Nancy Cormier v. Jacob Colby Perry

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: June 6, 2018
• Docket: CA-0018-0095
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-95

NANCY CORMIER

VERSUS

JACOB COLBY PERRY

**********

APPEAL FROM THE THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C-569-17 HONORABLE STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

ELIZABETH A. PICKETT JUDGE

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED. Michael H. Schwartzberg Glen D. Vamvoras Vamvoras, Schwartzberg & Antoon, LLC 1111 Ryan Street Lake Charles, LA 70601 (337) 433-1621 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Jacob Colby Perry

Ronald C. Richard Richard Law Firm, LLC 1 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 120 Lake Charles, LA 70629 (337) 494-1900 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Nancy Cormier PICKETT, Judge.

The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of the defendant city alderman’s

special motion to strike and dismissal of his suit for defamation against the alderman.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

Nancy Cormier filed suit against Jacob Colby Perry, a city alderman for the

City of Welsh, alleging that Mr. Perry used his position as a platform to defame her.

She seeks damages for Mr. Perry’s alleged “malicious and intentional

misrepresentations.” Mr. Perry filed an answer in which he denied Ms. Cormier’s

claims and asserted that any statements he made were protected speech under Article

III, § 8 of the Louisiana Constitution and, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity

from prosecution. He also filed a special motion to strike, as provided in La.Civ.

Code P. art. 971, in which he argued that he is immune from prosecution because his

statements were made in his capacity as alderman and pertain to public issues.

After a hearing held December 7, 2017, on Mr. Perry’s motion, the trial court

granted the motion and dismissed Ms. Cormier’s petition in open court. The trial

court awarded Mr. Perry attorney fees as requested. On December 13, 2017, the trial

court signed a judgment dismissing Ms. Cormier’s suit with prejudice and awarding

Mr. Perry $5,850 in attorney fees; the judgment was mailed December 18, 2017. On

December 17, 2017, Ms. Cormier filed a motion to recuse the trial judge. The trial

judge denied the motion without a hearing.

Ms. Cormier appeals the trial court’s judgment and assigns three errors with the

trial court’s proceeding:

(1) The trial court committed error in granting the Motion to Strike filed by Jacob Colby Perry.

(2) The trial court committed error in denying the Motion to Recuse and for Stay of All Proceedings During the Pendency of this Motion filed by Plaintiff. (3) The trial court committed error in denying a hearing over the Motion to Recuse and for Stay of All Proceedings During the Pendency of this Motion filed by Plaintiff.

Mr. Perry filed an answer to Ms. Cormier’s appeal, seeking an award of

attorney fees for work performed on appeal.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Strike

Ms. Cormier sued Mr. Perry seeking damages for alleged defamatory

statements that Mr. Perry made about her. In Aymond v. Dupree, 05-1248, pp. 9-10

(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/12/06), 928 So.2d 721, 728 (citations omitted), writ denied, 06-1729

(La. 10/6/06), 938 So.2d 85, this court explained the plaintiff’s burden of proof for

defamation, stating:

[T]o maintain an action for defamation, he has the burden of proving five elements: (1) defamatory words; (2) unprivileged publication; (3) falsity; (4) malice (actual or implied); and, (5) injury. Defamation involves the invasion of a person’s interest in his or her reputation and good name. A defamatory communication or defamatory words are those which harm the reputation of another so as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter others from associating with him.

Whether a particular statement is objectively capable of having a defamatory meaning is a legal issue to be decided by the court, considering the statement as a whole, the context in which it was made, and the effect it is reasonably intended to produce in the mind of the average listener.

“Malice (or fault), for purposes of the tort of defamation, is a lack of reasonable belief

in the truth of the statement giving rise to the defamation.” Costello v. Hardy, 03-

1146, p. 18 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129, 143.

Ms. Cormier argues the trial court erred in granting Mr. Perry’s special motion

to strike. Article III, § 8 of the Louisiana Constitution provides immunity to members

of the legislature for “any speech in either house.” It has been held to constitute “an

absolute bar to interference when members are acting within the legitimate legislative

sphere.” Parish of Jefferson v. SFS Constr. Grp., Inc., 01-1118, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir.

