Natal v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York

305 So. 2d 438
Supreme Court of Louisiana·Decided December 2, 1974·No. 54388·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

305 So.2d 438 (1974)

Gordon NATAL, Sr., Individually and on behalf of his minor daughter, Melanie Natal
v.
PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO. OF NEW YORK, Frank Natal, Craft Metal Products, Inc. and Lynn Mutual Insurance Co.

No. 54388.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

December 2, 1974.
Rehearings Denied January 17, 1975.

*439 David Gertler, Owen J. Bradley, The Law Offices of Steven R. Plotkin, New Orleans, for plaintiff-applicant.

Wood Brown, III, Montgomery, Barnett, Brown & Read, New Orleans, for defendant-respondent.

BARHAM, Justice.

The plaintiff instituted suit for himself individually, and on behalf of his minor daughter, Melanie Natal, for damages for medical expenses incurred and personal injuries suffered when the daughter walked through a sliding glass door in the home of defendant, Frank Natal. The only defendants before this Court are the homeowner and his liability insurer. Originally, the builder of the house, the engineer who approved the house plans, and the manufacturer of the door were also made defendants, but suit has been dismissed against these three parties and they are not before this Court.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the homeowner and the insurer, in solido. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court in its award of damages against these two defendants. 286 So.2d 738 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973). We granted writs of certiorari to review that judgment. 290 So.2d 329 (La. 1974).

The defendant, Frank Natal, and his wife were entertaining friends in their home; at the same time their children were entertaining friends which included Melanie, a fourteen-year-old cousin. Shortly after eight o'clock, some of the children, including Melanie, left the patio-swimming pool area and went upstairs to listen to records. To go inside and upstairs from the patio through the family room of the house, it was necessary to enter by a sliding glass door which separated the family room from the patio. This door consisted of a single sliding glass panel approximately six feet, ten inches high and three feet wide. The door panel was in an aluminum frame with a handle on one side about three and one-half feet from the floor. The glass panel was three-sixteenths of an inch in thickness. A similar, but immobile, glass panel was located to the right of the sliding door. Both were installed in casements. Prior to going upstairs the children had been swimming in the pool for a considerable time and had passed from the pool-patio area into the family room of the house several times during the afternoon and evening, but on each occasion the door between the areas was opened for Melanie.

Another child summoned Melanie from upstairs to answer a telephone call from her father. Melanie came downstairs into the family room. The lights in the family room had been turned off. The patio was well lighted. Melanie was walking at a slow pace as she approached the phone, which was situated on a low table out on the patio, just beyond the glass door. As she stepped to reach for the telephone, she bent slightly and in doing so, smashed the glass door, shattering the glass and causing the injuries for which recovery is sought.

Undoubtedly, Melanie knew that a glass door separated the patio from the family room. She of course knew that the door was at times closed in order to maintain the temperature in the air-conditioned interior of the house. However, during the day it often was open and as previously noted, Melanie never had to open the door in passing from the patio into the family room during the swimming activity.

Plaintiff urges several theories of responsibility for recovery from these defendants. Because of the peculiar facts of the case, we resolve the liability of the defendants *440 under La.Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316. We conclude that the defendant, Frank Natal, was negligent in maintaining this glass door in this particular location under the lighting arrangement existing at the time.

A homeowner is obligated to warn guests of hidden or concealed perils of which he knows, or should know in the exercise of reasonable care. Foggin v. General Guaranty Insurance Co., 250 La. 347, 195 So.2d 636 (1967).

Glass doors and panels which are clear and without any decoration create a transparency which, even under the best of circumstances, makes it difficult for one to observe the panel of glass. However, this ordinary situation of a totally transparent glass panel in a door was turned into what could be called a trap by the lighting condition which existed at the time that Milanie tried to reach for the phone. We quote from the trial court's finding:

"In this case there was an `illusion of space'; a bringing of the outside, inside; there was prior notice to the owner of the danger of the particular glass sliding door; there was the lighted patio and swimming pool and the darkened den; and there was the placing of the telephone in such a position as to cause an illusion that it was inside the den.
"It is the further opinion of the Court that Melanie Natal was not guilty of contributory negligence. That she was actually the victim of the negligence of Mr. Frank Natal, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Namely, maintaining a lighted patio and a darkened den, in an area of a sliding glass door which created an illusion of space and brought the outside—inside and to cap the climax; the placing of a telephone near the glass sliding door, where the effect would be to create an illusion that would bring the outside telephone inside the den. Naturally, the young girl leaned over to reach for the telephone and broke the 3/16 inch plate glass and was cut by the jutting pieces of glass.
"It is the opinion of the Court, that under the above circumstances, any ordinary prudent person would have re-acted in exactly the same manner in reaching for the telephone."

We believe the facts establish that the glass door created a deceptive illusion and was a trap by reason of the lighting conditions and absence of signs or markings on the door. The homeowner was negligent in failing to warn the minor child of the particular hazard created under these circumstances.

The trial court made no specific findings in its allocation of the award for pain and suffering and the appellate court of course did not pass upon the question of damages since it failed to find the defendant liable. We believe it will serve the best interest of all parties to remand the case to assess damages.

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeal for an assessment of damages not inconsistent with the opinion rendered herein. Costs are cast against defendants.

SUMMERS, J., dissents for the reasons assigned.

SANDERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent for the reasons assigned by SUMMERS, J.

SUMMERS, Justice (dissenting).

Gordon Natal's home was the site of social activity on the evening of April 23, 1967. He and Mrs. Natal were entertaining a couple of their friends while the Natal children were entertaining their friends; included in this latter group was *441 Melanie Natal, a fourteen-year old cousin, who had been invited to the party. The elder Natals and their guests were seated in the patio near the swimming pool, while the children were swimming and barbecuing nearby.

Shortly after eight o'clock, some of the children left the patio and swimming pool to go upstairs into the hou

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Natal v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York, 305 So. 2d 438 (La. 1974).

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