Nathan Canfield v. State of Missouri

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 2, 2023
• Docket: WD84989
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

NATHAN CANFIELD, Appellant, WD84989 OPINION FILED: v. May 2, 2023

STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri The Honorable Joshua C. Devine, Judge

Before Division Four: Gary D. Witt, Chief Judge, Presiding, Alok Ahuja, Judge and Lisa White Hardwick, Judge

Nathan Canfield ("Canfield") appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Boone

County, Missouri ("motion court"), denying, after an evidentiary hearing, Canfield's

motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035. 1 On appeal, Canfield claims

that the motion court clearly erred in denying his motion because he established that his

plea counsel ("Counsel") was ineffective in that he failed to fully investigate his case, and

1 All Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2018). had Counsel adequately investigated, Canfield would not have pled guilty. We affirm the

judgment of the motion court.

Factual and Procedural Background

On July 16, 2018, Canfield pled guilty to: Count I, stalking in the first degree; Count

II, harassment in the first degree; Count III, resisting a lawful stop; and Counts IV, V, and

VI, each for violating an order of protection. At the plea hearing, the State set forth the

factual basis for the plea:

On September 17 of 2017, the defendant sent his wife, J.C., a threatening e-mail. He then followed through with a threat that he made in that e-mail on the 19th of September, which involved posting private photographs of her on the internet. On the 21st, two days later, he was served with an order of protection prohibiting him from being at J.C.'s place of employment, or making any contact with her, or trying to contact her through third parties. On the same day, after being served, he went to her place of business in violation of that order of protection. He then continued to contact J.C. by e-mail two days later. And then tried to interfere with their children at their church when he knew J.C. to be there with the children on October 1. On September 20, as alleged in Count II, he sent J.C.'s co-worker 50 text messages within three hours without receiving any response from her. He threatened to create bad publicity for the co-worker, K.R., and her company if the co-worker did not comply with his demands. And he said that he is just trying to make everyone else's life as miserable as his right now. He acknowledged that he was making threats, and the business shut down as a safety precaution for a few days. As to Count III, on October 3, when the defendant saw law enforcement officers parked at his business, he left the parking lot and fled in his vehicle when law enforcement officers were trying to stop him with their lights activated. As to Count IV, on November 29, 2017, he called J.C. in violation of that order of protection twice from the jail. On the same date, he called C.C. and asked her to contact J.C. for him. And then on that same date, as alleged in Count VI, he contacted K.C., asking that person to contact J.C. on his behalf. And in those calls he admitted he was a stalker.

2 Canfield agreed with the prosecutor's statement and affirmed that he was pleading guilty

because he was guilty. Canfield also affirmed that he had had ample opportunity to discuss

the case with his attorneys, that there was nothing that he asked them to do that they did

not do, and that he had no complaint "at all" about the way they had represented him.

Canfield also affirmed in his testimony that he understood that the court would order a

sentencing assessment report and that there were several possibilities as to a final outcome:

he could be sentenced up to the maximum of four years on Counts I and II, but with

execution of the sentences suspended so that he could be put on probation (SES); that he

could be put on probation without having any sentence imposed (SIS); or that the court

might do something different than what the prosecutors thought was appropriate or than

what his counsel requested on his behalf.

At his sentencing hearing, Canfield did not object to anything in his sentencing

assessment report, which the sentencing court noted detailed behavior and statements that

were "horrifying really." (L.F. 29, p. 29). The sentencing court acknowledged that with

no prior record, Canfield's case seemed like a "slam dunk for probation[, a]nd on the

defendant's part even for an SIS." But the court expressed concern for the wellbeing and

safety of the victims "not only his wife, but his children, and even—you know you could

see her employer—I mean, she hired police officers off duty to secure the building." The

court stated, "He has created terror, and I don't trust that it's over." After receiving input

from J.C., the prosecutor, the probation officer, and Canfield's counsel, the court sentenced

Canfield to four years for each of the felony counts, to run consecutive to each other, and

essentially time served on the four misdemeanor counts. The court suspended the

3 execution of the sentences in Counts I and II (the felony counts) and placed Canfield on

probation for five years, such probation including no contact with J.C. or K.R. by any

means whatsoever, completion of a batterer's intervention program and treatment court,

and GPS monitoring of Canfield. After sentence was pronounced, Canfield affirmed that

he still believed he had effectively been represented by counsel.

On May 10, 2019, Canfield's probation was revoked because he failed to complete

the batterer's intervention program and failed to complete treatment court. He was ordered

delivered to the Department of Corrections for execution of his sentence. At that hearing

Canfield once again affirmed that he believed he had been effectively assisted by his

counsel.

On September 16, 2019, Canfield filed his Rule 24.035 motion. 2 His amended

motion, filed by appointed counsel, included a claim that his plea counsel was ineffective

in failing to investigate the charges against Canfield, in failing to request a bill of particulars

to determine the details of the charges against Canfield, and in failing to adequately advise

Canfield regarding the particulars of the charges. 3

2 Although presently and at the time of Canfield's sentencing Rule 24.035 requires post-conviction motions to be filed within 180 days of a movant's sentencing, Canfield was erroneously informed by the sentencing court that his Rule 24.035 motion needed to be filed within 180 days of his delivery to the Department of Corrections, which was the rule through 2017. Because Canfield was misinformed of the deadline for filing his motion, his out-of-time filing is excused. Watson v. State, 520 S.W.3d 423, 434 (Mo. banc 2017). The State agreed that under these facts his motion was filed timely, and timeliness of the motion is not at issue in this appeal. Also, while our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that the deadlines for filing under Rule 24.035 are mandatory and cannot be waived, Hatmon v. Missouri, SC99591, March 21, 2023, Hatmon cites a 2016 Court of Appeals case for this proposition and does not cite Watson and similar cases, nor does it directly address the defendant's being misinformed of the filing deadline by the sentencing court, and so it does not change our analysis. 3 Canfield's motion made additional claims, but they are not raised in this appeal, and so we do not address them herein.

