Nappi v. Nappi

2014 Ohio 2696
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 23, 2014
Docket2013-A-0041
StatusPublished

This text of 2014 Ohio 2696 (Nappi v. Nappi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nappi v. Nappi, 2014 Ohio 2696 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

[Cite as Nappi v. Nappi, 2014-Ohio-2696.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO

THOMAS NAPPI, : PER CURIAM OPINION

Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. 2013-A-0041 - vs - :

LAUREN NAPPI, :

Defendant-Appellee. :

Civil Appeal from the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas. Case No. 1996 DR 737.

Judgment: Affirmed.

Samuel L. Altier, 1027 Lake Avenue, Ashtabula, OH 44004 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).

William P. Bobulsky, William P. Bobulsky Co., L.P.A., 1612 East Prospect Road, Ashtabula, OH 44004 (For Defendant-Appellee).

PER CURIAM.

{¶1} Appellant, Thomas Nappi, appeals the judgment of the trial court clarifying

a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”), which increased the monthly payment to

appellee, Lauren Nappi, from $77.82 per month to $302.77 per month. Based on the

following, we affirm.

{¶2} The parties were married on June 15, 1982, and divorced by final

judgment on December 16, 1997. Prior to that date, the trial court noted that the parties

had reached an agreement as to all the marital issues and granted the parties’ divorce on the ground of incompatibility. The December 16, 1997 Final Decree of Divorce

provided the following:

{¶3} “C. Retirement Benefits

{¶4} “1. The marital portion of Plaintiff, Thomas Nappi’s retirement benefit with

ESAB shall be divided in accordance with the Qualified Domestic Relations Order.”

{¶5} The QDRO relative to Thomas’s ESAB Welding & Cutting Products Plan

(“the Plan”) was filed on January 29, 1998. Each party, along with their counsel, signed

a separate approval page, which were incorporated into the document. At paragraph 5

of the QDRO, it stated that Lauren would receive the following:

[F]ifty percent (50%) of Participant’s pension entitlements from the date of marriage of June 5, 1982 through December 3, 1997 shall be credited to a separate bookkeeping account under the Plan in the name of Alternate Payee. Such amount, adjusted in accordance with the Plan for any appreciation or depreciation and gains or losses subsequent to the most recent Plan valuation date * * * and prior to the date of distribution, but not adjusted for any contributions or forfeitures under the Plan subsequent to the Valuation Date, shall be payable to Alternate Payee in accordance with Section 6 of this Order.

{¶6} Thomas retired from his ESAB employment on September 1, 2012. The

plan, however, had terminated on December 31, 2006. Lauren was notified by ESAB

that her share of the pension, after 15.5 years with marital rights in the plan, was limited

to $77.82 per month. The Plan Administrator calculated the total benefit amount as

$432.61 per month based on the length of the parties’ marriage. Then, the Union

Carbide portion of the benefit in the amount of $276.98 was subtracted from the total, as

Thomas had been employed at Union Carbide prior to the parties’ marriage. The

calculation resulted in a total net monthly amount of $155.63, of which Lauren was

entitled to 50%, or $77.82.

2 {¶7} Lauren filed a motion for modification of the QDRO. In her motion, Lauren

argued that Thomas was hired on June 6, 1973, and the Plan terminated on December

31, 2005, for a total of 33.58 years in the Plan. She further argued the parties were

married for a total of 15.5 years, which represents the marital portion of the Plan.

Therefore, the total marital percentage in the Plan is 46.16%, of which Lauren’s share is

one-half, or 23.08%. As the pension estimate determines that Thomas’s “unreduced

monthly benefit” is $1,311.88, Lauren claims she is entitled to 23.08%, or $302.77, per

month.

{¶8} In its judgment entry, the trial court found the following: “The Court finds

that it was the intent of the parties herein that the Defendant should receive 50% of the

Plaintiff’s retirement benefits accrued during the parties’ marriage, not 5.93% as

determined by the pension plan administrator.” Consequently, Lauren’s monthly

payment was increased from $77.03 per month to $302.77 per month.

{¶9} Thomas filed a notice of appeal and asserts the following assignment of

error for our review:

{¶10} “The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of Plaintiff–Appellant in finding the

ESAB QDRO to be ambiguous, and subject to clarification.”

{¶11} On appeal, Thomas argues the trial court erred, as the QDRO employed a

frozen coverture method, i.e., it described a specific period of time for which 50% of

Thomas’ pension entitlements must be segregated into Lauren’s newly-created account.

{¶12} While a court has the power to enforce a property division incorporated into a divorce decree, R.C. 3105.65(B), a trial court may not modify that property division. R.C. 3105.171(I); Bond v. Bond (1990), 69 Ohio App. 3d 225, 228. However, ‘where there is good faith confusion over the requirements of the dissolution decree, a court has the power to enforce its decree, to hear the

3 matter, clarify the confusion, and resolve the dispute.’ Bond, 69 Ohio App. 3d at 228. Where a clause in the divorce decree is ambiguous, a court ‘has broad discretion in clarifying ambiguous language by considering not only the intent of the parties but the equities involved.’ Id.

Straw v. Straw, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008433, 2004-Ohio-4065, ¶4. In Hoyt v. Hoyt,

53 Ohio St.3d 177, 180 (1990), the Ohio Supreme Court stated:

The trial court must have the flexibility to make an equitable decision based upon the circumstances of the case, the status of the parties, the nature, terms and conditions of the pension plan, and the reasonableness of the result. Thus, any given pension or retirement fund is not necessarily subject to direct division but is subject to evaluation and consideration in making an equitable distribution of both parties’ marital assets.

{¶13} The Court identified several ways that a trial court may divide a pension

plan, “such as an immediate offset or a current assignment of proportionate shares, with

either a current distribution or a deferred distribution. A deferred distribution may

consist of either a current assignment or a division of the asset at such time that the

plan directs distribution based upon the employee’s eligibility.” Id. at 181. The Court

noted that these varied theories are necessary based on the circumstances of each

case. “In a situation involving vested but unmatured benefits,” it would be appropriate to

divide the pension proportionately. Id. at 182-184.

{¶14} Below, Lauren argued that her share of the pension should have been

calculated according to the traditional coverture method rather than the frozen coverture

method, thereby increasing her monthly payments.

{¶15} In addressing vested but unmatured benefits, the Hoyt Court outlined a

formula whereby the duration of the parties’ marriage is divided by the total number of

years of employment of the employed spouse. That sum is multiplied by one-half; the

4 consequent percentage is then multiplied by the sum of the retirement benefits. Id. at

182.

{¶16} Thomas maintains the QDRO at issue explicitly employed the frozen

coverture method, thus Lauren’s monthly benefit is correct at $77.82.

{¶17} Under the frozen coverture method, or dollar amount, the trial court ‘freezes’ the pension benefits at the amount in the account as of the divorce date.

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Related

Reising v. Reising
2012 Ohio 1097 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2012)
Bond v. Bond
590 N.E.2d 348 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1990)
Straw v. Straw, Unpublished Decision (8-4-2004)
2004 Ohio 4065 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2004)
Hoyt v. Hoyt
559 N.E.2d 1292 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1990)

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