Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Hannah

27 S.W.2d 1089, 160 Tenn. 586, 7 Smith & H. 586, 70 A.L.R. 837, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 137
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedMay 24, 1930
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 27 S.W.2d 1089 (Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Hannah) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Hannah, 27 S.W.2d 1089, 160 Tenn. 586, 7 Smith & H. 586, 70 A.L.R. 837, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. 1930).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Chambliss

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Desiring to modify its passenger service between certain points, the Railway gave public notice of such intention. Before the date of the taking effect of the proposed modification, the State Railroad & Public Utilities Commission issued an order directing the Railway to appear on a day set to show cause why an order should not he entered forbidding it to modify its passenger train service, unless and until the Commission on an application duly made so authorized.

The Railway appeared to challenge the jurisdiction of the Commission, filing an answer explaining its purpose and showing the limited nature of the modification and the necessity therefor, and particularly showing that the Railway purposed to continue to furnish adequate passenger service between the points involved. The Commission held that the Railway could make no reduction of any kind in such service without first obtaining the approval and authority of the Commission. Thereupon the Railway filed its petition for certiorari and super-sedeas in the Circuit Court of Davidson County, setting forth the facts. A demurrer being sustained to this petition the case was appealed to this Court.

It is proposed by the Railway to make two changes, cancelling a local train operating week days between Nashville and Tullahoma, and another between Nashville *588 and Dickson. The following statement of facts is made on the brief as to one of the changes, and the facts of the other change are substantially the same:

“The Railway for many years operated between Nashville and Tullahoma, a distance of 69.33 miles, and beyond, six passenger trains in each direction each day running on regular schedule. Among these trains was the so-called ‘ Tullahoma Accommodation, ’ being trains seven and eight, operating daily except Sunday between Nashville and Tullahoma. For a long time the Tullahoma Accommodation’s gross passenger revenues have failed to pay more than about one-half of the actual out-of-pocket cost of running this train, even eliminating from consideration anything for taxes, supervision, maintenance of roadway and structures, interest on bonds, etc. This has been due largely to the revolution in transportation brought about by good roads and automobiles. As there was no public need for or use in any substantial degree of this train the Railway proposed to discontinue it, but the Railway proposed to continue to operate between Nashville and Tullahoma and beyond every day the other five regular passenger trains in each direction. In other words, only two useless trains out of a fleet of twelve daily trains were to be discontinued.”

The extent of the jurisdiction of the commission is the sole question involved, and counsel appear to agree that this is to be determined by a construction of Chapter 61 of the Acts of 1927, which is as follows:

“AN ACT to empower and direct the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission of the State of Tennessee to authorize the discontinuance of intra-state railroad passenger service upon certain conditions,
*589 • “SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission of the State of Tennessee shall have the power, after notice and hearing, and it shall be its duty so to do, to authorize common carriers by railroad in Tennessee to entirely discontinue particular intrastate passenger service by steam railroad when the following conditions are shown to exist, viz.:
“ (a) Whenever any particular intra-state passenger service by railroad is regularly carried on at a loss and there is no reasonable probability that such condition shall be substantially changed; and,
“(b) Whenever any particular intra-state passenger service by railroad has for any reason become unnecessary in the public interest. '•
“Provided, that nothing in this Act shall in any way affect any railroad or part of a -railroad now involved in proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission for abandonment.”

For the Railway stress is laid upon the language in Section 1, “to entirely discontinue;” it being plausibly insisted that by the use of the word “entirely” the Legislature made its intention clear to restrict the operation of the act conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission to cases in which it was the purpose of a common carrier railroad to abandon altogether passenger service on some portion of its lines or between certain points.

On the other hand, counsel for the Commission select for emphasis the reiterated language occurring in the Act, “particular intra-state passenger service,” defining the word “particular” and insisting that its use indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature to confer upon the Commission the power to determine whether or not *590 a change or modification in any particular should be made in intra-state passenger service by railroads.

It does not appear to be contended that the Commission has powers beyond and other than those conferred by Statute; and while the Commission has been long established and has had conferred upon it by various acts jurisdiction over steam railroads, public utilities and common carriers by bus and truck, it appears to be conceded, as already indicated, that no jurisdiction over train service on steam railroads has in any manner been conferred other than by the Act of 1927, hereinabove set forth.

Not only do we find no previous statutory enactments restricting the right of a railroad to control and change its train service, but it will be observed that the Act of 1927, supra, does not in terms do so. The Act is permissive only, apparently assuming the existence of some legal limitation upon this power, and making provision for the meeting of such necessity as may arise.

With this in mind, and looking to the act as a whole, it appears to have been the intention by this act to confer upon the Commission power, not theretofore possessed, to relieve the railroads of public service obligations, which under changing conditions had become unduly burdensome; and that the act was passed for the benefit of the railroads of the State. While there appears to have been no statutory restriction upon the power of a railroad corporation to. regulate in its discretion its train service, it was doubtless recognized that railroad corporations — in common with other public service utilities holding franchises conferring condemnation and other privileges-1 — are under obligations to perform all their functions fairly and fully in the interest of the public, and that an arbitrary and unjustified failure in this regard would subject them to proceedings by man- *591 damns, or perhaps their charters and franchise rights to forfeiture. See 1 Elliott on Railroads, paragraphs 59, 60, as to such obligation, and the same authority, Yol. 2, paragraphs 735, 736, as to the right to compel performance by mandamus.

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Bluebook (online)
27 S.W.2d 1089, 160 Tenn. 586, 7 Smith & H. 586, 70 A.L.R. 837, 1929 Tenn. LEXIS 137, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nashville-chattanooga-st-louis-ry-v-hannah-tenn-1930.