4 On August 4, 2021, the motion court held a hearing on Canfield's motion at which

he and his plea counsel testified. Canfield testified that if his plea counsel had fully

investigated the charges and fully advised him regarding the details or particulars of the

charges, he would not have pled guilty. He also testified that he had a bachelor of science

degree and understood the English language, but that he was under "extreme duress" from

being held in the jail for approximately ten months while awaiting trial. He testified that

the conditions of his confinement and the duress resulting therefrom prevented him from

making a logical, reasonable decision for his best interests, and he would have said

anything to get himself out of that situation. He acknowledged that he had repeatedly

expressed satisfaction with his counsel, including at his revocation hearing, at which time

he had not been confined, but stated that he had "a very difficult time confronting

somebody about their inability to do their job" because he felt it was rude.

Plea counsel testified that he had investigated all of Canfield's charges during the

representation, had reviewed all of the written reports and forwarded them to Canfield, and

would have reviewed all of the other discovery materials that had been provided to him.

Counsel testified that he had discussed all matters with Canfield including "various

different investigative procedures." Counsel testified that Canfield's financial resources

somewhat limited his ability to take depositions, but Canfield also did not want to depose

his wife, who was the primary witness and victim in the case, because he was hopeful of

reconciling their marriage. Finally, Counsel testified that he did not request a bill of

particulars because by the time it would have been appropriate to request a bill of

particulars, they had nearly all of the discovery in terms of informing them of the

5 approximate dates, times, and details of each of the charges so he did not feel that a bill of

particulars was necessary. Counsel thought that through his investigations and discussions

with Canfield, he was able to determine what the State was charging, what witnesses and

evidence would be brought to bear by the State, and what, if any, defenses they would be

able to mount to those charges.

The motion court denied Canfield's motion, determining that Canfield's motion was

properly considered even though it was out-of-time, but that Canfield had failed to establish

that his plea counsel was ineffective. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of the motion court's action on a motion pursuant to Rule 24.035

is limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the motion court

are clearly erroneous. Bogard v. State, 356 S.W.3d 850, 852-53 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012).

The motion court's findings and conclusions are presumptively correct. Lee v. State, 97

S.W.3d 9, 13 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002). The motion court's findings and conclusions are

clearly erroneous only when a review of the entire record leaves the appellate court with a

firm and definite impression that a mistake has been made. Eberspacher v. State, 915

S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996).

Analysis

Canfield's sole point on appeal is that the motion court clearly erred in denying his

motion for post-conviction relief because his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate the charges against him and to request a bill of particulars. We disagree.

6 To sustain his burden of proving that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,

Canfield must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Counsel failed to exercise the

level of skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney and that he was prejudiced

by Counsel's ineffective performance. Jones v. State, 541 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Mo. App.

W.D. 2018). When a defendant has pled guilty, the movant must show that, but for his

counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

Eberspacher v. State, 915 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996). "When a conviction

results from a plea of guilty, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial

except to the extent that it impinges upon the voluntariness and knowledge with which the

plea was made. Id.

More specifically, where a movant alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary

because his plea counsel failed to engage in an adequate investigation, the movant must

allege and prove what evidence counsel failed to discover and how that undiscovered

evidence would have affected the proceeding.

In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on inadequate preparation or investigation, [the movant is] required to allege what information plea counsel failed to discover; that a reasonable investigation or preparation would have resulted in the discovery of such information; and that the information would have aided or improved his defense. State v. Evans, 524 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (quoting Gooch v. State, 353

S.W.3d 662, 666 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011)); see also Collins v. State, 447 S.W.3d 222, 224

(Mo. App. S.D. 2014).

In this case, Canfield has utterly failed to allege any basis to establish how his plea

counsel erred by failing to investigate or to request a bill of particulars. Canfield does not

7 allege what possible exculpatory evidence or information Counsel could have found by

further investigation. He does not allege whom Counsel should have interviewed or what

further investigation or actions that Counsel should have undertaken. Counsel testified as

to his efforts to investigate the charges against Canfield and the information he provided

to Canfield regarding the charges and the evidence the State would use against him should

the case proceed to trial. As for the bill of particulars, Counsel reasonably testified that a

bill of particulars was unnecessary as he was able to determine what the State was charging,

what witnesses and evidence would be brought to bear by the State, and what, if any,

defenses they could mount against those charges. Canfield fails to even attempt to show

what his defense might have gained by the filing of a bill of particulars.

Moreover, the motion court was justified in finding Canfield’s current complaints

not to be credible, given that Canfield expressed his satisfaction with his plea counsel

repeatedly during his multiple hearings. He was questioned about his satisfaction with

Counsel's performance at his plea hearing, at his sentencing hearing, and at his probation

revocation hearing; at each opportunity he expressed satisfaction with his counsel.

Canfield now claims that his earlier statements of satisfaction should be disregarded,

because he was under "extreme duress" from his pre-trial confinement, which would apply

to countless criminal defendants, and that he had a hard time confronting his counsel about

his inability to do his job because he sees it as rude. The motion court could find it

disingenuous that Canfield would choose a possible prison sentence over being "rude" to

his attorney; and Canfield’s claim of “extreme duress” does not apply to his expression of

8 satisfaction with counsel at his probation revocation hearing, after he had spent several

months in the community on probation.

We conclude that Canfield has completely failed to establish that Counsel's

performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced in any manner by Counsel's

representation of him. Accordingly, Canfield's single point on appeal is denied.

Conclusion

For all of the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the motion court.

__________________________________ Gary D. Witt, Judge All concur