Nathan Brock v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: February 6, 2026
• Docket: 2024-CA-0338
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 6, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-0338-MR

NATHAN BROCK APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE RICHARD A. BRUEGGEMANN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00623

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, ECKERLE, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, L., JUDGE: Nathan Brock brings this appeal from a March 11, 2024

Final Judgment and Sentence on Plea of Not Guilty – Jury Trial adjudicating him

guilty of one count of Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to Induce a Minor to

Engage in Sexual Activities. We affirm.

Brock was indicted by a Boone County Grand Jury upon one count of

Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to Induce a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activities (KRS1 510.155) and two counts of Possession of Matter Portraying a

Sexual Performance by a Minor (KRS 531.335). The charges stemmed from a

criminal complaint wherein it was alleged that Brock solicited sexual intercourse

and nude photographs from his then twelve to thirteen-year-old biological

daughter, J.B. More particularly, it was alleged that Brock asked J.B. to have

sexual intercourse with him over a messaging application on his phone and if she

would get naked in front of him and take nude pictures.

A jury trial ensued. Brock moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at

the close of the Commonwealth’s case and timely renewed the motion thereafter.

The jury found Brock guilty of one count of Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to

Induce a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activities and not guilty of two counts of

Possession of Matter Portraying a Sexual Performance by a Minor. Brock was

sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment with a five-year period of

conditional discharge. This appeal follows.

Brock contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a

directed verdict of acquittal upon Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to Induce a

Minor to Engage in Sexual Activities. More particularly, Brock argues there was

insufficient evidence presented at trial that the message he sent J.B. was “for the

purpose of procuring or promoting . . . a sexual performance.” Brock’s Brief at 11.

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-2- Rather, Brock contends he asked J.B. to send him the sexually explicit pictures he

believed she had sent to a boy in order to get J.B. to admit she had done so.

The standard of review applied to a motion for directed verdict in a

criminal action was set forth by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.

Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991):

On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.

Id. at 187; CR2 50.01.

Upon appellate review, “the test of a directed verdict is, if under the

evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only

then is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.” Id. at 187. This

Court must also “be mindful of the rule that ‘[c]redibility and weight of the

evidence are matters within the exclusive province of the jury.’” Reynolds v.

Commonwealth, 113 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Ky. App. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Smith, 5 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Ky. 1999)). And a “trial court is certainly authorized to

2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-3- direct a verdict for the defendant if the prosecution produces no more than a

mere scintilla of evidence. Obviously, there must be evidence of substance.”

Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983). Our review proceeds

accordingly.

Brock was indicted upon one count of Unlawful Use of Electronic

Means to Induce a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activities and was convicted of

same. Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to Induce a Minor to Engage in Sexual

Activities is codified at KRS 510.155, which provides, in relevant part:

(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly use a communications system, including computers, computer networks, computer bulletin boards, cellular telephones, or any other electronic means, for the purpose of:

(a) Procuring or promoting the use of a minor . . .

...

for any activity in violation of KRS 510.040, 510.050, 510.060, 510.070, 510.080, 510.090, 510.100, 529.100 where that offense involves commercial sexual activity, or 530.064(1)(a), or KRS Chapter 531.

(4) The solicitation of a minor through electronic communication under subsection (1) of this section shall be prima facie evidence of the person’s intent to commit the offense, and the offense is complete at that point without regard to whether the person met or attempted to meet the minor.

-4- In the case sub judice, the evidence presented a reasonable basis for

the jury finding that Brock was guilty of Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to

Induce a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activity. Evidence indicated that Brock

learned that J.B. had been given a cell phone by a friend after Brock had smashed

J.B.’s phone. J.B. testified that after Brock learned about the phone, he told her

that he would not tell her mom about it if J.B. kept his secret. According to J.B.’s

testimony, the secret was that Brock wanted to see J.B. naked. J.B. initially

thought Brock was joking but he made the request twice: once in person and once

through text. J.B. further testified that Brock then began messaging her through

the Discord application. An exhibit introduced at trial revealed the following

conversation between J.B. and Brock:

Brock: Can I see now? Pls?

J.B.: [Three days later J.B. responded] No

Brock: Answered (sic) me shit head

J.B.: Because I said so

J.B.: Okay and ?

J.B.: I don’t wanna show you

J.B.: God just please stop asking

Brock: cya

Brock: Good night.

-5- Commonwealth’s Trial Exhibit 1.

A few weeks after the above messages were sent, Brock again

messaged J.B. through Discord and asked if she wanted to wrestle.

