BARNES, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from appellant’s conviction on all four counts of a four count indictment. He was convicted on Count I of subornation of perjury in inducing one Joel Benton to testify falsely
be
fore a committee of the United States Senate (18 U.S.C. § 1622);
Count II of corruptly influencing Benton to so testify falsely (18 U.S.C. § 1505) ;
in Count III of corruptly influencing Benton to give false and perjurious information to investigators of the committee (18 U.S.C. § 1505); and in Count IV of willful income tax evasion in 1956 by failure to report the same $3,500 involved in the other counts (26 U.S.C. § 7203).
Sentences on Counts I, II and III of three years confinement, to be served concurrently, were imposed. On Count IV appellant was granted three years probation.
The sole legal question raised on this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the crimes charged. By reason of the concurrent sentences, we need find but one of the first three counts supported by substantial evidence to affirm the conviction on all three. Sinclair v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692; Byrnes v. United States, 9 Cir. 1964, 327 F.2d 825, 830.
On this appeal, of course, we must view the facts in the most favorable light to sustain the judgment below. Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680. Mosco
v. United States, 9 Cir. 1962, 301 F.2d 180, 181, cert. den. 371 U.S. 842, 83 S.Ct. 72, 9 L.Ed.2d 78.
We therefore adopt the government’s statement of the facts, as appears in the margin.
To sustain the conviction under Count I for subornation of perjury, the •“two witness rule” applies. That is, to show that perjury was actually committed, either two witnesses must so testify, or one witness’ testimony to that
effect must be corroborated by other evidence. Catrino v. United States, 9 Cir. 1949, 176 F.2d 884, 888; Weiler v. United States, 1945, 323 U.S. 606, 65 S.Ct. 548, 89 L.Ed. 495; Hammer v. United States, 1926, 271 U.S. 620, 46 S.Ct. 603,
70 L.Ed. 1118. But the two witness requirement is not applicable in showing that perjury was induced by the defendant. Catrino v. United States, supra 176 F.2d at 888.
Nor is the two witness rule applicable in showing that the defendant obstructed justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 by influencing a witness to give false testimony and information to a Senate Committee and its investigators. Catrino v. United States, supra 176 F.2d at 888.
Thus, the testimony of one person alone is sufficient to convict the defendant of obstructing justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (Count II — influencing Benton to give false testimony to the Senate Committee), and giving false and perjurious information to the committee investigators (Count III). We hold that the
following evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of Stein on both Counts II and III:
(a) ' The testimony of Benton himself;
(b) Ex. 44 — the subpoena of January 20, 1958;
(c) Ex. 30 — the statement of Benton, dated July 6, 1962;
(d) Stipulation No. 2, reciting that Exhibits 24 and 25 were read into evidence before the committee;
(e) a fair and careful reading of defendant Stein’s own testimony.
And, more particularly as to Count I, there exists the following corroboration :
(f) Exhibits 45 and 47 — the affidavits of Hornada and Bernard Schwab, respectively;
(g) the testimony of Hornada and of Schwab;
(h) the testimony of Williams and Hayes;
(i) the testimony of Hoffa and Collins ;
(j) Exhibits 5, 8, 10 and 18 — the four checks totalling $4,400;
(k) Exhibits 5 and 26A — the stubs for these four checks; and
(l)
Exhibits 9, 11 and 19 — the vouchers for three of the checks.
We hold that the testimony of Benton to the effect that the testimony he gave to the committee was false was adequately corroborated by the evidence listed above from (f) to (l), inclusive, to satisfy the two witness rule and thus sustain the conviction on Count I. There can be no question that the jury was justified in concluding that Stein knew that the testimony was false and that Stein induced Benton to give it to the ■committee.
Appellant urges, however, that Benton was not a “witness,” citing Berra v. United States, 8 Cir. 1955, 221 F.2d 590, affirmed 351 U.S. 131, 76 S.Ct. 685, 100 L.Ed. 1013. There, in an income tax •case, Berra was accused of obstructing .justice by influencing one Schmidt to destroy records. This was almost one month before Schmidt first met with investigating revenue agents, and two months before Schmidt was served with a subpoena. Thus Schmidt was not only not a witness under subpoena; he was at the time in question not even a
probable
witness. We may assume he might be classified as a
possible
witness; at least in the defendant’s eyes. (221 F.2d at 596) But no proof that he then
intended
to testify existed.
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BARNES, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from appellant’s conviction on all four counts of a four count indictment. He was convicted on Count I of subornation of perjury in inducing one Joel Benton to testify falsely
be
fore a committee of the United States Senate (18 U.S.C. § 1622);
Count II of corruptly influencing Benton to so testify falsely (18 U.S.C. § 1505) ;
in Count III of corruptly influencing Benton to give false and perjurious information to investigators of the committee (18 U.S.C. § 1505); and in Count IV of willful income tax evasion in 1956 by failure to report the same $3,500 involved in the other counts (26 U.S.C. § 7203).
Sentences on Counts I, II and III of three years confinement, to be served concurrently, were imposed. On Count IV appellant was granted three years probation.
The sole legal question raised on this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the crimes charged. By reason of the concurrent sentences, we need find but one of the first three counts supported by substantial evidence to affirm the conviction on all three. Sinclair v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692; Byrnes v. United States, 9 Cir. 1964, 327 F.2d 825, 830.
On this appeal, of course, we must view the facts in the most favorable light to sustain the judgment below. Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680. Mosco
v. United States, 9 Cir. 1962, 301 F.2d 180, 181, cert. den. 371 U.S. 842, 83 S.Ct. 72, 9 L.Ed.2d 78.