2/13/02), 812 So.2d 103, 105, writ denied, 02-791 (La. 5/31/02), 817 So.2d 95. 2 Inquiries into the motivation for legislative actions have also been held to be contrary

to the purpose of Article III. Copsey v. Baer, 593 So. 2d 685 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991),

writ denied, 594 So.2d 876 (La.1992). This immunity extends to city legislative

bodies. Ruffino v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 06-2073 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/8/07), 965

So. 2d 414.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 971 provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability of success on the claim.

(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.

....

F. As used in this Article, the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them below, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise: (1) “Act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue” includes but is not limited to: (a) Any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law. (b) Any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official body authorized by law. The legislature enacted Article 971 “as a procedural device to be used in the

early stages of litigation to screen out meritless claims brought primarily to chill the

valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for redress

of grievances.” Aymond, 928 So.2d at 727. Appellate courts review the grant of a

special motion to strike under the de novo standard of review because it involves

issues of law. Id.

3 To prevail on his special motion to strike, Mr. Perry must make a prima facie

showing that the causes of action asserted against him “arise[] from an act by him in

the exercise of his right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana

Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Shelton v. Pavon, 17-482, pp. 5-6

(La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1233, 1237.

To establish that his comments were made in connection with a public issue

and, therefore, privileged and immune from suit, Mr. Perry attached an affidavit

executed by him. In his affidavit, he stated that he had been informed by the Mayor

of Welsh, Carolyn Louviere, who is Ms. Cormier’s mother, that she referred all new

businesses in Welsh to Ms. Cormier, who is a realtor. He explained that he was

concerned that Ms. Louviere’s referral of new business to Ms. Cormier might be a

violation of La.R.S. 42:1119, which prohibits nepotism. Ms. Cormier presented no

evidence challenging the veracity of Mr. Perry’s assertions in his affidavit that any

statements he made regarding Mr. Johnson were made in his role as alderman. We

find that Mr. Perry made a prima facie showing that his statements were made in his

role as alderman and “in furtherance of [his] right of . . . free speech under the United

States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue” and, therefore, are

privileged speech. La.Code Civ.P. art. 971(F)(1).

The burden of proof then shifted to Ms. Cormier to show that she will probably

succeed on her claims. She must prove all the required elements of defamation or her

claims fail. Costello, 864 So.2d 129. Ms. Cormier relies upon the allegations of her

petition to satisfy her burden of proof. She asserted in her petition that Mr. Perry:

(1) “has written and published various types of correspondence regarding Plaintiff’s alleged activities, to include but not limited to collusion, for financial gain, with the Mayor, mother of the Plaintiff”;

(2) “alleged that the Plaintiff was abusing her relationship to the Mayor and this led to real estate mis-dealings in the form of unfair business practices utilizing the Mayor’s position”;

4 (3) “used his personal profile and his position as Alderman of The City of Welsh as a platform to allege, via social media, news outlets and other means, that the Plaintiff had acted in an illegal fashion using her relationship to the Mayor for her own gain”;

(4) made “public statements on various occasions in an attempt to defame her reputation.”

Ms. Cormier has not presented any evidence showing that Mr. Perry’s

statements were defamatory because she has failed to prove that they were

unprivileged publications and were made with malice, i.e., he knew his statements

were false, or made with reckless disregard to the truth. Nonetheless, she argues the

trial court erred in finding that Mr. Perry’s speech was protected because La.R.S.

9:2798.1 excepts certain actions by legislators from protection. Louisiana Revised

Statutes 9:2798.1 states, in pertinent part:

B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.

C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not applicable:

(1) To acts or omissions which are not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists; or

(2) To acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.

Ms. Cormier has not shown that Mr. Perry’s actions and statements fall within

the parameters of La.R.S. 9:2798.1(C)(1) or (C)(2). Moreover, she has failed to

establish that “a statute, regulation or policy specifically prescribes the course of

action for [Mr. Perry] to follow,” which is required for the application of La.R.S.

9:2798.1. Simeon v. Doe, 618 So.2d 848, 852-53 (La.1993). For these reasons, the

trial court did not err in granting Mr. Perry’s special motion to dismiss.

