Nash v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Nash v. State

675 So. 2d 955, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 3719, 1996 WL 169025

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 12, 1996

DocketNo. 95-595

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 675 So. 2d 955 (Nash v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Nash v. State, 675 So. 2d 955, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 3719, 1996 WL 169025 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996).

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Opinion

WOLF, Judge.

Glen Nash appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief made pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). In his motion, appellant alleged one error: That his sentence for 21 years for third-degree murder under section 782.04(4), Florida Statutes, was illegal as beyond the statutory maximum of 15 years. In the order denying appellant’s motion, the trial court pointed out that “defendant pled guilty to murder in the second degree under section 782.04, Fla.Stat.,” and further stated that “defendant has not stated a legal basis for relief in light of the plea agreement he signed....” The appellant’s judgment and sentence forms and signed plea agreement were attached to the order.

Although it seems apparent from the record that the appellant agreed to 21 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder (a first-degree felony punishable by life) under section 782.04(3), the judgment form refers to section 782.04(4), which is the statute addressing third-degree murder (a second-degree felony). A 21-year sentence for third-degree murder would be illegal as beyond the statutory maximum. The judgment, sentence and plea forms, however, all refer to second-degree murder and the degree of crime references life imprisonment. It, therefore, appears from the record that the appellant was actually sentenced to 21 years for a first-degree felony punishable by life pursuant to a valid plea agreement. Where a sentence is imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement, no error has occurred. See Sellers v. State, 578 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA), aff'd, 586 So.2d 340 (Fla.1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed, but remand for the trial court to change the incorrect references to section 782.04(4) in the judgment and sentence forms.

BOOTH and BENTON, JJ., concur.

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WOLF, Judge.

Glen Nash appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief made pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). In his motion, appellant alleged one error: That his sentence for 21 years for third-degree murder under section 782.04(4), Florida Statutes, was illegal as beyond the statutory maximum of 15 years. In the order denying appellant’s motion, the trial court pointed out that “defendant pled guilty to murder in the second degree under section 782.04, Fla.Stat.,” and further stated that “defendant has not stated a legal basis for relief in light of the plea agreement he signed....” The appellant’s judgment and sentence forms and signed plea agreement were attached to the order.

Although it seems apparent from the record that the appellant agreed to 21 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder (a first-degree felony punishable by life) under section 782.04(3), the judgment form refers to section 782.04(4), which is the statute addressing third-degree murder (a second-degree felony). A 21-year sentence for third-degree murder would be illegal as beyond the statutory maximum. The judgment, sentence and plea forms, however, all refer to second-degree murder and the degree of crime references life imprisonment. It, therefore, appears from the record that the appellant was actually sentenced to 21 years for a first-degree felony punishable by life pursuant to a valid plea agreement. Where a sentence is imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement, no error has occurred. See Sellers v. State, 578 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA), aff'd, 586 So.2d 340 (Fla.1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed, but remand for the trial court to change the incorrect references to section 782.04(4) in the judgment and sentence forms.

BOOTH and BENTON, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

675 So. 2d 955, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 3719, 1996 WL 169025, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nash-v-state-fladistctapp-1996.

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