Naomi L. Gilbert v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 14, 2002
• Docket: 09-01-00519-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-01-519 CR

NAOMI L. GILBERT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 411th District Court

San Jacinto County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 8412

OPINION

Naomi L. Gilbert was convicted by a jury of having committed the offense of Aggravated Robbery. The jury assessed punishment at confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division for a term of seven years. The lone appellate issue reads as follows:

Whether the Trial Court reversibly erred, in that the Trial Court improperly entered an affirmative finding of the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, when a special issue regarding the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon was not submitted in the Trial Court's charges to the Jury in either Guilt or Punishment, when the Trial Court's charge to the Jury on Guilt contained an instruction on the Law of Parties.

Generally, an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon may be entered when the (a) indictment alleges the use of a deadly weapon and the jury finds the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, (b) the weapon is deadly per se, (c) or the jury affirmatively answers a special issue on the matter. See Davis v. State, 897 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). In the instant case, the trial court did not submit the deadly weapon question to the jury as a special issue. See Travelstead v. State, 693 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (special issue is preferred procedure when jury is trier of fact). Although the indictment expressly alleged appellant "use[ed] or exhibit[ed]" a deadly weapon, and the jury found her guilty "as charged in Count I of the indictment[,]" the verdict did not constitute an affirmative finding that appellant personally used or exhibited a deadly weapon because the charge included an instruction on the law of parties and appellant's conviction can be sustained only on that basis. ⁽¹⁾

Furthermore, the jury's verdict also did not constitute an affirmative finding that appellant was a party to the use of a deadly weapon within the meaning of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2002), because the court's party's charge did not require a finding that appellant knew that a deadly weapon would be used or exhibited during the offense. See Howard v. State, 966 S.W.2d 821, 829 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. ref'd).

While it could be argued that the jury impliedly found that appellant was a party to an offense in which she knew that a deadly weapon would be used, an implied finding does not constitute the "affirmative finding" required to be found under art. 42.12, sec. 3g(a)(2), as interpreted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ("We have searched the legislative history of Article 42.12, supra, and have determined that, given the previous definitions, these words taken together were intended to mean the trier of fact's express determination that a deadly weapon or firearm was actually used or exhibited during the commission of the offense."). We hold, therefore, that the jury did not make an art. 42.12, sec. 3g(a)(2), affirmative finding, and that the trial court abused its discretion in entering such a finding on the face of the judgment.

Having found error by the trial court we now conduct a harm analysis. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). We disregard any non-constitutional error that does not affect the appellant's substantial rights. Id. The significance of a deadly weapon finding is its impact on appellant's parole eligibility. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.145 (Vernon Supp. 2002). When, however, a defendant has been convicted of one of several offenses statutorily designated to be subject to the same limitations on parole eligibility that apply when a deadly weapon finding has been specifically entered, the defendant's substantial rights are not affected. Compare Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, §§ 3g(a)(1)(F), 3g(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2002), with Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.145(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Because appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and is subject to the same limitations on parole eligibility regardless of the deadly weapon finding, her substantial rights were not affected by the trial court's erroneous entry of the deadly weapon finding in the judgment.

A close reading of appellant's brief, however, indicates that she does not merely request a reformation of her judgment to delete the erroneous entry of the deadly weapon finding. While the wording of her appellate issue, and indeed the authorities she relies upon, all complain of trial error, the last four sentences of her brief demand what would amount to an entirely different result, viz:

In the case at bar, the Jury did not specifically find that Appellant used a deadly weapon or that Appellant knew that a deadly weapon would be used or exhibited. A required element, necessary for a finding of guilt of the offense of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, as alleged, was missing.

The Trial Court's entry of an affirmative finding on the use of a deadly weapon was improper. Therefore, this Court should sustain Appellant's ISSUE NUMBER ONE; reform the Judgment to acquit Appellant of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY; find Appellant GUILTY of the lesser offense of THEFT; and, remand this Cause to the Trial Court for a new hearing as to Punishment.

Appellant completely misconstrues the distinction between a statutory-based "affirmative finding" for parole eligibility purposes, art. 42.12, sec. 3g(a)(2), and the constitutionally-mandated due process standard of measuring evidentiary sufficiency against the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law as announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 n.16, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). As alluded to above, the trial court's instructions to the jury included language defining appellant's possible culpability for the aggravated robbery as a party. Appellant lodged no objection to said instructions. The verdict in every criminal action must be general. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 1(a) (Vernon 1981). Where there is a general verdict returned and evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt under any of the paragraph allegations submitted, the verdict will be upheld. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The jury in the instant case was not requested to make any specific findings, for legal sufficiency purposes, as to any one element of the offense charged, nor would it have been proper to do so under art. 37.07, sec. 1(a). Examining all of the record evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, including the allegations that appellant acted as a party to the alleged offense as that term was defined for the jury. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319. As such, no "affirmative finding" by the jury of the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon was required to sustain appellant's conviction for aggravated robbery under the appropriate standard for measuring legally sufficient evidence. To the extent that appellant has raised a legal sufficiency claim, we overrule her issue. As to appellant's complaint regarding the trial court's entry in the judgment of an affirmative finding of use of a deadly weapon, we hold the trial court erred, but the error did not affect her substantial rights. We affirm appellant's conviction.

AFFIRMED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on July 29, 2002

Opinion Delivered August 14, 2002

Do Not Publish

Before Walker, C.J., Burgess and Gaultney, JJ.

1. The evidence in the record before us indicates that appellant was either the driver of the getaway vehicle involved in the robbery, or was a passenger in the vehicle. The record reveals that appellant knowingly accompanied the principal actors to the robbery scene and shared in the proceeds of the robbery thereafter.