Nartia v. Soriano, Jr.

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: January 8, 2013
• Docket: CV0388-09
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2

3 ISAIAH PETER MONIZ NARTIA ) Civil Case no. CV0388-09 4 (D.O.B. 1/9/07), ) ) 5 By: LOLOANIE CHARF AUROS MONIZ, ) Guardian Ad Litem for Plaintiff, ) 6 DECISION AND ORDER Plaintiff, ) re: Motion for Partial 7 ) Summary Judgment vs. ) 8 ) NICK SORIANO, JR., NISSAN MOTOR ) 9 CORPORATION IN GUAM, NISSAN ) 10 RENT-A-CAR (GUAM), INC., JOHN DOE ) INSURER and DOES 1-10, ) 11 ) Defendants. ) 12 ____________________________) 13

14 INTRODUCTION 15 This matter came before the Honorable Judge Michael J. Bordallo on both Plaintiff and 16 Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on August 7, 2012. The Plaintiff was 17 represented by Attorney Anthony C. Perez. Defendant Nick Soriano, Jr., Nissan Motor 18 Corporation in Guam, and Nissan Rent-A-Car (Guam), Inc. were represented by Attorney 19

20 Louie J. Yanza. Defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa was

21 represented by Attorney Randall Todd Thompson. After considering the matters presented, the 22 Court issues the following decision and order denying Plaintiff's motion for partial summary 23 judgment on the issue of liability and granting Defendant's motion for partial summary 24 judgment. 25

26 BACKGROUND

27 The instant matter arises out of a complaint filed by the Plaintiff on March 6, 2009. The

28 complaint alleges that Defendant Soriano negligently caused the death of Peter P. Nartia,

Page 1 of 11 deceased ("Decedent"), in a motor vehicle collision on or about March 26, 2007. The Amended 2 Complaint contains seven (7) claims for relief. Claims one (1) to three (3) alleges negligence 3 and liability in various forms. The fifth (5th) claim is a direct action against the insurers. The 4 sixth (6th) and seventh (7th) claim are for imputed negligence and vicarious liability onto the 5

6 registered owner of the vehicle and defendant's employer. The fourth (4th) claim alleges

7 liability for reckless and/or willful and wanton conduct. Before the court now is both parties 8 motion for partial summary judgment. 9 On June 12, 2002, Defendant National Union Insurance Company filed a motion for 10 partial summary judgment foreclosing all liability for punitive damages and attorneys fees. 11

12 Subsequently, on June 24, 2012, Defendant Nissan Motor Corporation in Guam, Nissan Rent-

13 A-Car, and Soriano also filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the same issues. On 14 June 24, 2009 and March 17, 2010, Defendant Nissan Rent-A-Car amend their motion for 15 partial summary judgment and assert they are not liable under the imputed negligence statute 16 because they had delivered possession to Nissan Motor Corporation 17

On April 27, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues 18

19 of liability based on negligence, res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se, direct action against

20 insurer, direct action against owner-imputed liability, and respondeat superior. On June 10, 21 2010, Defendant National Union filed an opposition contending Guam as a contributory 22 negligence jurisdiction precludes summary judgment on the negligence issues. On the same 23 day, Defendant Soriano, Nissan Motors Corporation in Guam, and Nissan Rent-A-Car (Guam) 24

25 filed an opposition arguing Soriano's guilty plea (CF0237-07) does not prevent Defendants

26 from raising defenses of comparative negligence and assumption of risk in this civil case. 27 On June 10, 2010, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's Soriano, Nissan Motor 28 Corporation, and Nissan Rent-A-Car motion for partial summary judgment. On the same day,

Page 2 ofll Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant National Union's motion arguing punitive damages 2 are awardable for wrongful death. On June 17, 2010, Defendant Soriano, Motor Corporation, 3 Rent-A-Car filed their reply asserting Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof under Rule 4 56. 5

6 On June 18, 2010, Defendant National Union filed their reply brief in support of their

7 motion for partial summary judgment. On the same day, Plaintiffs filed their reply to Defendant 8 National Union, Soriano, Nissan Motor Corporation, and Nissan Rent-A-Car's opposition to 9 Plaintiffs motion. On June 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed their opposition to Defendant Soriano, Motor 10 Corporation, and Nissan Rent-A-Car's motion. Lastly, Defendant Soriano, Nissan Motors II

12 Corporation, and Nissan Rent-A-Car filed their reply to Plaintiffs opposition. Before the Court

13 are three (3) motions for partial summary judgment. The Court now issues its decision and 14 order based on the following analysis. 15 DISCUSSION 16 Summary judgment or partial summary judgment IS appropriate if the pleadings, 17 depositions, interrogatories and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any show the 18

