Nat Gosline v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: June 13, 2017
• Docket: A17A0618
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., BRANCH and BETHEL, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. http://www.gaappeals.us/rules

June 13, 2017

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A17A0618. GOSLINE v. THE STATE.

PER CURIAM.

Nat Gosline appeals from the trial court’s denial of his plea in bar, which was

based on speedy-trial grounds. Because he was incarcerated in Michigan when he

filed his statutory demand for speedy trial and during the next term of court, we

affirm.

In November 2015, Gosline was charged with aggravated battery and

aggravated assault. In February 2016, he filed a statutory demand for speedy trial.

Then, in May 2016, Gosline filed a motion for discharge and acquittal pursuant to

OCGA § 17-7-170, based on the state’s failure to try him within two terms of court

of his demand for speedy trial. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, during

which the parties agreed that Gosline was arrested in Michigan five days after the incident that led to the charges in this case. He remained incarcerated in Michigan

until after the trial court’s next term of court ended. Because of his incarceration in

Michigan, the trial court denied Gosline’s motion for discharge. In its order, the court

noted that it has no authority to compel the attendance of a defendant who is in the

custody of a different sovereign.1 Gosline then filed this appeal.

Gosline acknowledges that he was incarcerated in Michigan when he filed his

statutory demand for speedy trial and during the next term of court. He insists,

however, that he is entitled to discharge because he would have waived his right to

be present at trial if the court had set his trial on its trial calendar. We disagree.

Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 (b), if a defendant who files a statutory demand

for speedy trial “is not tried when the demand for speedy trial is made or at the next

succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided that at both court terms there were

1 Georgia does have the authority under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, OCGA § 42-6-20 et seq., to compel production of a person sentenced and incarcerated in a foreign state, absent disapproval by the governor of the sending state. See OCGA § 42-6-20 (Art. IV). But the parties correctly agree that the Act is not applicable to this case, as it does not apply to pretrial detainees in the sending state. See generally United States v. Muniz, 1 F3d 1018, 1026 (II) (E) (10th Cir. 1993).

2 juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant, the defendant shall be absolutely

discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation.”2

“Under the statute, two circumstances must coexist before discharge occurs:

two terms of juries impaneled and qualified to try defendant, and the availability of

defendant.” McIver v. State, 205 Ga. App. 648, 649 (423 SE2d 27) (1992). Where the

accused is in the custody of a different sovereign and the Interstate Agreement on

Detainers Act does not apply, the accused is not available for trial “because [t]here

is no inherent authority in a court of this state to compel an accused’s presence or

in-court attendance where such defendant is incarcerated by or in the control of a

different sovereign.” Baldwin v. State, 270 Ga. App. 201, 202 (605 SE2d 889) (2004)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

Here, as in McIver, Gosline was in the custody of a different sovereign during

the time relevant to his speedy-trial demand. Gosline acknowledges this fact. He

argues, however, that McIver is “erroneous” and “too broad” because it does not

consider the possibility of a defendant waiving his right to be present at trial. To the

extent Gosline contends that McIver should be overruled, we decline to do so. McIver

2 In this case, the parties agree that Gosline was not tried in the term in which he made his speedy trial demand, nor in the next term, and that juries were empaneled in both terms and were qualified to try his case.

3 is consistent with our precedent holding that a defendant who invokes the speedy-trial

guarantee must be available for trial, and that a defendant who is in the custody of a

different sovereign is “not available for trial since there is no inherent authority in a

court of this [s]tate to compel his presence under those circumstances.” State v.

Collins, 201 Ga. App. 500, 501 (411 SE2d 546) (1991) (discussing Luke v. State, 180

Ga. App. 378, 379 (349 SE2d 391) (1986) (overruled by Collins, 201 Ga. App. 500),

and Hunt v. State, 147 Ga. App. 787, 788 (250 SE2d 517) (1978)). Compare Reid v.

State, 116 Ga. App. 640, 647-648 (2) (158 SE2d 461) (1967) (defendant who was in

the custody of the Georgia State Board of Corrections on a previous conviction was

entitled to a discharge of his pending charges when he was not brought to trial within

two terms of his demand for speedy trial). Further, nothing in the record – except for

Gosline’s motion for discharge and acquittal, which was filed after the relevant time

period – reflects a desire to waive his right to be present at trial. Gosline

acknowledges this fact as well, but maintains that the trial court’s failure to place him

on the calendar precluded him from voicing that waiver. He does not, however, cite

any authority in support of his implicit contention that a waiver could be effected only

during a calendar call or only after the trial was placed on the calendar, and we

decline to impose such a rule.

4 Gosline also contends that McIver is inconsistent with the principle that, once

a defendant files a proper demand for speedy trial, he is not required to take any

further action to be automatically entitled to a discharge if the two-term deadline

passes without trial. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 337 Ga. App. 336, 337-338 (1) (787

SE2d 290) (2016). Even the cases reciting this principle, however, have recognized

that a defendant must be available for trial to invoke the two-term deadline. For

example, in Flagg v. State, 11 Ga. App. 37 (74 SE2d 562) (1912), the defendant filed

a demand for speedy trial on his felony indictment. We concluded that he was

available for trial, and was therefore entitled to a discharge based on the passage of

two terms, even though he was serving a chain-gang sentence for a previous

conviction. Central to our conclusion was the fact that both the pending felony

indictment and the previous conviction were before the same trial court, so the state

had the defendant in its custody and could produce him for trial. Id. at 41.

Under the circumstances, we conclude that Gosline’s incarceration in Michigan

extended the time for his speedy trial demand. See McIver, 205 Ga. App. at 648-649.

Because Gosline was not available for trial, the state’s failure to try him within two

terms of his statutory demand for speedy trial does not render him entitled to a

discharge. Id.

5 Judgment affirmed. Division Per Curiam. All Judges concur.