Nash v. Solvay Process Co.

189 So. 493, 1939 La. App. LEXIS 287
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 8, 1939
DocketNo. 5748.
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 189 So. 493 (Nash v. Solvay Process Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nash v. Solvay Process Co., 189 So. 493, 1939 La. App. LEXIS 287 (La. Ct. App. 1939).

Opinion

DREW, Judge.

The defendant is a corporation engaged in the business of mining and crushing rock near Winnfield, Louisiana, and after same is mined and crushed, they are loaded onto railroad cars and shipped to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for chemical purposes. In connection with the mining and shipping, the defendant has a short line railroad over which cars are transferred to the mine and loaded and then transferred back to the L & A Railroad, where they are then sent out into commerce.

The plaintiff had been in the employ of the defendant company for two or three years as brakeman, and on the 27th of July, 1937, while he was engaged in the discharge of services that arose out of and were incidental to his employment and in the course of his employer’s business, he received an injury. The plaintiff contends that while he was assisting in moving one vibrator from one bin to another for load *495 ing purposes, he was caught between the lever that opened the bin and the traveling vibrator which was being shoved by a locomotive engine; that he was caught and mashed, receiving an injury to -his chest and in the smalb of the back and was finally somersaulted out over the cars for some distance. He alleges he was permanently and totally disabled by said accident. The injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff are as follows: his tenth rib was broken. He was knocked unconscious and remained so until about eight o’clock P. M., the accident having occurred between eight and nine A. M. That he received internal bruises and abrasions and suffers internally in the region of his intestines. That his gall bladder was injured and as a result fails to function. His liver was injured and bruised and fails to function properly; and that he suffered an injury to his spleen, nerves, ligaments of his chest, intestines and back. That he suffered an injury and strain to the sacro-iliac joint, which gave him considerable pain, and injured his hip joints. It caused a paralysis of his nerves and his digestion has been greatly impaired. That his vision in his right eye is practically gone and the hearing in his right ear impaired. That he suffered permanent injury to the spine and vertebrae; and that all of these injuries were caused by the accident.

It is alleged and admitted that plaintiff was working for thirty-seven cents an hour, working 40 hours a week, making a total of $14.80 per week, and, if the plaintiff is entitled to recover, he is due $9.62 a week during the time of his disability.

There is no dispute but that plaintiff received an injury from an accident which occurred on July 27, 1937, while he was performing his duties in connection with the hazardous business operated by the defendant. The defendant recognizes the injury received from this accident, and permitted plaintiff to cease from his labors for four weeks, at which time he was pronounced well by the doctors employed by defendant. Plaintiff refused to resume his labors for the reason, from his viewpoint, that he was unable physically to perform the duties required of him, and the real issue in this case is to what extent the plaintiff was injured by the accident.

The lower court in a written opinion awarded plaintiff compensation for total disability for twenty-four weeks, less eight weeks, for which compensation had been paid. Plaintiff perfected a devolutive appeal and defendant a devolutive and sus-pensive appeal.

Motion to Strike.

At the conclusion of the trial in the lower court, the district judge proposed that he be permitted to take the plaintiff to New Orleans at defendant’s expense and there have him examined by a roentgen-ologist of the court’s own choosing. Counsel for plaintiff objected to the proposal for the reason claimed that plaintiff’s case had been made out by overwhelming proof; that the proposal was contrary to recognized procedure and would operate against the interests of both plaintiff and defendant. Notwithstanding this objection, the lower judge took the x-ray pictures offered in evidence to a roentgenologist in New Orleans for interpretation. Defendant paid the expenses of the trip. The written opinion of the lower judge shows conclusively that his opinion was based to a great extent, if not entirely, on the information given the court by the roentgen-ologist in New Orleans, outside of the presence of either plaintiff, counsel for plaintiff or defendant. We make this statement, due to the following excerpt taken from the written opinion:

“After hearing all of the testimony of the experts .and other testimony, all of which was very conflicting and confusing, and the judge not being a roentgenologist and unable to interpret the pictures, he informed the plaintiff and the defendant that he would seek some recognized roentgen-ologist, present him with the x-rays filed in evidence and ask for an interpretation of same, explaining to him that he was neither representing the plaintiff nor the defendant, but was acting as a friend of the court, to interpret these pictures which the court was unable to, and was unable to reach a conclusion from the testimony of the experts on this point. This was agreed to by plaintiff and defendant, and the trial judge took all of the x-rays filed in evidence, went to New Orleans and visited Dr. A. Granger, who is recognized as being high-class and an outstanding roentgenologist. He presented the x-rays to Dr. Granger with the explanation that the other doctors had differed so in their explanation of them that he wanted Dr. Granger’s interpretation as to whether they disclosed any injury to plaintiff’s bones or *496 bony structure; and that he approached the doctor as a friend of the court and not representing either side.
“Dr. Granger spent forty minutes interpreting and explaining the pictures, placed them in a shadow box and went into detail in his explanation. After a thorough investigation and examination, he stated that the x-rays disclosed no pathology in the bony structures of plaintiff. The court inquired specifically as to the sacro-iliac joint.and Dr. Granger stated that the right apparently had an opening, but that one had to interpret an x-ray picture with reference to the bony structure in connection with this and after doing that, he said there was absolutely no separating of the sacro-iliac; that there might appear to be a narrowness between' the fourth and fifth vertebrae in the foramen and this was due to the angle at which the light struck these vertebrae; that as a matter of fact, they' were normal and there was no narrowing.
“Dr. Granger took up each detail and to our satisfaction explained that there was no defect or injury to the bony structures complained of; that the vertebrae were not turned or twisted and, if it appeared so, it was due to the manner in which the x-ray was taken. He gave the court a short statement showing he was unable to find that the x-rays disclosed any pathology in the bony structure of plaintiff.
“Dr. Hamilton testified that the foramen between the fourth and fifth vertebrae could be diminished or closed by pressure from the back. The court visited a human skeleton and examined it.

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Bluebook (online)
189 So. 493, 1939 La. App. LEXIS 287, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nash-v-solvay-process-co-lactapp-1939.