Narowski v. Kichar

435 A.2d 32, 181 Conn. 251, 1980 Conn. LEXIS 882
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJune 17, 1980
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 435 A.2d 32 (Narowski v. Kichar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Narowski v. Kichar, 435 A.2d 32, 181 Conn. 251, 1980 Conn. LEXIS 882 (Colo. 1980).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The plaintiff brought this action for partition1 alleging that she has an undivided one-half interest and each of the defendants a one-eighth interest in the subject property. The defendants, by way of special defense, alleged that the plaintiff’s title to the property was void in that the deed was not validly executed and was procured through misrepresentation and undue influence. The defendants also filed a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff’s title was procured by fraud and asking that the court impose a constructive trust upon the property. The plaintiff moved to strike the special defenses and counterclaim.2 The trial court granted the motion to strike.

[253]*253At trial the plaintiff placed in evidence a quitclaim deed from one Maty Kichar to Paul Kichar, one of the defendants, and Anna Narowski, the plaintiff.3 Francis Baut, an attorney, testified that he had prepared the quitclaim deed and had witnessed its execution, that the deed was signed in his presence and that he had taken the acknowledgment. The defendants attempted to cross-examine the witness as to the preparation and execution of the deed and as to the mental state of the grantor at the time of its execution. The plaintiff objected on the ground that any inquiry as to the validity of the deed had been foreclosed when the court had ordered the special defenses and the counterclaim stricken. The court sustained the plaintiff’s objection.

The defendants then made an offer of proof in order to show that the plaintiff did not have valid title. Again, the plaintiff objected to such offer of proof upon the same grounds and the court sustained the objection. The defendants duly excepted to the rulings of the court. Prom the judgment ordering the sale of the subject property the defendants have appealed.

Only the owner of real or personal property may proceed under § 52-500 of the General Statutes to have that property partitioned or sold. Vail v. Hammond, 60 Conn. 374, 379, 22 A. 954 (1891). It was therefore appropriate for the defendants to raise by way of special defense the invalidity of the deed through which the plaintiff claims ownership. See Practice Book, 1978, § 164. The fact that the defendants derive their apparent title through the [254]*254same deed is not relevant to the determination of the validity of the deed through which the plaintiff claims title.

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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Related

Centerbank v. Curran, No. 0109612 (Aug. 13, 1991)
1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 7307 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1991)
Cohn v. Johl, No. 09 11 79 (Apr. 10, 1991)
1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 3126 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
435 A.2d 32, 181 Conn. 251, 1980 Conn. LEXIS 882, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/narowski-v-kichar-conn-1980.