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2. J.B. testified that when she and Brock would wrestle

in her bedroom, Brock would take her phone and would refuse to give her access

to it unless she took off her bra. J.B. further described Brock picking her up,

putting her on the bed, and pulling her down the bed by her legs. If this caused her

shirt to ride up, Brock would tell her not to worry about it. J.B. also testified that if

she tried to leave the bedroom Brock would lock the door and block her from

leaving through the bathroom. J.B. additionally described two occasions when

Brock smacked her on the buttocks and flicked her breasts.

One day during school recess, J.B. told a friend what Brock had been

doing to her. The friend apparently reported the information, and a school

counselor became involved. The counselor passed the information to the school

resource officer. Later the same day, a detective with the Boone County Sheriff’s

Office was assigned to investigate the allegations and spoke with J.B.

Subsequently, the detective spoke with Brock in a recorded interview that was

played for the jury. In the video, Brock admitted to asking J.B. for the nude

pictures through the Discord app but claimed he was only doing so to test her.

Brock also admitted he asked to see J.B.’s breast once while in her room and once

-6- through Discord; he claimed, however, that he “really didn’t mean anything by it.”

VR 12/11/23, 4:19:42.

Considering the evidence as a whole, we conclude that sufficient

evidence was presented to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable

doubt that Brock was guilty of Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to Induce a

Minor to Engage in Sexual or Other Activities. Therefore, the trial court properly

denied Brock’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

Brock contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a

directed verdict of acquittal as he did not intend to receive a sexually graphic

photograph of J.B. This contention ignores the plain language of KRS 510.155(4)

which clearly states that soliciting a minor through electronic communication

under subsection (1) of KRS 510.155 “shall be prima facie evidence of the

person’s intent to commit the offense, and the offense is complete at that

point. . . .” It is irrelevant whether Brock ever received the picture he requested

from J.B.; what is relevant is that he solicited a minor through electronic

communication to provide the picture. Thus, Brock’s contention is without merit.

Brock’s final contention is that KRS 510.155 is unconstitutional as applied

to his conduct. More particularly, Brock asserts that his conduct occurred “almost

exclusively offline . . . and the presence of a single ambiguous text message was

not sufficient to establish a violation of KRS 510.155.” Brock’s Brief at 14.

-7- Brock concedes this issue was not raised before the trial court and seeks review

pursuant to the palpable error rule of RCr3 10.26.

In response, the Commonwealth asserts that Brock did not notify the

Attorney General of the constitutional challenge as mandated by KRS 418.075. As

such, the Commonwealth maintains Brock is barred from raising on appeal the

constitutional challenge to this statute. For the foregoing reason, we agree.

KRS 418.075 provides, in relevant part:

(1) In any proceeding which involves the validity of a statute, the Attorney General of the state shall, before judgment is entered, be served with a copy of the petition, and shall be entitled to be heard[.]

And, also relevant is CR 24.03 which reads, in relevant part:

When the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly affecting the public interest is drawn into question in any action, the movant shall serve a copy of the pleading, motion or other paper first raising the challenge upon the Attorney General.

KRS 418.075 and CR 24.03 both mandate the Attorney General must

be served with notice of a constitutional challenge to a statute. The precedent

established by the Kentucky Supreme Court is clear – KRS 418.075 and CR 24.03

must be strictly complied with when challenging the constitutionality of a statute.

Brashars v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 58 (Ky. 2000); Benet v. Commonwealth,

3 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

-8- 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2008). In fact, the Supreme Court specifically held “that

strict compliance with the notification provisions of KRS 418.075 is mandatory”

and that such notice shall “be given to the Attorney General prior to the entry of

judgment.” Benet, 253 S.W.3d at 532. If a party does not strictly comply with the

notification requirements of KRS 418.075 and CR 24.03, the

constitutional challenge is unpreserved, and it will not be reviewed upon the

merits. Brashars, 25 S.W.3d 58; Benet, 253 S.W.3d 528.

In this case, it is undisputed that Brock failed to notify the Attorney

General of his constitutional challenge to KRS 510.155 before entry of the trial

court’s judgment. Therefore, we determine that his constitutional challenge to the

statute is unpreserved for our review. Consequently, we will not address the merits

of Brock’s argument that KRS 510.155 is unconstitutional.

In sum, we believe the trial court properly denied Brock’s motion for

a directed verdict. And we view any remaining contentions of error to be moot or

without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the March 11, 2024 Final Judgment and

Sentence on Plea of Not Guilty – Jury Trial entered in the Boone Circuit Court

adjudicating him guilty of Unlawful Use of Electronic Means to Induce a Minor to

Engage in Sexual Activities is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

-9- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Timothy G. Arnold Russell Coleman Department of Public Advocacy Attorney General of Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky Melissa A. Pile Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

-10-