. Newaygo Cnty., Mich.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: May 1, 2024
• Docket: 23-1653
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0191n.06

No. 23-1653 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 01, 2024 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

) NATHAN CHARLES CRANDALL, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEWAYGO COUNTY, MICHIGAN; ) MICHIGAN RACHEL ROBINSON, ) Defendants-Appellees. ) OPINION )

Before: COLE, CLAY, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Nathan Crandall appeals the district court’s dismissal of

his complaint, which alleged that Defendants Rachel Robinson and Newaygo County violated his

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Crandall’s

girlfriend’s pit bulls were responsible for the death of another dog. Crandall alleges, among other

things, that as a co-owner of the dogs, he did not receive due process before the state court prior

to the dogs being ordered to be euthanized. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district

court’s dismissal of Crandall’s complaint.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

This case arises from the violent behavior of two pit bulls belonging to Erickah Cook,

Plaintiff Crandall’s then-girlfriend and now-wife. In April of 2020, Cook and the pit bulls were

living with Crandall at his residence, at which time the pit bulls killed a neighbor’s dog. Four No. 23-1653, Crandall v. Newaygo Cnty., Mich., et al.

months later, Defendant Rachel Robinson, the local prosecutor, filed a “Complaint and Summons

Regarding Dangerous Animal” and named Crandall as the assumed owner. The complaint ordered

Crandall to show cause as to why the dogs should not be destroyed. At the show cause hearing,

Crandall noted multiple times that they were not his dogs, but rather that the dogs belonged to

Cook.

The case against Crandall was dismissed, and the case was refiled by a different prosecutor

against Cook as the dogs’ owner. Cook was given notice about her own show cause hearing, at

which she was to provide evidence as to why the dogs were not dangerous. At that hearing, Cook

was given the opportunity to cross-examine the state’s witnesses and bring her own witnesses, but

she did neither. Rather, Cook expressed remorse, testified that she had undergone significant

expense and efforts to ensure that “something like this” never happened again, and requested that

nothing happen to her dogs. R. 8-5, Page ID #21–22. The district court expressed sympathy but

felt that its hands were tied by Michigan state law, which provides: “After a hearing, if the animal

is found to be a dangerous animal that caused serious injury or death to an individual or a dog” the

court “shall order the destruction of the animal.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.322(3). On October

28, 2020, the district court ordered both dogs to be destroyed. Cook’s attempts to appeal and move

the court to reconsider were unsuccessful.

Procedural Background

Crandall filed this case in December 2022, alleging violations of his civil rights under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, Crandall alleged that

(1) as a legal co-owner of the dogs, he had a property interest in the dogs that Robinson abridged

by unconstitutionally seizing them (Count 1); (2) Defendant Newaygo County was subject to

Monell liability because of its “policy indicating a deliberate course of action of seizing dogs in an

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unlawful manner” and failure to train and supervise its attorneys (Counts 2 and 5); (3) the

dangerous animal statute’s unconstitutional vagueness violated his property interest in the dogs

and constituted a violation of his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

(Count 3); and (4) the state court’s failure to use the correct evidentiary standard violated his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights (Count 4). Crandall sought compensatory and punitive

damages as well as attorney’s fees.

The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that (1) the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not divest the court of jurisdiction; (2) Crandall was judicially

estopped from asserting ownership over the dogs after disavowing such ownership at the first show

cause hearing; (3) Crandall failed to state a claim because he received all the process he was due;

(4) the relevant Michigan statute did not create a property right, nor was it void for vagueness; (5)

Crandall failed to state a claim against Newaygo County for Monell liability; (6) Robinson was

entitled to absolute and qualified immunity; and (7) Crandall failed to assert how Newaygo County

or Robinson were responsible for the state court’s application of the wrong evidentiary standard.

Crandall timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

We review a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Inner City

Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville, 87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023). Just like the

district court, we accept “the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and view the complaint in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but are not required to accept legal conclusions

or unwarranted factual inferences as true.” Id. (quoting Moody v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd.,

847 F.3d 399, 402 (6th Cir. 2017).

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At the outset, this Court “must satisfy itself that appellate jurisdiction exists to hear the

appeal.” United States v. Michigan, 134 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Defendants

claim that we lack jurisdiction, invoking the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims of injuries ruled upon

by state court judgments. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). The

doctrine is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-

court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). And the doctrine is “inapplicable where the party against whom the

doctrine is invoked was not a party to the underlying state-court proceeding.” Lance v. Dennis,

546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006). Defendants seek to reduce Crandall’s claim to a base attack on the state

court judgment barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. But the district court held that, because

Crandall “was not a party to the underlying suit which he claims is the source of his injury,” the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply. R. 16, Page ID #382.

The district court resolved the Rooker-Feldman issue correctly in Crandall’s favor.

Rooker-Feldman applies “only in limited circumstances . . . where a party in effect seeks to take

an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 466

(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291). Crandall is not appealing the state court decision to

euthanize the dogs, he is alleging that his procedural due process rights were violated by the

prosecutor and Newaygo County. Because he does not seek an appeal but rather an independent

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remedy for an alleged lack of due process in the form of damages, Rooker-Feldman does not

apply.1

We must next resolve Defendants’ claim that Crandall’s entire appeal is moot because he

did not effectively plead before the district court the one claim he substantively briefed before this

Court: his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. The district court substantively

considered Crandall’s procedural due process argument in its dismissal of the case. Because

Crandall seeks to reverse that decision by the district court, we may properly consider his

procedural due process claim. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 554 (6th Cir.

