1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 NARCISA ANDUNDIA-CARILLO, Case No. 3:25-cv-10380
8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY 9 v. RESTRAINING ORDER
10 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 4 Respondents. 11
12 13 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. TRO 14 Mot., ECF No. 4. On December 3, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 15 and an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, against Field Office Director of the San 16 Francisco Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office Sergio Albarran, Acting Director of 17 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd Lyons, Secretary of the United States 18 Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and Attorney General of the United States Pamela 19 Bondi. ECF Nos. 1, 4. Petitioner asks this Court to (1) immediately release her from 20 Respondents’ custody and enjoin Respondents from re-detaining her absent further order of this 21 Court; (2) in the alternative, immediately releases her from Respondents’ custody and enjoin 22 Respondents from re-detaining her unless they demonstrate at a pre-deprivation bond hearing, by 23 clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that 24 her physical custody is required; and (3) prohibit the government from transferring her out of this 25 District and/or removing her from the country until these habeas proceedings have concluded. 26 ECF No. 4. For the following reasons, the TRO is GRANTED as modified below. 27 I. BACKGROUND 1 United States from Ecuador in 2022, fleeing extortion, death threats, and sexual violence. ECF 2 No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 60, 61. When Petitioner arrived in the United States, “[s]he was apprehended by 3 immigration officials at the border and was released after nearly two months in ICE detention.” 4 Id. ¶ 60. “Respondents determined she posed little if any flight risk or danger to the community 5 and released her into the community.” Id. “Petitioner has no criminal record, and there is no basis 6 to believe that she poses any public-safety risk.” Id. at 54. “She has appeared repeatedly at her 7 immigration hearings.” Id. 8 Petitioner “has filed a timely asylum claim and was scheduled to have a merits hearing in 9 the San Francisco Immigration Court on January 8, 2026.” Id. at 3. “Throughout Petitioner’s 10 asylum case, she has been on the non-detained docket, that is, she has been allowed to be free 11 while pursuing her immigration case.” Id. at 7. 12 On December 3, 2025, Petitioner attended an Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 13 (“ICE”) check-in at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco. Id. at 10. Petitioner “showed the ICE 14 officers her chat log with dozens of messages and proof of all her check-ins, demonstrating that 15 she was fully cooperating and responsive within the online ICE check-in process.” Id. Despite 16 this, “ICE agents alleged that Petitioner missed an ICE self report check-in on July 23, 2025, even 17 though there was no appointment visible on Petitioner’s application for that date,” and detained 18 her. Id. “ICE officers did not allow Petitioner’s attorney to speak with Petitioner after she was 19 detained” and presented no evidence “to document the grounds for detention.” Id. at 11–12. “She 20 is presently in civil immigration detention at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco.” Id. at 21. 21 On December 3, 2025, the Petition was filed. The same day, Petitioner’s counsel provided 22 notice of the Petition and a forthcoming motion for a TRO to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. ECF No. 23 4-2, Decl. of Ghassan Shamieh ¶ 19. Petitioner’s counsel did not receive a substantive response. 24 Id. ¶ 6. Counsel for Petitioner also emailed a copy of the filed Petition and a copy of the 25 Memorandum of Points and Authorities to Respondents’ counsel shortly before filing it. ECF 4 at 26 2. In the motion, Petitioner contends that her arrest and detention violate the Due Process Clause 27 of the Fifth Amendment, both substantively (because Respondents allegedly have no valid interest 1 hearing). 2 II. LEGAL STANDARD 3 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the 4 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th 5 Cir. 2017). Thus, a party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish “[1] that he is likely 6 to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 7 preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in 8 the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 9 “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser 10 showing than likelihood of success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if 11 the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are 12 satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 13 quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final 14 two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 15 An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may 16 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 17 U.S. at 22. A “TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and preventing 18 irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing, and no 19 longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 20 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 21 423, 439 (1974)). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that her 24 ongoing detention violates her procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 25 Petitioner has a substantial interest in remaining out of custody, and the Due Process Clause 26 entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any arrest or detention. 27 Pinchi v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. 1 (1976) to similar circumstances); see also Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv- 2 06487-PCP, 2025 WL 2203419, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 3 Petitioner has also demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of 4 temporary relief. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that Petitioner faces is an 5 immediate and irreparable harm. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 6 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th 7 Cir. 2017) (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Warsoldier 8 v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005).
