Nathalie Nehme, V. Rochelle Murray

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: 87275-3
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

NATHALIE NEHME, No. 87275-3-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION ROCHELLE MURRAY,

Respondent.

DÍAZ, J. — Nathalie Nehme challenges the trial court’s denial of her petition

for a protection order, which she filed against Rochelle Murray, her brother’s

girlfriend. Because Nehme does not establish that the court abused its discretion,

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties present competing sets of facts. Nehme alleges that, in

December 2018, Murray threatened Nehme’s brother with a knife, and that Murray

threatened her when she intervened. Nehme also claims that on March 17, 2024,

Murray came to Nehme’s residence and threw her belongings about, while

demanding she leave. Nehme asserts that Murray approached threateningly and

said that she would call the police to falsely report that Nehme had assaulted her.

Murray testified that, during the December 2018 incident, Nehme was the No. 87275-3-I/2

one who tried to attack her. Murray also denied Nehme’s description of the March

17 incident. She admitted that she told Nehme that she deserved to die from an

illness she had but explained that Nehme had provoked her by harassing Murray’s

child.

Nehme filed a petition for a protective order against Murray on March 19,

2024. The commissioner held a hearing on May 13, 2024. The commissioner

found Murray’s testimony credible and denied the protective order.

Nehme subsequently moved for revision of the commissioner’s order, which

the superior court denied. She then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the

court also denied. Nehme timely appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Nehme, pro se, claims that the court erred when it denied her petition for an

antiharassment protection order, seemingly arguing that substantial evidence does

not support the court’s findings. We disagree

As a preliminary matter, we note that “[c]ourts hold pro se litigants to the

same standards as attorneys.” In re Vulnerable Adult Pet. for Winter, 12 Wn. App.

2d 815, 844, 460 P.3d 667 (2020); see also In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App.

621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993) (courts are “under no obligation to grant special

favors to . . . a pro se litigant.”).

Also preliminarily, Nehme seeks to introduce new facts into her brief on

appeal which she did not present to the commissioner or superior court. See, e.g.,

Br. of Appellant at 2-3. This court may not take evidence except under the limited

circumstances set forth in RAP 9.11, which Nehme neither addresses nor satisfies.

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See State v. Elmore, 139 Wn.2d 250, 302, 985 P.2d 289 (1999) (“an appellate

court is confined to evidence presented to the trial court” except where criteria set

forth in RAP 9.11(a) are satisfied). We therefore limit our review to the record that

was before the superior court.

The superior court adopted the commissioner’s findings and conclusions

when it denied de novo revision. Grieco v. Wilson, 144 Wn. App. 865, 877, 184

P.3d 668 (2008). We then review “whether substantial evidence supports the

findings of fact and, if so, ‘whether the findings in turn support the trial court's

conclusions of law.’” In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d

144 (1999) (quoting Organization to Preserve Agric. Lands v. Adams County, 128

Wn.2d 869, 882, 913 P.2d 793 (1996)).

We review a court’s decision whether to grant a protection order for abuse

of discretion. See Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653, 669-70, 131 P.3d 305

(2006) (reviewing modifications to an antiharassment order for abuse of

discretion). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

unreasonable, or when it exercises its discretion on untenable grounds or for

untenable reasons. In re Parentage of T.W.J., 193 Wn. App. 1, 6, 367 P.3d 607

(2016).

“The court shall issue a protection order if it finds by a preponderance of

the evidence that the petitioner has proved . . . that the petitioner has been

subjected to unlawful harassment by the respondent.” RCW 7.105.225(1)(f).

“‘Unlawful harassment’ means . . . [a] knowing and willful course of conduct

directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is

3 No. 87275-3-I/4

detrimental to such person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.” RCW

7.105.010(37)(a).

Here, the court denied the protective order, finding that “[t]he respondent

did not engage in acts of harassment against petitioner.” Substantial evidence

supports the court’s findings.

Murray testified that she acted calmly to protect her child after Nehme

provoked her. The court found Murray’s explanation of the events credible. “We

will not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s, weigh the evidence, or adjudge

witness credibility.” Greene, 97 Wn. App. at 714.

Additionally, Murray presented a declaration from Elie Nehme, who swore

that the December 2018 incident never occurred. Murray confirmed that Elie

Nehme was present at the relevant time. He also swore that Nathalie was lying

about the March 17 incident. This testimony provides additional substantial

evidence for the court’s conclusion

Although, as Nehme’s counsel at the time argued, Murray’s evidence was

not authenticated under the Washington Rules of Evidence, the court still had

discretion to consider it as evidence. The rules of evidence need not be applied in

protection order proceedings. Gourley v. Gourley, 158 Wn.2d 460, 467, 145 P.3d

1185 (2006) (citing ER 1101(c)(4)); Blackmon v. Blackmon, 155 Wn. App. 715,

722, 230 P.3d 233 (2010) (holding that “competent evidence sufficient to support

the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a petition for a domestic violence

protection order may contain hearsay or be wholly documentary.”). The court was,

therefore, within its discretion to weigh the declaration as additional evidence in

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Murray’s favor.

In short, there is substantial evidence that Nehme did not meet her burden

to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Murray had engaged in a

“knowing and willful course of conduct directed at [Nehme] that seriously alarms,

annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and that serves no legitimate

or lawful purpose.” RCW 7.105.010(37)(a). Because the trial court’s findings are

supported by substantial evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied the antiharassment protection order. 1

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order.

WE CONCUR:

1 Nehme also requests attorney fees. Attorney fees may be awarded only when authorized by a contract, statute, or recognized ground of equity. Labriola v. Pollard Grp., Inc., 152 Wn.2d 828, 839, 100 P.3d 791 (2004). Nehme does not point to any contract, statute, or ground in equity that justifies attorney fees. We therefore decline to award fees. 5