Nashua Savings Bank v. City of Nashua

46 N.H. 389
Supreme Court of New Hampshire·Decided June 15, 1866·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinions

Pekley, C. J.

The land belonging to the Savings Bank and lying in Nashua was properly taxed to the bank in that town. The bank was in possession of the land with a legal title, and it was taxed in the town where it was situated. All real estate, with certain enumerated exceptions, is made liable to taxation, and the statute is express that it shall be taxed in the town or place where it is situated. Rev. Stat. ch. 39, sec. 2, and ch. 40, sec. 7.

There is an obvious reason for this general rule, which requires all real estate to be taxed where it is situated. Personal property is transitory and follows the owner; but land is stationary, and cannot be withdrawn from sharing in the public burdens of the place where it lies.

If it were taxed to the non-resident proprietors in the places where they reside, it might happen that taxable property enough would not be left where the land was situated to bear the charges of local expenditures.

Because the land belonging to the bank and situated in Nashua is taxable in that place to the bank, it by no means follows that stocks and other personal property of the bank are also taxable to the bank in Nashua where the bank is established and has its place of business. The land is taxable in Nashua, not because the bank is there, but because the land is there. If the land were not in Nashua, though it belonged to the bank, it could not be taxed in Nashua, but must be taxed in the town where it is situated. And so if it had happened that this bank had established its place of business in some other town, this land situated in Nashua, could not be taxed in the other town, where the bank was established. It thus appears that the place where the business of the bank is transacted has nothing whatever to do with the right of Nashua to tax this real estate; and I think it will be found on further inquiry that it has just as little to do with the right claimed by Nashua to tax the bank for stocks in another corporation.

This distiction between the liability of corporations to be taxed for their land and for their real estate, is established by numerous authorities. In the Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston, 9 Met. 199, it was held that the corporation were liable to be taxed for their real estate situated in that city, but not for their personal estate or income. In that case Shaw, G. J., says: "If it be said that the plaintiffs are not a manufacturing corporation, then there is no statute provision making any of their personal property liable to taxation, and the respective owners are taxable for the whole value of the personal property, and of course the corporation is not taxable. But the real estate stands upon a different footing, and must be taxed where it is situated whoever the owner is, and therefore is taxable to the corporation.” So, in the Commercial Bank v. Mumford, 4 R. I. 478, it was decided that by the law of Ehode Island banks of discount and deposit were taxable for [392]*392their real estate in the towns where it was situated, but not for their personal estate in the towns where the banks were established, and the same rule was applied to the case of a savings bank in the Providence Savings Institution v. Gardner, 4 R. I. 484.

Personal property, as a general rule, is taxable to the owner in the place where he resides, and land is always, so far as I am informed, in the place where it is situated. In the case of corporations, which deal in money and securities, like banks, the stockholders are the beneficial owners of all the corporate property, and are taxed for it in the places where they reside , and consequently the personal property of such corporations is not liable to another tax assessed on the corporation in the town where it is established and has its principal place of business. In some cases where personal property is employed in manufactures and in trade, and by the nature of the employment is paid in the place where the business is transacted, and in that respect assumes the character of real estate, the property is taxed in the place where it is so employed. In making personal property so used and employed taxable where it is situated, the law follows the same general policy, which requires land to pay taxes in the place where it is situated.

By our statute all real estate, with certain specified exemptions, is liable to be taxed. Rev. Stat. ch. 39, sec. 2. But it is important, in the present inquiry, to bear in mind that there is no law of this State which makes personal property generally liable to taxation. Our statute sets out and describes the different classes of personal property liable to be taxed, and no other personal property than the kinds thus specified and enumerated is liable to be taxed in this State. Rev. Stat. ch. 39. sec. 3. The chapter, which declares and defines what personal property is taxable, does not prescribe the rate or the mode of taxation; it only states what personal property shall be liable to taxation; and the evident intention is that no other personal property shall directly or indirectly be taxed or bear the burden of taxation. Other chapters prescribe where and to whom the property thus made liable to taxation shall be taxed, and in what manner the tax shall he assessed and realized. Smith v. Burley, 9 N. H. 423, 429. It is not, therefore, incumbent on the party, who resists a tax assessed on personal property, to show a special exemption; but the town, which claims the right|to tax, must show that the property taxed comes within some description of property made specially liable to taxation by statute.

I find no law of this State which authorizes the pérsonal property belonging to a savings bank, or to a bank of discount and deposit, to be taxed to the bank in the town where it is established and has its place of business.

It has been said that a corporation is a person within the meaning of the statute on the subject of taxation, and that the establishment of a corporation in a town is equivalent to the residence or inhabitancy of a person there; and that consequently a corporation may be taxed for its personal property in the place where it is established, under the statute which provides that "every person shall be taxed in the town in which he is an inhabitant or resident on the first day of April, for his poll and [393]*393estate, except in cases otherwise provided for by law.” Rev. Stat. ch. 40, sec. 1. It is evident that if this construction of the statute can be applied to savings banks, it may be to every other bank and to corporations generally ; and that if it can be applied to stock owned by a corporation, it is equally applicable to all other, kinds of taxable personal property. Stocks in corporations, with the exception of railroad and manufacturing corporations, are taxed to the owners of the stock in the towns or places where they reside, if they reside in this State; and where they reside out of the State the stock is taxed to the corporation; but the corporation has a lien on the stock for the taxes thus paid on account of the non-resident stockholders, so that ultimately in all cases the stockholders pay a tax on all the property of the corporation. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, secs. 4 and 15. The consequence of treating corporations as persons residing in the town where they are established and taxing them there for the personal property which they own on the first day of April, would be to levy a double tax on all such property; a result which never could have been contemplated by the statute.

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Nashua Savings Bank v. City of Nashua, 46 N.H. 389 (N.H. 1866).

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