Nancy Lorraine and Charles Galford v. Nancy Friend

• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Decided: October 17, 2014
• Docket: 13-1134
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Nancy Lorraine Galford and Charles Galford, FILED Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners October 17, 2014 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS vs) No. 13-1134 (Preston County 13-C-42) OF WEST VIRGINIA

Nancy Friend, individually, and Big Bear Lake Property Owners Association, Inc., Defendants Below, Respondents

MEMORANDUM DECISION Petitioners Nancy and Charles Galford, by counsel Edward R. Kohout, appeal the order of the Circuit Court of Preston County, entered October 9, 2013, granting summary judgment in favor of respondents. Respondent Nancy Friend filed her response by counsel Mark Gaydos, Buddy Turner, and Cody E. Nett. Respondent Big Bear Lake Property Owners Association, Inc., by counsel John R. Fowler and Michael P. Markins, joined in Friend’s response.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the order of the circuit court is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Petitioners are owners of property at Big Bear Lake Campground in Bruceton Mills. Respondent Friend is the president and sole owner of Alyeska, Inc., the campground developer. Little information has been provided about Respondent Big Bear Lake Property Owners Association, Inc. Petitioners filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County (later transferred to the Circuit Court of Preston County), alleging that Respondent Friend operates an illegal political subdivision at Big Bear Campgrounds, an area organized by Friend’s father in 1972, by directing Big Bear Lake’s Board of Directors to establish traffic laws, building codes, and a code of conduct, sometimes in contravention of the original bylaws. Petitioners sought declaratory relief, asserting that both respondents: violated West Virginia Code § 36A-3-13 (part of the Unit Property Act) by failing to provide an accounting of expenditures of petitioners’ assessments1; violated West Virginia Code § 36B-3-114 (part of the Uniform Common Interest

1 West Virginia Code § 36A-3-13 provides:

The treasurer shall keep detailed records of all receipts and expenditures, including expenditures affecting the common elements, specifying and itemizing the maintenance, repair and replacement expenses of the common elements and 1 Ownership Act) by failing to return surplus funds to property owners2; and operated Big Bear Lake Campground as if it were a municipal corporation, in violation of West Virginia Code § 8­ 2-13.

Respondent Friend filed a motion to dismiss (and petitioners filed a response), and the circuit court converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment after notifying the parties. The circuit court granted summary judgment by order entered October 9, 2013,

any other expenses incurred. Such records shall be available for examination by the unit owners during regular business hours. In accordance with the actions of the council assessing common expenses against the units and unit owners, he shall keep an accurate record of such assessments and of the payment thereof by each unit owner. 2 West Virginia Code § 36B-3-114 provides:

Unless otherwise provided in the declaration, any surplus funds of the association remaining after payment of or provision for common expenses and any prepayment of reserves must be paid to the unit owners in proportion to their common expense liabilities or credited to them to reduce their future common expense assessments. 3 West Virginia Code § 8-2-1 provides, in part:

(a) Any part of a county or counties may be incorporated as a city, depending upon the population, either as a Class I, Class II or Class III city, or as a Class IV town or village, as classified in section three, article one of this chapter if the area proposed for incorporation meets the following conditions: (1) The area is not currently within any municipality urban in character; (2) For areas that are more than one square mile there must be an average of not less than five hundred inhabitants or freeholders per square mile; (3) For areas less than one square mile there must be at least one hundred inhabitants or freeholders; (4) The total area to be incorporated must not include an amount of territory disproportionate to its number of inhabitants; and (5) The proponents of incorporation shall provide to the county commission a proposal . . . (b) The creation of any new municipality is prohibited if: (1) The area to be incorporated is within close proximity to an existing municipality and the existing municipality is capable of more effectively and efficiently providing services to the area; or (2) The creation of a new municipality is not in the best interest of the county as a whole. (c) It is within the reasonable discretion of the county commission to determine the exact area or portions thereof to be included or excluded in the new municipality . . . 2

finding that: (1) West Virginia Code § 36A-3-13 does not apply in this case because no duly recorded declaration states the parties’ intent to submit the property to the provisions of the Unit Property Act; (2) West Virginia Code § 36B-3-114 is inapplicable because it was enacted fourteen years after the formation of Big Bear Lake Campground; and (3) West Virginia Code § 8-2-1 does not contain a private right of action.

