Narragansett v. Guilbert

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: March 26, 1993
• Docket: 92-1622
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

March 24, 1993

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________
        No. 92-1622

                             NARRAGANSETT TRIBE, ET AL.,
                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                                  PAUL E. GUILBERT,
                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Breyer, Chief Judge,
                                         ___________
                            Brown,* Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Mark B. Morse for appellants.
            _____________
            Bruce N. Goodsell for appellee.
            _________________
                                 ____________________

____________________

        _____________________

        *Of  the  Fifth Circuit,  sitting by  designation.   Judge  Brown (now
        deceased)  heard oral argument in this matter, and participated in the
        semble, but did not participate in the drafting or the issuance of the
        panel's  opinion.   The remaining  two panelists therefore  issue this
        opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.   46(d).

1

BREYER, Chief  Judge.   The sole question  on this
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             appeal  is  whether  the   Narragansett  Indian  Tribe   has

             sovereign  immunity  from claims  against  it  for abuse  of

             process  and slander of title.   We have  recently held that

             the  Tribe  does possess  sovereign  immunity.   Maynard  v.
                                                              _______

             Narragansett Indian Tribe, No. 92-2106, slip. op. at  4 (1st
             _________________________

             Cir. January 27, 1993).   And, that decision requires  us to

             reverse a default judgment entered against the Tribe.

                                          I

                                      Background
                                      __________

                       On December 6, 1990, the Narragansett Indian Tribe

             brought a lawsuit in Rhode Island federal court against Paul

             Guilbert, an adjacent landowner.  The Tribe alleged that  it

             held title to  Guilbert's property, and it  sought to enjoin

             Guilbert's planned  sale of that  property.  The  Tribe also

             filed  a  lis pendens  (or  notice  of  pendency)  with  the

             Charlestown, Rhode  Island,  Land Evidence  Records  Office.

             That  filing effectively  clouded  Guilbert's  title to  the

             property and frustrated  his efforts to  sell it.   Guilbert

             filed an answer to the federal court complaint.  That answer

             included counterclaims  for abuse of process  and slander of

             title.  

The  district court issued a temporary restraining

             order,  prohibiting  the  sale,  but, after  a  hearing,  it

             vacated  the  TRO  and  denied  the  Tribe's  motion  for  a

             preliminary injunction.   Thereafter, counsel for  the Tribe

             moved  to withdraw  from  the case  because  the Tribe  "has

             insisted  upon a  course  of action  that counsel  considers

             imprudent."    The  district  court granted  the  motion  to

             withdraw.    It  gave the  Tribe  one  month  to secure  new

             counsel.   Five  months  later, the  Tribe  had not  secured

             counsel.  Guilbert  then  asked  the court  to  dismiss  the

             Tribe's  claims,  to vacate  the  lis  pendens  in the  land

             office, and to enter a default judgment against the Tribe on

             Guilbert's   counterclaims.    The  district  court  granted

             Guilbert's motions and, after a hearing on damages (at which

             the  Tribe was  represented  by new  counsel), it  entered a

             default judgment against the  Tribe for about $50,000 (which

             represented  lost profit  on  a frustrated  land sale,  some

             financing costs  related to that failed sale, and legal fees

             incurred in defending against the Tribe's  suit).  The Tribe

             appeals  the default judgment.  It claims that its sovereign

             immunity renders the default judgment void.

                                          II

                                 The Default Judgment
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Our  recent  decision in  Maynard  v. Narragansett
                                                 _______     ____________

             Indian  Tribe,  No. 92-2106  (1st  Cir.  January 27,  1993),
             _____________

             determines the outcome of  this appeal.  We there  held that

             the  Narragansett Indian Tribe possesses sovereign immunity,

             despite  Congress's  enactment of  the  Rhode  Island Indian

             Claims  Settlement Act.  Id. at 3 (explaining that the Rhode
                                      __

             Island Indian  Claims Settlement Act  subjected the  Tribe's

             lands,  but not the Tribe itself, "to the civil and criminal
             _____

             laws and  jurisdiction of  the State  of  Rhode Island,"  25

             U.S.C.    1708).  Controlling case law also makes clear that

             the  Tribe, by  filing its  suit  against Guilbert,  did not

             waive  its  immunity   in  respect  to  the   counterclaims.

             Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
             ___________________    ____________________________________

             111 S.Ct.  905, 909 (1991);  United States v.  United States
                                          _____________     _____________

             Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 510-12  (1940) (allowing
             ____________________

             counterclaims only to offset  amounts owed under a principal

             claim, but not  to result  in a money  judgment against  the

             immune entity); cf. Wichita  and Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel,
                             ___ ______________________________    _____

             788 F.2d 765, 773-74 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (no waiver of immunity

             from cross-claims either).  Consequently, the district court

             lacked  jurisdiction  over  Guilbert's  counterclaims,  see,
                                                                     ___

             e.g., J.C.  Driskill, Inc. v. Abdnor, 901 F.2d 383, 385 n. 4
             ____  ____________________    ______

             (4th Cir. 1990), and its default  judgment is void.  Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 60(b)(4); 11  Charles A. Wright & Arthur  R. Miller,

             Federal Practice and Procedure   2862 at 198-200 (1973).
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                       We   add  that   we   have   not  considered   the

             relationship  of sovereign  immunity to  Rule 11  sanctions,

             which  the district  court  mentioned but  did not  address.

             Whether  the bringing  of  a suit  in  federal court  waives

             immunity   from   such  sanctions   raises   very  different

             considerations not now before us.   See, e.g., Mattingly  v.
                                                 ___  ____  _________

             United States, 939 F.2d 816, 818-19 (9th Cir. 1991) (Federal
             _____________

             Rules  of Civil  Procedure  waive  the Federal  Government's

             sovereign  immunity  from  Rule 11  sanctions);  Adamson  v.
                                                              _______

             Bowen, 855 F.2d  668, 670-71 (10th Cir.  1988) (Equal Access
             _____

             to  Justice  Act,  28   U.S.C.     2412(b),  waives  Federal

             Government's sovereign  immunity  from Rule  11  sanctions);

             United States v. Gavilan  Joint Community College Dist., 849
             _____________    ______________________________________

             F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 1988). 

                       The judgment of the district court is

                       Reversed.
                       _________

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