Nanini v. Ninth Judicial District Y

CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedMay 29, 1996
Docket95-486
StatusPublished

This text of Nanini v. Ninth Judicial District Y (Nanini v. Ninth Judicial District Y) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nanini v. Ninth Judicial District Y, (Mo. 1996).

Opinion

NO. 95-486 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1996

ANITA NANINI, Plaintiff and v. NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT YOUTH GUIDANCE HOME, Defendant and

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, In and for the County of Glacier, The Honorable John Warner, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: John F. Lynch; Lynch & Chisholm, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent: Thane P. Johnson; Werner, Epstein & Johnson, Cut Bank, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: March 14, 1996 Decided: May 29, 1996 Filed: Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its

result to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing

Company.

Anita Nanini (Nanini) appeals from the judgment entered on the

order of the Ninth Judicial District Court, Glacier County, granting the Ninth Judicial District Youth Guidance Home's

(Guidance Home) motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred

in granting the Guidance Home's motion for summary judgment.

Nanini was employed as a houseparent by the Guidance Home, a nonprofit corporation, from July of 1990 until June of 1993. She

was earning $4.35 per hour at the time the Guidance Home terminated

her employment.

On June 20, 1994, Nanini filed a complaint alleging that the

Guidance Home wrongfully discharged her from employment on or about

June 30, 1993. The Guidance Home answered Nanini's complaint and

alleged, as an affirmative defense, that Nanini's last day of work was June 12, 1993, and, therefore, that her action was barred by

the l-year statute of limitations contained in § 39-2-911(l), MCA. A scheduling conference was held and a scheduling order

2 issued. Discovery ensued. On April 6, 1995, the Guidance Home moved for summary judgment. The basis for the motion was that Nanini's last day of

work was June 12, 1993, that her cause of action accrued on that day and, therefore, that the 5 39-2-911(l), MCA, statute of

limitations began to run on that day. Because Nanini's complaint

was not filed until June 20, 1994, the Guidance Home contended that

the action was barred by the statute of limitations as a matter of

law. The parties fully briefed the motion.

On September 8, 1995, the District Court granted the Guidance

Home's motion for summary judgment. The court determined that no

genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the June 12,

1993, date of termination and, therefore, that the Guidance Home

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Nanini's action

was barred by the l-year statute of limitations. Nanini appeals.

Did the District Court err in granting the Guidance Home's motion for summary judgment?

A motion for summary judgment will be granted by a district

court

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Our review of a district court's grant of

summary judgment is de nova; we apply the same Rule 56(c) standards

as used by the district court. Redfern v. Montana Muffler (1995),

271 Mont. 333, 335, 896 P.2d 455, 456 (citation omitted). The

initial burden is on the moving party to establish that no genuine

3 issue of material fact exists; only when that burden has been met

does the burden shift to the party opposing the motion to establish

otherwise. Spain-Morrow Ranch, Inc. v. West (1994), 264 Mont. 441,

444, 872 P.2d 330, 332 (citations omitted).

Issues involving application of a statute of limitations to

bar an action often can be resolved as a matter of law. Indeed, we

resolved the statute of limitations issue as a matter of law in the

context of a wrongful discharge action in Redfern. Redfern, 896 P.2d at 457. However, where facts necessary to a determination of

the statute of limitations question are disputed, the question must

be resolved by the trier of fact rather than as a matter of law.

See Werre v. David (Mont. 1996), 913 P.2d 625, 630, 53 St.Rep. 187,

189.

Here, the Guidance Home's statute of limitations-based motion

for summary judgment was premised on its position that Nanini had

been discharged on June 12, 1993. The Guidance Home contends that

Redfern controls and mandates the conclusion here that Nanini's

action is barred by the l-year statute of limitations contained in

s 39-2-911(l), MCA. Nanini argues that, unlike Redfern, a genuine

issue of material fact exists in this case which precludes summary

judgment.

In Redfern, we observed that "[tlhe facts necessary to our

resolution of this appeal are undisputed." Redfern, 896 P.2d at

456. The undisputed facts were that the employer had terminated

Redfern's employment effective at the end of his October 24, 1992,

shift and paid him two days later for the previous two weeks' work

4 plus five days of earned vacation time; we merely applied the law to those undisputed facts and concluded that Redfern's "date of

discharge" was October 24, 1992. Redfern, 896 P.2d at 456-51. We

rejected Redfern's contention that the five days' vacation pay

constituted "earned compensation" for that period after his last

work shift and, therefore, extended his discharge date, on the

basis that the vacation pay was a fringe benefit which had been

earned prior to the date of his discharge. Redfern, 896 P.2d at 457.

It is clear that Redfern would be applicable here, if at all,

only in the event no genuine issue of material fact exists as to

Nanini's date of discharge and termination,of employment. Thus, we

begin by reviewing the record in that regard to determine whether

the first summary judgment prong--absence of a genuine issue of

material fact--is met.

The record reflects that the Guidance Home's Board of

Directors (Board) met on June 9, 1993, and voted to terminate

Nanini's employment. The Board ordered Kathy Black (Black), the

director of the Guidance Home, to dismiss Nanini immediately and

pay her two weeks' severance pay. Black carried out the Board's

orders, and gave Nanini a check for the severance pay, on June 12,

1993. Nanini did not perform any work at the Guidance Home after

June 12, 1993, and, indeed, applied for unemployment compensation

stating that June 12 was her last day of employment.

On the basis of this record, the Guidance Home met its initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

5 fact regarding the date of Nanini's discharge. Thus, the burden shifted to Nanini to come forward and establish the existence of

such a genuine issue of fact.

Nanini relies on a letter from Black, on official letterhead

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Related

Spain-Morrow Ranch, Inc. v. West
872 P.2d 330 (Montana Supreme Court, 1994)
Redfern v. Montana Muffler
896 P.2d 455 (Montana Supreme Court, 1995)
Werre v. David
913 P.2d 625 (Montana Supreme Court, 1996)

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