5 Recusal

Ms. Cormier also assigns error with the trial court’s denial of her motion to

recuse and for stay of all proceedings and with the trial court’s denial of her request

for a hearing on the motion. Ten days after the hearing was held on Mr. Perry’s

special motion to strike, Ms. Cormier filed a motion to recuse the trial judge. Ms.

Cormier cited the trial judge’s prior representation of Mr. Perry’s grandparents, self-

recusal from a matter in which the grandparents were defendants, and close friendship

with Mr. Perry’s uncle as “a clear potential for bias” by the trial judge and grounds for

his recusal. She asserted that she did not learn of these acts until the day before he

filed his motion; therefore, her motion was timely.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 154 provides that a motion to recuse

a trial judge must be filed before trial, “unless the party discovers the facts

constituting the ground for recusation thereafter, in which event it shall be filed

immediately after these facts are discovered, but prior to judgment.” Ms. Cormier did

file her motion to recuse before the trial court signed a judgment in this matter.

Therefore, it was timely.

The Code of Civil Procedure identifies four situations in which a judge “shall

be recused.” La.Code Civ. P. art. 151(A). The only situation that might be applicable

herein is when the trial judge:

(4) Is biased, prejudiced, or interested in the cause or its outcome or biased or prejudiced toward or against the parties or the parties’ attorneys or any witness to such an extent that he would be unable to conduct fair and impartial proceedings.

Id. A judge “has full power and authority to act in the cause,” until he recuses himself

or a motion to have him recused is filed. La.Code Civ.P. art. 153. Article 154

(emphasis added) further provides, “If a valid ground for recusation is set forth in the

motion, the judge shall either recuse himself, or refer the motion to another judge or a

judge ad hoc . . . for a hearing.” Ms. Cormier acknowledges that a trial judge can

6 deny a motion for recusal without a hearing, but she argues that the facts of this case

warrant a hearing.

In In re Eleanor Pierce (Marshall) Stevens Living Trust, 17-111, 17-112, pp.

13-14 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/17), 229 So.3d 36, 47 (footnote omitted), writ denied, 17-

1868 (La. 1/29/18), 233 So.3d 613, this court explained the grounds required for

recusal:

Article 151 “do[es] not include a ‘substantial appearance of the possibility of bias’ or even a ‘mere appearance of impropriety’ as causes for removing a judge from presiding over a given action.” Slaughter [v. Board of Sup’rs of Southern Univ., 10-1114 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/2/11), 76 So.3d 465, 471, writ denied, 11-2112 (La. 1/13/12), 77 So.3d 970]. It instead requires a finding of actual bias or prejudice that is of a substantial nature, and not one based on merely conclusory allegations. Covington v. McNeese State Univ., 10-0250 (La. 4/5/10), 32 So.3d 223. Furthermore, and as a foundational point, it is important to recall that “[a] judge is presumed to be impartial.” Slaughter, 76 So.3d at 471.

Neither Ms. Cormier’s motion to recuse nor her supporting affidavits contain

any allegations of bias or prejudice by the trial judge. The two affidavits merely state

that the trial judge’s connections to Mr. Perry’s family members “certainly appears to

be improper for him to hear cases involving them.” Accordingly, we find no error

with his denial of the motion to recuse without holding a hearing.

Attorney Fees

Mr. Perry properly filed an answer to Ms. Cormier’s appeal, seeking an award

of attorney fees for work performed on appeal. An award of attorney fees is mandated

by La.Code Civ.P. art 971 for a successful special motion to strike. Alexander v.

Times–Picayune L.L.C., 16-1134 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/31/17), 221 So.3d 198, 203, writ

denied, 17-1322 (La. 11/6/17), 229 So.3d 469.

We have reviewed counsel’s statement of work performed in the trial court

which includes his hourly rated, as well as the work performed in the trial court, and

award Mr. Perry an additional $1,500 in attorney fees for work performed by his

counsel on appeal.

7 DISPOSITON

The judgment of the trial court is amended to award Mr. Perry additional

attorney fees in the amount of $1,500 for work performed on appeal and affirmed as

amended.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.