19 there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

20 judgment as a matter of law. Guam R. Civ. P. 56(c). Izuka Corp. V Kawasho International

21 (Guam), Inc., 1997 Guam 10 ~7. 22 [A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of 23 informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 24 on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the 25 absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

26 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 27 In rendering its decision on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw 28 inferences and view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bank of

Page 3 ofll Guam v. Flores, 2004 Guam 25 ~7. If however, the movant can demonstrate that there are no 2 genuine issues of material fact, the non-movant cannot merely rely on allegations contained in 3 the pleading, but must produce at least some significant probative evidence to support the 4 pleading. Edwards v. Pacific Financial Corporation, 2000 Guam 27 ~7. Consequently, the 5

6 court's "ultimate inquiry is to determine whether the 'specific facts' set by the nonmoving

7 party, coupled with undisputed background or contextual facts, are such that a rational or 8 reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor based on that evidence." Edwards, 2000 9 Guam 27 ~7; Iizuda, 1997 Guam 10 ~8; Guam Top Builders. Inc. V. Tanota Partners, 2006 IO Guam 3 ~8. A material fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and II

I2 whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary

13 facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Edwards, at ~7; Guam Top, at ~9.

14 The plain language of Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after 15 adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's I6 case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete I7 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case I8 necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

I9 Celotex Corp. at 322-323 (1986)(internal citations omitted). 20 Negligence 21 Plaintiffs submits that Soriano's guilty plea to negligent homicide, causing the wrongful 22 death of decedent, indicates there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the first (negligence 23

24 causing wrongful death), third (negligence per se ), and fourth (reckless and/or willful and

25 wanton conduct causing wrongful death) claims of action. Plaintiff argues Defendant Soriano's 26 admission of guilt entitles them to partial summary judgment because Soriano has admitted to 27 his negligence being the cause of Decedent's death. 28 Defendants oppose Plaintiffs argument and reasons because Guam IS under the

Page 4 ofll modified comparative negligence jurisdiction, apportionment of liability is to be determined by 2 a trier of fact, the jury. Thus, although Soriano admission of guilt means he was negligent, 3 genuine issues of material fact still exists on the extent of his negligence. Defendants submit 4 Decedent was contributory negligent in the collision by negligently operating his own motor 5

6 vehicle. Witness statements allege Moniz was distracted before the accident "fixing something

7 on the right side of his body and then quickly accelerating" (See Declaration of Randall Todd 8 Thompson). Moniz was also alleged to have been changing lanes right before the accident and 9 his view may have been obstructed by another vehicle (See Declaration of Joshua Duenas, at 10 ~3, Exhibit A). Furthermore, Defendants presented skid mark analysis which indicate Decedent II

12 was traveling at a minimum of 44 to 50 m.p.h., which exceeds the speed limit of 35 m.p.h. The

13 Court finds significant probative evidence which could give rise to the inference that Decedent 14 was contributory negligent. 15 The Guam Superior Court set out the standard for summary judgment in Salas v. Hanil 1 16 (CV-0454-91). The burden of proof for the non-moving party is only to point out to evidence in 17

18 the record which gives rise to the inference Decedent was negligent. Salas v. Hanil (Decision &

19 Order for Summary Judgment) (May 15, 1992). At this stage of the proceeding, the non- 20 moving party need only show what facts could be used for the jury to reasonably infer that 21 Decedent was negligent in operating the motor vehicle. !d. Based on the evidence alleged by 22 the Defendants, in a light most favorable to the non-movant party, it is reasonable that a jury 23

24 may infer that Decedent was contributory negligent. Moreover, it is evident that defendant's

25 liability is controverted and genuine issues of material fact exist at the present time.

26 Accordingly, this Court denies Plaintiffs request for partial summary judgment on the issue of 27

28 1 The facts in Salas v. Hanil Development Corp are as follows. Defendant was operating a truck for work when he accidently collided itto the victim on a bicycle. The jury found vi::tim was negligent and the proximate cause of the accident by driving on the wrong side of the road and making an improper right turn. Page 5 ofll liability. 2 Imputed Negligence 3 Next, the Court will address the issue of imputed negligence on the owners of the 4 vehicle. An owner is defined as a "person having all the incidents of 0\vnership including the 5

6 legal title of a vehicle whether or not such person lends rents or pledges such vehicle." 16 GCA

7 § 1102 (w). Soriano's employer at the time of the collision was Nissan Motors Corporation

8 (Guam) See Complaint ~16. 16 GCA §17101(a) provides the responsibility of owners for 9 negligent operation by person using motor vehicle with permission: IO "Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or II injury to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such I2 motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with permission, express or implied, of such owner, and the I3 negligence of such person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil damages." I4

I5 Although the registered owner of the vehicle was Nissan Rent-A-Car, Defendants allege