2008) (“[B]ecause the district court did consider the issue in this case, we address the merits of

[the defendant’s] argument on this issue.”); cf. Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 554 (6th

Cir. 1998) (“Typically, we will not address issues unless ruled upon by the trial court below.”).

However, Crandall has forfeited almost all of his other claims—his Fourth Amendment

claim, his claim regarding the state court’s application of the incorrect evidentiary standard, his

vagueness challenge of the Michigan dangerous animal law, and his Monell liability claims against

Newaygo County—by failing to raise them in his opening brief. Scott v. First S. Nat’l Bank,

Defendants argue that Rooker-Feldman applies because if Crandall was a co-owner of the 1

dogs with Cook—as he alleges in his complaint—then he was “in privity” with Cook. Because Cook was the party in the underlying suit regarding the dogs, Crandall being “in privity” with her would mean Crandall was also a party to the suit, and Rooker-Feldman can therefore apply. See McCormick, 451 F.3d at 396. But the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 466. Even if Crandall’s status as a co-owner of the dogs put him in privity with Cook, this privity, under Lance, would not be sufficient to invoke Rooker-Feldman. In any case, as stated above, Rooker-Feldman does not apply because Crandall’s case is not a functional appeal of the state court judgment.

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936 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2019).2 We therefore decline to review the district court’s dismissal

of these claims and consider only whether the district court erred in dismissing Crandall’s

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.

We find that district court correctly held that Crandall failed to state a claim.3 Crandall’s

procedural due process claim is premised on his argument that he has property rights in the dogs,

and was not afforded due process prior to the order that they be euthanized. “Procedural due

process requires that the government, prior to depriving an individual of their property, provide

that individual with notice of the proposed action and an opportunity to be heard.” Paterek v. Vill.

of Armada, 801 F.3d 630, 649 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “To establish a procedural

due process claim, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a protected property interest at issue,

(2) a deprivation of that protected property interest, and (3) that he or she was not afforded adequate

procedures.” Id.

Crandall’s claim fails on the first and third prongs.4 On the first, as mentioned above,

Crandall at his show cause hearing relinquished whatever property interest Michigan law conferred

2 Even if Crandall had adequately briefed his Fourth Amendment claim, it would still fail. Although Michigan law gave him a property interest in the dogs, he relinquished that interest at his show cause hearing. Crandall repeatedly, under oath, disclaimed his ownership. And although he claims he did so because he was ignorant of the law and uncounseled, “even for pro se litigants, ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Spohn v. Van Dyke Pub. Schs., 822 N.W.2d 239, 251 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012). Thus, without an interest in the dogs, Crandall has no basis to challenge their seizure. 3 The district court diligently analyzed each of Defendants’ arguments that the case should be dismissed pursuant to judicial estoppel, and official immunity. Because we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the case on failure to state a claim grounds, we elect not to opine on the other issues. Cf. Angel v. Kentucky, 314 F.3d 262, 264 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e are free to affirm the judgment on any basis supported by the record.”). 4 The district court also held that Michigan law does not confer upon Crandall a property interest in the dogs. But Michigan’s Dog Law defines a dog’s owner as “every person who keeps or harbors the dog or has it in his care, and every person who permits the dog to remain on or about any premises occupied by him.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.261. It is undisputed that the dogs

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on him. On the third, he cannot show that he was afforded inadequate procedures. Crandall claims

that at no time was he “advised that as an owner he had a constitutional right to a hearing which

he clearly wanted.” Pl. Br., ECF No. 18, 28. But Crandall did have his own hearing, at which he

stated he was not the owner of the dogs. Crandall makes no argument as to why this process was

insufficient as a matter of law. As the district court aptly explained, “Crandall received notice as

to the potential deprivation of any rights he may have in the two pit bulls and received his

opportunity to be heard in court.” R. 16, Page ID #385.

Further, courts evaluate procedural due process claims by weighing (1) “the private interest

that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest

through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Crandall did not, and cannot, make any claim

that there was a risk of erroneous deprivation as a result of the procedure used, nor that additional

procedural safeguards would have been valuable. The state judge who ordered the dogs to be

euthanized did so reluctantly, because the judge concluded that the statute required him to order

the dogs destroyed once there was a finding that they had harmed another animal. Not only is this

deprivation not erroneous, but any increase in procedure likely would not have moved the needle.

While Crandall argues that Michigan law requires that all owners be included in proceedings

lived with Cook and Crandall on Crandall’s property. Therefore, Crandall qualifies as an owner under this statute. And this Court has previously upheld a district court’s reading of § 287.261 as creating a possessory interest for individuals who have dogs residing at their homes. Smith v. City of Detroit, No. 16-11882, 2017 WL 3279170, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2017), rev’d in part on other grounds by Smith v. City of Detroit, 751 F. App’x 691 (6th Cir. 2018). Therefore, Crandall would have a possessory interest in the dogs under Michigan law had he not disclaimed such an interest, but he still fails to show that he was deprived of this interest without due process.

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conducted pursuant to Michigan’s Dog Law, Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.261, and that he was not

sufficiently included in the underlying proceeding, Crandall does not show that the existing

procedures were somehow lacking—especially given that Crandall was served and did have an

opportunity to participate in not one but two hearings—or that “including” him in the proceeding

would have any probative value.

Further, the deprivation in this case came after Cook’s hearing, for which she was given

notice and at which she testified and was able to call witnesses. Thus, even if Crandall was denied

adequate process, which he was not, it is not clear that the alleged deprivation of Crandall’s

protected property interest (the euthanasia order) is causally linked to such allegedly deficient

procedure. Therefore, there was no deprivation of due process, and Crandall’s procedural due

process claims must fail.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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