Napier v. Napier

13 Ga. 243
Supreme Court of Georgia·Decided February 15, 1853·No. No. 31·Published

Opinion

By the Court.

Lumpkin, J.

delivering the opinion.

[1.] We will not stop to inquire whether it lies in the mouth of the trustee who has accepted the trust created by [247] this deed, to resort to the defence which he seeks to set up to defeat the complainant’s recovery. Grant that there was fraud practised by the donee, so far as extinguishing the amount of his liabilities is concerned, the donors who contributed this fund are' not complaining. Can he avail himself of the fraud to avoid accounting ?

Another interesting question, well deserving of examination, is this: if the trustee has, in the exercise of the discretion delegated to him, settled the claims against the trust fund at a discount, will it not accrue for the benefit of the cestui que trust ? Is he not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the creditors for the full amount of their demands upon this fund of $5,000 ? Green vs. Winters, 1 John. Ch. Rep. 27. McClanahans vs. Henderson, 2 A. K. Marshall, 389. Kellog vs. Wood, 4 Paige, 578. Parkist vs. Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 394. Holdridge vs. Gillespie, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 30. Hart vs. Ten Eyck, 4 Johns. Ch. Rep. 104. Pavoree vs. Panning, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 457. Matthews vs. Drayard, 3 Desseaus. 25.

But we waive these grounds.

When this deed of trust was before this Court at this place, in 1849, .upon a demurrer to the bill, we held, that the complainant was entitled to the unexpended balance of the $5,000 which had been set apart for the payment of his debts out of the general fund of. $15,000 contributed by the residuary legatees under the will of Thomas Napier, senior, for his use and benefit. And, in our judgment, this construction of the instrument is conclusive upon all the questions raised upon this record. 6 Geo. Rep. 404.

It was the leading intent of the donors, in obedience to the dying wishes and injunction of their deceased father, as well as in accordance with their own feelings, to raise and appropriate the gross amount of $15,000 for the benefit of their brother, who had been accidentally excluded, by the will of their common parent, from participating in the common patrimony. The designation of $5,000 for the payment of his debts out of this fund, was a more secondary matter, and made in subor[248] dination to the main object. They supposed, from the statement, which at their request, he supplied, that it would require $5,000 to pay his debts — they limited the fund to be taken out of the $15,000 to that sum; and the residue computed to be sure of $10,000 still. The whole residue, be it that or more, is expressly rested in the trustee for his support and maintenance. And ayo have already adjudged that this residue shall go to him. And AYhcther the amount demanded for the payment of William Napier’s debts Avas over or underrated, cither by him or the donors, by mistake or othenvise, is obviously, in this vícav of the' subject, a matter of no earthly consequence; and fraud or no fraud, in ascertaining the aggregate indebtedness of the beneficiary of this provision, is an immaterial issue, and cannot affect the result, so far as the liability of the defendant is concerned. The loss the creditors get, the more ayíII be loft in the hands of the trustee for his cestui que trust. In any event, he cannot be injured. And the donors, Ave are sure, will not regret that less is needed to relievo their brother from his enthralment than they anticipated. They ought to rejoice rather, that they were misled in this particular. Ear, bettor far, that their bounty should go to their blood-kin than to the blood-suckers avIio sought to devour him. This remark is not, intended for his Iona fide creditors.

Had this instrument, a copy of which I have appended to this opinion, been drawm differently, viz: First, creating a fund of $10,000 to be vested in the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust, and then contributing $5,000 to be applied to the satisfaction of his debts, or so much thereof as might be required for that purpose, and out of the latter fund a surplus had remained, after; the execution of the trust; in that event, it might have been contended Ayith some plausibility at least, that this surplus Avould, from construction of laiv, have reverted to the donors.* For, tho true doctrine upon this subject, ayo apprehend to be this : that if he Avho AYas before [249] possessed of the whole, carves out of it a part, and grants it away, whatever is not granted remains in the donor. Blackstone, title Reversion. But such, we repeat, is not this case. But on the contrary, the manifest design of this deed is to raise and invest by voluntary contributions $15,000 for the complainant’s benefit, and to devote so much of this fund only as may be needed to relieve him from his embarrassments; that being justly considered indispittably necessary for the respectability as well as comfort of their portionless relative.

With this interpretation of the deed, the second point, as to interest, becomes a plain one. It is admitted that the trustee was liable for interest on the $10,000, whether he made it or not. If then, the remainder of the $5,000, after the debts are extinguished, is to be added to the $10,000 and employed in the same way, that is, for the use and support of the cestui que trust, it follows of course, that it will bear interest from the time that all the debts are paid; so that the question mooted in the discussion, as to whether or not this balance is a liquidated demand or an open account, in contemplation of our Statute, does not arise. The balance in the hands of the trustee bears interest from the time it is relieved 'from the incumbrance of the debts, not because it is a liquidated demand, but because it is a trust fund to be managed by the trustee so as to make interest, and for which he is liable to pay interest even for his failure so to use it, unless he renders some satisfactory excuse. Here there can be none, for it is conceded in the argument, that his note of $5,000 due the estate of his father, and bearing interest, has been surrendered up to him to meet this liability for the debts of the cestui que trust under the deed.

Judgment affirmed.

Note. — It is possible that the instrument in its present shape may admit of this reading. It is not, however, its plain purport, especially when we take into consideration the avowed motives which prompted the parties to make it. Besides the deed is to be taken most strongly against the covenantors, and in favor of the cestui que trust.

[250] (copy.)

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