I6 at the time of the collision Nissan Rent-A-Car had sold the vehicle and given possession to

I7 Nissan Motors Corporation (Guam) to be resold (See Declaration of Philippe Gerling) I8 Defendant Nissan Rent-A-Car submitted a receiving report with the Declaration of Philippe I9 Gerling as evidence of sale and Nissan Motors Corporation took possession and had exclusive 20

2I control over the vehicle. See Ex. A. Although the transfer of ownership had not been filed with

22 the DMV, Plaintiffs do not contest Defendants' assertion of ownership lying in Nissan Motors

23 Corporation. Nissan Motors Corporation had all the incidentals of ownership, such as exclusive 24 control and possession of the vehicle at the time of the collision. 25 The Ninth Circuit, in Look v. Mobley, addressed the issue of liability and o\\nership 26 under Guam's Imputed Negligence Statute. The purpose ofthis statute is not to give an injured 27

28 party a crack at every person through whose hands the automobile has passed, Look v. Mobley

Page 6 of 11 323 F .2d 214 (1963). The Guam legislature has indicated otherwise by exempting conditional 2 vendors and chattel mortgagees out of possession. /d. at 219. The primary purpose is to allow 3 an injured party recourse against an owner who is in a position to control the use of his 4 property, and to insure against the harm it causes. /d. Adhering to the rational of the Guam 5

6 Legislature, the Court finds Nissan Motors Corporation to be the owner of the vehicle at the

7 time the collision occurred which resulted in the death of Decedent. Accordingly, the Court 8 finds Nissan Rent-A-Car is not subject to imputed negligence under 16 G.C.A. 17101 (a). 9 Alternatively, under 16 G.C.A. 17101(f), Nissan Motors Corporation would be deemed 10 to be the owner as the vendee. 16 GCA § 17101 (f) states: II

12 "If a motor vehicle is sold under a contract of conditional sale whereby the title to such motor vehicle remains in the vendor, such vendor or his assignee shall not be 13 deemed an owner within the provisions of this Section, but the vendee, or his assignee shall be deemed the owner, until the vendor or his assignee retake 14 possession of such motor vehicle. A chattel mortgage of a motor vehicle out of 15 possession shall not be deemed an owner within the provisions of this section"

16 Since Plaintiff does not contest Nissan Motors Corporation's assertion, the Court finds 17 Nissan Rent-A-Car was no longer deemed an o\\ner for purposes of this statute and is not liable 18 under 16 GCA 17101 for the damages from the motor vehicle collision. Accordingly, the Court 19 finds Nissan Motors Corporation was the 'owner' of the motor vehicle at the time of the 20

21 collision.

22 Vicarious Liability, Respondent Superior, and Res Ipsa Loiquitur 23 The Court will now address whether or not Defendants areliable for the negligence of 24 Soriano under the theories of vicarious liability and respondent superior. The basis for vicarious 25 liability lies in a relationship between the actor and non-actor held accountable for the actor's 26 negligence. One can be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of another if a relationship 27

28 exists between them. Under respondent superior, an employer is responsible for the actions of

Page 7 ofll employees performed within the course of their employment. The evidence shows that Soriano 2 was not an employee, friend, nor agent of Nissan Rent-A-Car, therefore Nissan Rent-A-Car 3 cannot be held vicariously liable. On the other hand, it is undisputed at the time of the collision 4 Nissan Motors Corporation was the employer of Soriano. Soriano was an authorized permissive 5

6 user. Therefore, the Court finds Nissan Motors Corporation, is vicariously liable for negligent

7 acts performed by Soriano during the course ofhis employment. 8 As for res ipsa loquitur, the Court finds the claim does not apply to the facts of the 9 instant case. Assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, it is reasonable to infer IO Decedent could have negligently operated his motor vehicle. However, under res ipsa loquitur, II

12 there must be a harm suffered by the Plaintiff who did nothing wrong. Since Decedent is

l3 alleged to be contributory negligent, the Court cannot find Nissan Motors Corporation or

14 Soriano to be liable under the theory of res ipsa loquitur. 15 Based on the evidence, the Court finds Nissan Motors Corporation to be vicariously 16 liable under the theory of respondent superior, but not res ipsa loquitur. Accordingly, the Court I7 grants Plaintiff's request for partial summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability on I8

19 Nissan Motors Corporation and dismisses the claim of res ipsa loquitur.

20 Direct Action against Insurer 2I Pursuant to Title 22 G.C.A. § 18305, Plaintiff has a right of direct action against the 22 insurer of any policy of liability insurance. National Union is the insurer covering the wrongful 23 acts of Defendant. Consequently, Plaintiff submits National Union is liable to Plaintiff for all 24

25 damages sustained. Defendant National Union does not dispute this assertion. As such, the

