Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Sutton

104 S.W.2d 834, 21 Tenn. App. 31, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 68
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJuly 25, 1936
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 104 S.W.2d 834 (Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Sutton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Sutton, 104 S.W.2d 834, 21 Tenn. App. 31, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinions

FAW, P. J.

Shortly before daylight on the morning of July 24, 1935, the dead body of Jim Sutton was found on the track of the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, between the stations of Anderson and Sherwood in Franklin county, Tenn. Before and at the time of his death, Jim Sutton was a resident of Franklin county, and his brother, Ulis Sutton, was appointed and qualified as administrator of his estate, and on August, 3, 1935, as such administrator, instituted an action against the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, in the Circuit Court of Franklin County, for $30,000 as damages, averring, in the second count of his declaration, that plaintiff’s intestate, while walking along the railroad of the defendant, which was customarily used by the deceased as a walkwav to his borne, was struck by one of defendant’s trains and was then and there horriblv mangled, wounded, and bruised on the head, back, limbs, and internally, from which wounds and bruises be suffered great physical pain and mental anguish and languished and died; that defendant did not, at the time and place aforesaid, have tbe engineer, fireman, or some other person upon tbe locomotive on the lookout ahead as required by law, and did not, when plaintiff’s intestate appeared upon the track or within strik-inff distance of said train, sound the alarm whistle, put down tbe brakes, and employ every possible means to stop the train and prevent the accident; that plaintiff’s intestate appeared upon the track of the- defendant and became an obstruction thereon at the time and place aforesaid; and that defendant’s failure to comply with tbe statute in such cases made and provided was the proximate cause of tbe accident and iniuries and death of plaintiff’s intestate.

It is seen, that plaintiff’s action is predicated upon an alleged failure of tbe defendant to complv with the “statutory precautions” prescribed by subsection 4 of section 2628 of the Code.

Tt is averred in the declaration and shown by tbe proof that the deceased, Jim Sutton, left surviving him a widow and nine children. for whose, use and benefit tbe suit wa,s brought. Plaintiff’s declaration contained two counts, but the first count, through whicn plaintiff sought to charge the defendant with common law negligence, was eliminated from consideration by appropriate action *34 of the trial court, and no question of the propriety of that action is made in this court.

Upon the issues made by defendant’s plea of not guilty, the case was tried to a jury, and the jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and assessed his damages at $2,000. A motion for a new trial on behalf of defendant was overruled by the trial judge, and thereupon the defendant reserved exceptions to the action of the court in overruling its motion for a new trial and appealed in error to this court.

Referring to the parties as plaintiff and defendant as they appeared on the record below:

At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant moved the court to peremptorily direct the jury to return a verdict for defendant, on the ground (as stated at the time by defendant’s attorney) “that there is in the entire record no competent, material and relevant proof upon which a verdict could be based; and particularly is there no proof to show that the decedent appeared as an obstruction upon the track prior to his death. ’ ’

The aforesaid motion was overruled, but it was renewed at the close of all the evidence, when it was again overruled.

Through its assignments of error in this court, the defendant asserts that there is no evidence to support the verdict, and that the circuit court erred in overruling its motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence.

It is contended for defendant that “the record contains no evidence to support an inference or finding of fact that the deceased appeared as an obstruction in front of and within striking distance of any of its trains; and that the verdict is the result of surmise, guess or speculation upon the part of the Jury, wholly unsupported bv evidence.”

It is further insisted for defendant, “as an alternative position,” that “anv possible probative value of the circumstances developed in the evidence, as making a urima facie case of liability, is entirely destroyed by affirmative testimony of the operators and inspectors of the trains involved, that no obstruction appeared on the track at or near the place where Sutton’s body was found.”

On the other hand, it is insisted for nlaintiff that, although (so far as the record shows) “no one saw defendant’s train kill plaintiff’s decedent.” the evidence discloses circumstances from which the jury could reasonably and properly find that plaintiff’s intestate a.pneared as an obstruction on defendant’s railroad track; that defendant failed to observe the statutory precautions when deceased thus atmeared as an obstruction on its track; and that nlaintiff’s intestate was then and there struck bv one of defendant’s locomotives and killed in the manner described in plaintiff’s declaration.

*35 It becomes our duty to ascertain whether there is material and substantial evidence of facts from which the jury could reasonably draw inferences supporting the finding of the issues in favor of the plaintiff. In making this inquiry it must be borne in mind that an inference cannot be drawn from another inference, and that the verdict cannot be sustained unless the facts in evidence afford a basis for no reasonable inference other than one consistent with the verdict.

The dead and mangled body of plaintiff’s intestate, Jim Sutton (who, for convenience, we will sometimes refer to as Sutton), was found on defendant’s track at 3:45 a. m. on July 24, 1935, at a point between the stations of Anderson and Sherwood and about 1,789 feet north of the defendant’s depot at Anderson. Sherwood is approximately six miles north of Anderson. Sutton was forty-eight years of age at the time of his death. He was much given to the habit of drinking intoxicating liquors. About 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of July 23, 1935, he appeared at Arms Spring, in the vicinity of the station at Anderson, with a fruit jar one-half full of “regular old mule whisky,” where he and Arms drank one-half of the whisky, and two or three other men who arrived later helped them consume the remainder. One of the men who drank with Sutton on that occasion testified at the trial that Sutton was “not drunk.”

After remaining at Arms Spring for a half hour or a little more on the occasion above mentioned, Sutton and the witness' Henry Bradford left there together and walked north on the railroad track from Anderson Depot, passing the place where Sutton’s body was later found, to a private road crossing over the railroad track, known as Pittmen’s Crossing, approximately • 1,950 feet north of Anderson Depot, where they walked west and southwest along Pittman’s private road for approximately 300 feet to a gate near Pittman’s house, which opened into a public road, described in the record as an “unimproved wagon road.”

Just inside the gate above mentioned, Sutton “laid down,” saying that “he wanted to rest a minute,” but he remained there only five or ten minutes, for the reason that Mrs.

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Bluebook (online)
104 S.W.2d 834, 21 Tenn. App. 31, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 68, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nashville-c-st-l-ry-v-sutton-tennctapp-1936.