Nathan Colodney v. Jay Orr

Ninth Circuit

Nathan Colodney v. Jay Orr

651 F. App'x 630

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJune 6, 2016

Docket15-56177

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 651 F. App'x 630 (Nathan Colodney v. Jay Orr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Nathan Colodney v. Jay Orr, 651 F. App'x 630 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Nathan J. Colodney appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his diversity action alleging fraud in connection with his employment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal of an action as barred *631 by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Colodney’s fraud claim was proper because Colodney failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Belasco v. Wells, 234 Cal.App.4th 409, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 840, 852 (2015) (elements of a fraud claim under California law).

Dismissal without leave to amend was proper because amendment would be futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “[a] district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Colodney’s motion to recuse and refusing to disqualify Judge Phillips. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (standard of review).

We reject as unsupported by the record Colodney’s contentions regarding conversion of defendant’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.

Colodney’s request for re-assignment on remand, set forth in his opening and reply briefs, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Nathan J. Colodney appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his diversity action alleging fraud in connection with his employment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal of an action as barred *631 by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Colodney’s fraud claim was proper because Colodney failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Belasco v. Wells, 234 Cal.App.4th 409, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 840, 852 (2015) (elements of a fraud claim under California law).

Dismissal without leave to amend was proper because amendment would be futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “[a] district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Colodney’s motion to recuse and refusing to disqualify Judge Phillips. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (standard of review).

We reject as unsupported by the record Colodney’s contentions regarding conversion of defendant’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.

Colodney’s request for re-assignment on remand, set forth in his opening and reply briefs, is denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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