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 NARCISA ANDUNDIA-CARILLO, Case No. 3:25-cv-10380
8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY 9 v. RESTRAINING ORDER
10 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 4 Respondents. 11
12 13 Before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. TRO 14 Mot., ECF No. 4. On December 3, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 15 and an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, against Field Office Director of the San 16 Francisco Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office Sergio Albarran, Acting Director of 17 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd Lyons, Secretary of the United States 18 Department of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, and Attorney General of the United States Pamela 19 Bondi. ECF Nos. 1, 4. Petitioner asks this Court to (1) immediately release her from 20 Respondents’ custody and enjoin Respondents from re-detaining her absent further order of this 21 Court; (2) in the alternative, immediately releases her from Respondents’ custody and enjoin 22 Respondents from re-detaining her unless they demonstrate at a pre-deprivation bond hearing, by 23 clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that 24 her physical custody is required; and (3) prohibit the government from transferring her out of this 25 District and/or removing her from the country until these habeas proceedings have concluded. 26 ECF No. 4. For the following reasons, the TRO is GRANTED as modified below. 27 I. BACKGROUND 1 United States from Ecuador in 2022, fleeing extortion, death threats, and sexual violence. ECF 2 No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 60, 61. When Petitioner arrived in the United States, “[s]he was apprehended by 3 immigration officials at the border and was released after nearly two months in ICE detention.” 4 Id. ¶ 60. “Respondents determined she posed little if any flight risk or danger to the community 5 and released her into the community.” Id. “Petitioner has no criminal record, and there is no basis 6 to believe that she poses any public-safety risk.” Id. at 54. “She has appeared repeatedly at her 7 immigration hearings.” Id. 8 Petitioner “has filed a timely asylum claim and was scheduled to have a merits hearing in 9 the San Francisco Immigration Court on January 8, 2026.” Id. at 3. “Throughout Petitioner’s 10 asylum case, she has been on the non-detained docket, that is, she has been allowed to be free 11 while pursuing her immigration case.” Id. at 7. 12 On December 3, 2025, Petitioner attended an Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 13 (“ICE”) check-in at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco. Id. at 10. Petitioner “showed the ICE 14 officers her chat log with dozens of messages and proof of all her check-ins, demonstrating that 15 she was fully cooperating and responsive within the online ICE check-in process.” Id. Despite 16 this, “ICE agents alleged that Petitioner missed an ICE self report check-in on July 23, 2025, even 17 though there was no appointment visible on Petitioner’s application for that date,” and detained 18 her. Id. “ICE officers did not allow Petitioner’s attorney to speak with Petitioner after she was 19 detained” and presented no evidence “to document the grounds for detention.” Id. at 11–12. “She 20 is presently in civil immigration detention at 630 Sansome Street in San Francisco.” Id. at 21. 21 On December 3, 2025, the Petition was filed. The same day, Petitioner’s counsel provided 22 notice of the Petition and a forthcoming motion for a TRO to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. ECF No. 23 4-2, Decl. of Ghassan Shamieh ¶ 19. Petitioner’s counsel did not receive a substantive response. 24 Id. ¶ 6. Counsel for Petitioner also emailed a copy of the filed Petition and a copy of the 25 Memorandum of Points and Authorities to Respondents’ counsel shortly before filing it. ECF 4 at 26 2. In the motion, Petitioner contends that her arrest and detention violate the Due Process Clause 27 of the Fifth Amendment, both substantively (because Respondents allegedly have no valid interest 1 hearing). 2 II. LEGAL STANDARD 3 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the 4 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th 5 Cir. 2017). Thus, a party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish “[1] that he is likely 6 to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 7 preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in 8 the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 9 “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser 10 showing than likelihood of success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if 11 the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are 12 satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 13 quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final 14 two factors “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 15 An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may 16 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 17 U.S. at 22. A “TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and preventing 18 irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing, and no 19 longer.’” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 20 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 21 423, 439 (1974)). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that her 24 ongoing detention violates her procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 25 Petitioner has a substantial interest in remaining out of custody, and the Due Process Clause 26 entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any arrest or detention. 27 Pinchi v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv-05632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *2-6 (N.D. Cal. 1 (1976) to similar circumstances); see also Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-cv- 2 06487-PCP, 2025 WL 2203419, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 3 Petitioner has also demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of 4 temporary relief. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that Petitioner faces is an 5 immediate and irreparable harm. