Natalie George and All Occupants v. Cerberur SFR Holdings II L.P. Court

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 01-23-00695-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued April 3, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00695-CV ——————————— NATALIE GEORGE AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS, Appellants V. CERBERUR SFR HOLDINGS II, L.P., Appellee

On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1207389

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal concerns a residential property. Appellant Natalie George leased

the property from appellee Cerberur SFR Holdings, II, L.P (Cerberur). After George

failed to pay rent, Cerberur filed suit to evict her and obtained a judgment entitling

Cerberur to recover possession of the property. Cerberur proceeded with eviction, removing George from the property and regaining possession.1 George appeals the

judgment.

In its brief, Cerberur asserts that the case has become moot. We agree. The

law is well established that, when a tenant appeals an eviction judgment but fails to

file a supersedeas bond and loses possession of the property, the appeal is moot

unless the appellant presents a potentially meritorious claim of right to current,

actual possession of the property. Because George does not present such a claim, the

appeal is moot. Accordingly, we vacate the county court’s judgment and dismiss the

case.

Background

In May 2021, Cerberur and George entered into a residential lease agreement

for George to rent property owned by Cerberur. Two years later, Cerberur filed a

forcible detainer action in justice court against George for non-payment of rent.

Cerberur sought to regain possession of the property from George.

In June 2023, the justice court rendered an eviction judgment against George.

George appealed to county court, which decided the matter de novo. In September

2023, the county court signed an eviction judgment entitling Cerberur to recover

1 Besides George, the trial court’s judgment was against “all other occupants” of the property, and the notice of appeal included “all other occupants.” However, because the record only reflects service of process on George, and no other party has been specifically identified on appeal, we limit our discussion to George’s arguments. 2 possession of the property from George. The county court ordered that “in the event

of an appeal of this Judgment, supersedeas bond in the amount of $20,650.00 shall

be posted” within 10 days. George appealed the judgment, but she did not post a

supersedeas bond.

On appeal, George filed a pro se brief challenging the county court’s eviction

judgment. George acknowledges that she is no longer in possession of the property.

Cerberur now has possession.

In its response brief, Cerberur argues that the appeal should be dismissed as

moot because George is no longer in possession of the property and has not shown

she has a potentially meritorious claim to current, actual possession. George did not

file a reply brief or otherwise address Cerberur’s dismissal argument.

Courts Cannot Decide Moot Controversies

This Court lacks jurisdiction to decide a moot controversy. See State ex rel.

Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018). A case becomes moot when (1) a

justiciable controversy no longer exists between the parties, (2) the parties no longer

have a legally cognizable interest in the case’s outcome, (3) the court can no longer

grant the requested relief or otherwise affect the parties’ rights or interests, or (4) any

decision would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. Elec. Reliability

Council of Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619

S.W.3d 628, 634–35 (Tex. 2021).

3 “A suit may become moot at any time, including on appeal.” In re

Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). As a result, “courts have

an obligation to take into account intervening events that may render a lawsuit

moot.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 166–67 (Tex. 2012). When

events that occur after a judgment render the issue before this Court moot, “we may

not decide the appeal.” Cappadonna Elec. Mgmt. v. Cameron Cnty., 180 S.W.3d

364, 375 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, no pet.). Instead, we dismiss

the case. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785,

790 (Tex. 2006).

George’s Eviction from the Property Rendered the Case Moot

The only issue in a forcible detainer action, like this one, is the right to actual

possession of the property.2 Id. at 785. If a defendant in a forcible detainer action

fails to file a supersedeas bond following an adverse judgment, the judgment “may

be enforced and a writ of possession may be executed, evicting the defendant from

the property.” Strange v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 01-23-00575-CV, 2024

WL 1862860, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 30, 2024, no pet.).

Under settled and binding Texas law, when a tenant is evicted from the

property (and thus no longer possesses the property), an appeal from a forcible

2 In her brief, George suggests that a “[j]udgement for money” was rendered against her. But the county court’s judgment only awarded possession of the property to Cerberur. 4 detainer action becomes moot unless the tenant asserts “a potentially meritorious

claim of right to current, actual possession” of the property. See Marshall, 198

S.W.3d at 787 (citing Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001)).

Here, George acknowledges that she was evicted and is no longer in

possession of the property. Thus, we must dismiss the case as moot unless George

has asserted “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession”

of the property. See id.; see, e.g., Abraham v. Victory Apartments, 578 S.W.3d 659,

662 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (recognizing that “an appellant

presents an arguable basis for current, actual possession where the appellant’s lease

contained an automatic-renewal provision and the appellant challenged the bases for

the lease’s underlying termination”).

George did not meet this standard. In her brief, George acknowledges that she

“got[] behind in [her] rent in September 2021.” She asserts that Cerberur “sign[ed]

an agreement with Harris County Emergency Assistance” and two non-profit

organizations, but she does not elaborate on the agreement’s contents. George states

that the non-profit organizations paid $16,750 to cover her rent from November 2021

through August 2022, but she does not assert that she made any payments after that

date.

The record shows that Cerberur filed its forcible detainer suit based on non-

payment of rent in May 2023, nine months after George claims she made the last

5 rental payment. George asserts that she tried to give Cerberur partial payments and

to set up a payment plan “the day before eviction.” But George cites to nothing in

the record and to no legal authority requiring Cerberur to accept partial rental

payment. Finally, George acknowledges that she no longer has a lease for the

property. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 (holding that appellant had no

meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession when she had given up

possession and her lease had expired).

George has not asserted a potentially meritorious claim of right to current,

actual possession of the property. See id. Because George is no longer in possession

of the property and George does not raise a potentially meritorious claim of right to

current, actual possession, Texas law dictates that the case is moot. See id.

Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider George’s challenge to the county

court’s judgment. See Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6.

Conclusion

We vacate the county court’s judgment and dismiss the case as moot. See

Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162 (“If a case is or becomes moot, the court must vacate

any order or judgment previously issued and dismiss the case for want of

jurisdiction.”); Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785 (“One purpose of vacating the

underlying judgment if a case becomes moot during appeal is to prevent prejudice

6 to the rights of parties when appellate review of a judgment on its merits is

precluded.”).

Jennifer Caughey Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Morgan.