Petitioners challenge that order on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that West Virginia Code § 36A-3-13 does not apply; (2) finding that certain provisions of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act are inapplicable; (3) “failing to grant declaratory relief as to Big Bear Lake Campground’s being illegally operated as a town without a charter[;]” and (4) granting summary judgment to Respondent Friend without discussing the factors required for “piercing the corporate veil.” We review petitioners’ assignments of error related to the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

Our review of the record on appeal shows that petitioners support these assignments of error with arguments nearly identical to those made in response to respondents’ motion to dismiss and subsequently rejected by the circuit court. For example, petitioners argued to the circuit court that, “The [Unit Property] Act does not state that the owner of a condominium property must reference the Act in the declarations for the Act to apply. The Act nowhere so states.” In its order granting summary judgment, the circuit court found to the contrary, citing West Virginia Code 36A-4-1(a): “The declaration shall contain the following: (a) A reference to this chapter [Chapter 36A] and an expression of the intention to submit the property to the provisions of this chapter.” Rather than offer a specific exception to the circuit court’s application of the aforementioned section, petitioners here cursorily argue, “The Act does not state that the owner of a condominium property must reference the Act in the declarations in order for the provisions of the Act to apply. The Act nowhere so states.” (Emphasis in original.) Petitioners have thus presented no basis to support the first assignment of error, in which they argued that the circuit court incorrectly found that West Virginia Code § 36A-3-13 does not provide petitioners a remedy. We agree with the circuit court that the parties’ declaration does not express an intent to subject property at Big Bear Lake Campground to the Unit Property Act and respondents thus did not violate the Act.

Likewise, in their argument in support of their second assignment of error (that the circuit court erred in finding certain provisions of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act inapplicable), petitioners fail to address the circuit court’s thorough explanation of its conclusion that West Virginia Code § 36B-1-204(a) “does not . . . make the whole Act applicable to preexisting common interest communities.”4 Instead, petitioners simply reiterate the argument

4 West Virginia Code § 36B-1-204(a), addressing “applicability to preexisting common interest communities,” provides

(a) Except as provided in section 1-205 [§ 36B-1-205] (Same—Exception for small preexisting cooperatives and planned communities), sections 1-105 [§ 36B­ 1-105] (Separate titles and taxation), 1-106 [§ 36B-1-106] (Applicability of local ordinances, regulations and building codes), 1-107 [§ 36B-1-107] (Eminent 3 they made before the circuit court, wherein they state that the Act applies to respondents on and after the effective date of July 1, 1986. We agree with the circuit court that West Virginia Code § 36B-1-204(a) specifically enumerates sections that prospectively apply to common interest communities that were in existence before the effective date of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act but West Virginia Code § 36B-3-114 is not among those sections. We find, then, that petitioners are entitled to no relief on this ground.

Finally, petitioners made no effort to address the circuit court’s finding that West Virginia Code § 8-2-1 does not contain a private right of action, choosing instead to support their third assignment of error by tersely arguing that the circuit court did not analyze this issue. Petitioners conclude that the circuit court “simply ruled that [it] found no violation of this section, without discussion.” The circuit court’s analysis is apparent in its order, and we disagree with petitioners’ argument.5

Having reviewed the circuit court’s “Final Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants,” entered on October 9, 2013, we hereby adopt and incorporate the circuit court’s well-reasoned findings and conclusions. The Clerk is directed to attach a copy of the circuit court’s order to this memorandum decision.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

domain), 2-103 [§ 36B-1-103] (Construction and validity of declaration and bylaws), 2-104 [§ 36B-2-104] (Description of units), 2-121 [§ 36B-2-121] (Merger or consolidation of common interest communities), 3-102(a)(1) through (6) and (11) through (16) [§ 36B-3-102] (Powers of unit owners’ association), 3­ 111 [§ 36B-3-111] (Tort and contract liability), 3-116 [§ 36B-3-116] (Lien for assessments), 3-118 [§ 36B-3-118] (Association records), 4-109 [§ 36B-4-109] (Resales of units), and 4-117 [§ 36B-4-117] (Effect of violation on rights of action; attorney’s fees), and section 1-103 [§ 36B-1-103] (Definitions) to the extent necessary in construing any of those sections, apply to all common interest communities created in this state before the effective date of this chapter; but those sections apply only with respect to events and circumstances occurring after the effective date of this chapter and do not invalidate existing provisions of the declaration, bylaws or plats or plans of those common interest communities. 5 Like the circuit court, we “conclude[] that a determination of whether piercing the corporate veil is appropriate is unnecessary because [we have] concluded that there have been no violations in the first instance of” the statutes discussed herein. We thus find no error in the circuit court’s having declined to undertake a “corporate veil” analysis and we consequently reject petitioners’ fourth assignment of error. 4

ISSUED: October 17, 2014

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Robin Jean Davis Justice Brent D. Benjamin Justice Margaret L. Workman Justice Menis E. Ketchum Justice Allen H. Loughry II