Natascha Aabbott v. Israel Kligman

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJuly 23, 2025
Docket3D2025-0402
StatusPublished

This text of Natascha Aabbott v. Israel Kligman (Natascha Aabbott v. Israel Kligman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Natascha Aabbott v. Israel Kligman, (Fla. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 23, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-402 Lower Tribunal No. 23-10448-FC-04 ________________

Natascha Aabbott, Appellant,

vs.

Israel Kligman, Appellee.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Gina Beovides, Judge.

Wasson & Associates, Chartered, and Roy D. Wasson, for appellant.

No appearance, for appellee. 1

Before EMAS, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

GORDO, J.

1 Appellee was precluded from filing an answer brief after failing to comply with this Court’s order. Natascha Aabbott (“Mother”) appeals a non-final order, issued

following a two-day evidentiary hearing, awarding Israel Kligman (“Father”)

two supervised overnights with the parties’ minor child.2 We have

jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)(b). For the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

In its well-reasoned order, the trial court ruled that it was in the best

interests of the child to award the Father two supervised overnight visits.

This conclusion is supported by competent substantial evidence presented

over the course of the two-day evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we find the

trial court did not abuse its discretion. See § 61.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (“The

court shall determine all matters relating to parenting and time-sharing of

each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the

child[.]”); Perez v. Maldonato, 324 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“A

trial court’s order on timesharing is typically reviewed for an abuse of

discretion.”); Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)

(“An appellate court must affirm if there is substantial competent evidence to

support the trial court’s finding that the custody award was in the best

interests of the child.”); Rodriguez v. Williams, 911 So. 2d 170, 171 (Fla. 3d

2 The order under review grants the Father’s verified urgent motion to implement the guardian ad litem and social investigator’s recommendation for supervised overnight timesharing.

2 DCA 2005) (“The record before us reflects that the trial court considered the

factors set forth in chapter 61, Florida Statutes, for evaluating the welfare

and best interests of the child in its determination of custody. Florida law

indicates that in child custody cases, the trial courts are accorded with broad

judicial discretion in evaluating factors affecting the best interests of the child

as enumerated in § 61.13(3). In addition, no appellate court may overturn a

trial court’s custody decision unless there is no substantial competent

evidence to support the decision. The record does not support [Appellant’s]

claim that the trial court in this case abused its discretion in entering the order

[under review]. The trial court was well within its discretion as substantial

competent evidence exists to support the decision. We therefore affirm the

trial court’s ruling.”); Saenz v. Sanchez, 390 So. 3d 71, 72-73 (Fla. 3d DCA

2023) (affirming trial court’s temporary child custody and timesharing

decision because it relied on competent substantial evidence, including

evidence and testimony demonstrating the best interests of the children).

While the Mother strongly urges us that the trial court erroneously

ignored the opinion of her expert witness, it is well within the trier of fact’s

purview to weigh and resolve any inconsistencies and conflicts in the

evidence. “This weighing process is for the trier of fact, not this court.”

Peacock v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 454 So. 2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1st DCA

3 1984). “The only question here is whether substantial competent evidence

supports the factual findings made below.” Id.; see also Richardson v.

Everbank, 152 So. 3d 1282, 1287-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“[T]he appellate

court does not re-weigh the evidence or assess whether it is possible to

recite contradictory record evidence which supports arguments rejected

below, nor does it retry the case or substitute its judgment for the trial court’s

on factual matters supported by competent, substantial evidence[.]” (quoting

Lahodik v. Lahodik, 969 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007))); Meyers v.

Meyers, 295 So. 3d 1207, 1213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (“The credibility of

witnesses is within the trial court’s exclusive purview. It is inappropriate for

an appellate court to reweigh the evidence and credibility of witnesses. And

so we defer to the trial court as to issues of credibility.”). As competent

substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision that the supervised

overnight timesharing would be in the child’s best interests, we cannot

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. Thus, we affirm.

Affirmed.

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Related

Peacock v. Farmers and Merchants Bank
454 So. 2d 730 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1984)
Lahodik v. Lahodik
969 So. 2d 533 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2007)
Young v. Hector
740 So. 2d 1153 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1999)
Rodriguez v. Williams
911 So. 2d 170 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2005)
Richardson v. Everbank
152 So. 3d 1282 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2015)

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