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 6 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th 7 Cir. 2017) (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Warsoldier 8 v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005). “[I]t follows inexorably from [the] 9 conclusion” that Petitioner’s detention without a hearing is “likely unconstitutional” that she has 10 “also carried [her] burden as to irreparable harm.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. 11 The final two Winter factors, the balance of the equities and public interest, also weigh 12 heavily in favor of granting temporary relief. “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding 13 procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 14 costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv- 15 01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (cleaned up); see Melendres, 695 16 F.3d at 1002 (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s 17 constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted)); Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 18 2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been 19 violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). As other courts in this 20 district and others have concluded under similar circumstances, “the potential harm to [Petitioner] 21 is significant, while the potential harm to the government is minimal.” Pablo Sequen, 2025 WL 22 2203419, at *3. At most, the government faces a short delay in detaining Petitioner if it ultimately 23 demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that her detention is necessary to prevent danger 24 to the community or flight. See Jorge M. F., 2021 WL 783561, at *3; Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv- 25 05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). The government is not “harmed in 26 any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. 27 Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Faced with “a conflict between 1 concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [Petitioner’s] favor.” Hernandez, 872 2 F.3d at 996) (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)). 3 A TRO immediately releasing Petitioner is appropriate to return her to the status quo. E. 4 Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 779. The status quo refers to “the last uncontested status 5 which preceded the pending controversy.” Doe v. Noem, 778 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1166 (W.D. 6 Wash. 2025) (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)). 7 That is the moment prior to Petitioner’s likely illegal detention. See Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 25- 8 cv-00663, 2025 WL 779743, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025) (granting a temporary restraining 9 order requiring immediate release of the petitioner back to home confinement from custody, as a 10 restoration of the status quo). 11 Because Petitioner satisfies all requirements for temporary injunctive relief and such relief 12 is necessary to restore the status quo, the TRO Motion is granted as detailed below. This Order 13 accords with many other recent grants of temporary relief in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Alva 14 v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06676, 2025 WL 2294917, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2025) (granting 15 temporary restraining order); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. 16 Cal. July 4, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order requiring release of asylum seeker and a 17 pre-detention bond hearing before re-arrest); Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *10 (granting 18 preliminary injunction); Doe v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *8 (E.D. 19 Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order); see also Diaz, 2025 WL 1676854 20 (granting temporary restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing before re-detention of 21 noncitizen out of custody five years); Garcia v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-5070, 2025 WL 1676855, at *3 22 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order requiring pre-detention hearing 23 before re-detention of noncitizen out of custody six years ); Enamorado v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv- 24 4072-NW, 2025 WL 1382859, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2025). 25 Finally, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 65(c) to dispense with the filing of 26 bond. “[T]here is no realistic likelihood of harm to the [Respondents] from enjoining [their] 27 conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, no security is ] hav[ing] been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). 2 || IV. ORDER 3 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for 4 || Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED to preserve the status quo pending further briefing 5 and a hearing on this matter. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from 6 || Respondents’ custody and ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner 7 || without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and from removing 8 Petitioner from the United States.! This Order shall remain in effect until December 17, 2025 9 || from date TRO issues. 10 Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in-person at a hearing in the courtroom 11 of the assigned Judge, or as otherwise ordered by that Judge, on December 17, 2025 why a «3 12 || preliminary injunction should not issue. Respondents shall file a response to Petitioner’s motion
13 |) by no later than December 10, 2025. Any reply shall be filed by December 14, 2025. The
14 || assigned Judge may modify this schedule as appropriate. IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 || Dated: December 3, 2025 at 8:25 p.m. PT
17 nne Gonzalez®oge 18 nited States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 %6 ' Petitioner also asks the Court to order that she remain within the Northern District of California in order to preserve this Court’s jurisdiction, but it 1s well-established that “when the Government 97 || moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction 2g || who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004).