We therefore adopt the government’s statement of the facts, as appears in the margin.
To sustain the conviction under Count I for subornation of perjury, the •“two witness rule” applies. That is, to show that perjury was actually committed, either two witnesses must so testify, or one witness’ testimony to that
effect must be corroborated by other evidence. Catrino v. United States, 9 Cir. 1949, 176 F.2d 884, 888; Weiler v. United States, 1945, 323 U.S. 606, 65 S.Ct. 548, 89 L.Ed. 495; Hammer v. United States, 1926, 271 U.S. 620, 46 S.Ct. 603,
70 L.Ed. 1118. But the two witness requirement is not applicable in showing that perjury was induced by the defendant. Catrino v. United States, supra 176 F.2d at 888.
Nor is the two witness rule applicable in showing that the defendant obstructed justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 by influencing a witness to give false testimony and information to a Senate Committee and its investigators. Catrino v. United States, supra 176 F.2d at 888.
Thus, the testimony of one person alone is sufficient to convict the defendant of obstructing justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (Count II — influencing Benton to give false testimony to the Senate Committee), and giving false and perjurious information to the committee investigators (Count III). We hold that the
following evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of Stein on both Counts II and III:
(a) ' The testimony of Benton himself;
(b) Ex. 44 — the subpoena of January 20, 1958;
(c) Ex. 30 — the statement of Benton, dated July 6, 1962;
(d) Stipulation No. 2, reciting that Exhibits 24 and 25 were read into evidence before the committee;
(e) a fair and careful reading of defendant Stein’s own testimony.
And, more particularly as to Count I, there exists the following corroboration :
(f) Exhibits 45 and 47 — the affidavits of Hornada and Bernard Schwab, respectively;
(g) the testimony of Hornada and of Schwab;
(h) the testimony of Williams and Hayes;
(i) the testimony of Hoffa and Collins ;
(j) Exhibits 5, 8, 10 and 18 — the four checks totalling $4,400;
(k) Exhibits 5 and 26A — the stubs for these four checks; and
(l)
Exhibits 9, 11 and 19 — the vouchers for three of the checks.
We hold that the testimony of Benton to the effect that the testimony he gave to the committee was false was adequately corroborated by the evidence listed above from (f) to (l), inclusive, to satisfy the two witness rule and thus sustain the conviction on Count I. There can be no question that the jury was justified in concluding that Stein knew that the testimony was false and that Stein induced Benton to give it to the ■committee.
Appellant urges, however, that Benton was not a “witness,” citing Berra v. United States, 8 Cir. 1955, 221 F.2d 590, affirmed 351 U.S. 131, 76 S.Ct. 685, 100 L.Ed. 1013. There, in an income tax •case, Berra was accused of obstructing .justice by influencing one Schmidt to destroy records. This was almost one month before Schmidt first met with investigating revenue agents, and two months before Schmidt was served with a subpoena. Thus Schmidt was not only not a witness under subpoena; he was at the time in question not even a
probable
witness. We may assume he might be classified as a
possible
witness; at least in the defendant’s eyes. (221 F.2d at 596) But no proof that he then
intended
to testify existed.
Here, appellant knew Benton was a probable witness; Stein had contacted Benton in 1957 to be sure Benton reported the proceeds of the checks in his 1958 income tax return. Stein contacted Benton early in 1958 to tell him about the McClellan Committee investigation, and to warn him he (Benton) might be contacted by federal men. Stein gave Benton the false story to tell when and if he testified — and for no other purpose! Stein later' obtained and suggested the specific number of trucks Benton was falsely to report he had seen and counted. He had Benton, two years after the event, invent the phony television show format.
When Stein contacted Benton in 1958, he (Stein) had already been subpoenaed to testify before the committee. He knew then that Benton might be called upon to testify, under oath, as to why Benton cashed these checks. At that time Stein knew the story he told Benton to tell the investigators was false.
Benton did intend to help Stein by giving such testimony; he gave such sworn testimony in affidavit form to government investigators, and this material was read into the investigating committee’s records as sworn testimony.
The fact Benton was not subpoenaed to testify at the time he gave his first false testimony is not “vital” and not controlling. He intended to testify. Smith v. United States, 8 Cir. 1921, 274 F. 351, 353; Walker v. United States, 8 Cir. 1938, 93 F.2d 792, 795; United States v. Presser, 6 Cir. 1961, 292 F.2d 171, 174, affirmed by an equally divided court, 371 U.S. 71, 83 S.Ct. 178,
9 L.Ed.2d 163, rehearing den. 371 U.S. 960, 83 S.Ct. 498, 9 L.Ed.2d 508; Samples v. United States, 5 Cir. 1941, 121 F.2d 263, cert. den. 314 U.S. 662, 62 S.Ct. 129, 86 L.Ed. 530; Odom v. United States, 5 Cir. 1941, 116 F.2d 996, reversed
313 U.S. 544, 61 S.Ct. 957, 85 L.Ed. 1511.
We distinguish Berra v. United States, supra, on the facts of the cases it cites and relies upon.
Appellant has raised questions on this appeal as to Counts I, II and III, but not with respect to IV — the income tax evasion. The conviction on that count involves no legal question, but purely the issue of whom the jury believed- — as to whether the money represented by the checks was earned and should have been reported by Stein or Benton. The jury believed Benton, and not Stein. We are required to affirm.
The judgment is affirmed as to all counts.