26 Court grants Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment allowing a claim of direct action 27 against National Union. 28 Punitive and/or exemplary damages

Page 8 ofll As mentioned above, the complaint alleges that Defendants negligently caused the 2 wrongful death of Decedent in a motor vehicle collision. Plaintiffs request for punitive and/or 3 exemplary damages in their complaint. Under Guam law, pursuant to 20 G.C.A. §2120 which 4 states: 5

6 When exemplary damages allowed. In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, 7 fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing 8 the defendant. 9 Defendants argue Plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive damages or attorneys' fees 10 against Defendants because Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the requisite elements which II

12 might entitle him to such award (See MPA in support ofNational Union's Motion for Partial

13 Summary Judgment). Defendant seek partial summary judgment to be granted as to the issue of 14 punitive damages and attorneys' fees. See Patton v. Atena Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 533, 536 15 (N.D. Miss 1984) (granting partial summary judgment foreclosing liability for punitive 16 damages, dismissing argument that "partial summary judgment regarding punitive damages in 17

18 an insurance case is inappropriate when the ultimate issue of liability under the insurance

19 contract must be determined at trial"); see also P.N v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 474 F. 3d 20 1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of summary judgment motion for attorneys' fees). 21 On the other hand, Plaintiff argues punitive damage have not been specifically excluded 22 by the statute. On June 17, 2010, in their reply, Plaintiff requests for a Rule 56 extension for 23

24 discovery for further information and investigation on the matter. Defendants oppose the

25 extension and argue Plaintiff's request for extension to be untimely and they have failed to

26 meet their burden of proof as the instant case has been pending since 2009. The Court denies 27 Plaintiffs request for an extension as they have had ample time to investigation their claims. 28 Guam's punitive damages statute is derived from Section 3294 of the California Civil

Page 9 ofll Code. The Court looks to California case law as persuasive authority. California Courts have 2 long held that ordinary negligence is not a basis for punitive damages. Punitive damages 3 usually are intended to either punish a wrongdoer whose culpability has exceeded that of 4 simple negligence or to discourage such behavior in the future. "Since ordinary or simple 5

6 negligence necessarily implies an absence of intent or purpose, it cannot form the basis of an

7 award of exemplary damages. Even an act of gross carelessness will not, of necessity, warrant 8 the imposition of exemplary damages" (14 California Jurisprudence 2d, p. 812, §812) See also 9 Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal.App.2d 517,526-27 (1958). The Guam Superior court has followed 10 California precedent and rational by holding in Sablan v. Samurai (CV -1393-07) (Order II

12 Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment September 11, 2009) that ordinary negligence

13 is not a basis for punitive damages. See also Bangayan v. Aeta Ins. Co., CV 1202-87 (February

14 16, 1988) (granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs claims 15 2 for exemplary damages ). 16 Assuming arguendo, punitive damages are appropriate Defendants argue such damages 17 are not awardable absent a showing of malice. Generally, punitive and exemplary damages are 18

19 not recoverable in auto accident cases. Under Guam law, punitive damages are only awardable

20 when there has been oppression, fraud, or malice. At most, the factual allegations asserted in 21 the opposition was a failure to observe traffic laws, nothing to exceed ordinary negligence. It is 22 undisputed that Defendant did not know Decedent and thereby had no motive for malice. Based 23 on the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff did not allege any facts or submit evidence which 24

25 would give rise to the inference of oppression, fraud, or malice. Moreover, Plaintiff also failed

26 to provide supporting facts or inferences that Defendant's conduct was reckless and/or willful 27

28 2 In Bangayan v. Aetna Ins. Co., Plaintiff brought a wrongful dealh claim for the death of his spouse and two minor children who died as a result

of negligent car repair. The Guam Superior Court held punitive damages are not recoverable in a wrongful death action "even where the complained of conduct is so egregious and/or grossly negligent, that additional damages would have a deterrent effect" !d. at 7 Page 10 of 11 and wanton. Thus, the Court hereby grants Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. 2 Attorneys Fees and Costs of Suit 3 As for the issue of attornevs fees, Guam law follows the American Rule which 4 generally does not grant attorneys fees in absence of contractual or statutory provision Fleming 5

6 v. Quigley, 2003 Guam 4, ,7. In the instant case, there is no contractual or statutory obligation

7 to award attorneys fees. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's request for attorneys fees and 8 finds grants Defendants motion for partial summary judgment. 9 CONCLUSION IO Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion for partial summary II

I2 judgment on the issue of liability and vicarious liability. As for Defendant's motion for partial

I3 summary judgment, the Court GRANTS the motion and dismisses the claims for punitive

I4 damages and attorneys fees. I5

I6 SO ORDERED, this __ day I7

I8

I9

2I Judge, S peri or Court of Guam 22

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