Nancy Alonso v. New Orleans Aviation Board

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-0626
• Status: Published
• Author: Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott

Opinion

NANCY ALONSO * NO. 2025-CA-0626

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL NEW ORLEANS AVIATION * BOARD FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2025-00583, DIVISION “L-6” Honorable Kern A. Reese ****** Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott ****** (Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)

Eulis Simien, Jr. SIMIEN & SIMIEN, L.L.C. 7908 Wrenwood Blvd. Baton Rouge, LA 70809

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Lawrence G. Pugh, III Alexander J. Brewster PUGH ACCARDO, LLC 1100 Poydras Street, Suite 3600 New Orleans, LA 70163

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

MOTION TO REMAND GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED

March 5, 2026 NEK RML DNA

Appellant, Nancy Alonso, appeals the district court’s July 23, 2025

judgment granting the Appellee’s Motion for Involuntary Dismissal and dismissing

her suit against Appellee without prejudice. During the pendency of this appeal,

the parties filed a Joint Motion to Remand, requesting the matter be remanded and

reconsidered by the district court. For the following reasons, we grant the Joint

Motion to Remand, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand the case back

to the district court for reconsideration.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from the district court’s granting of the Appellee’s Motion

for Involuntary Dismissal based on Appellant’s failure to pay the required service

fee and effectuate service within ninety days of filing her petition.

Appellant, Nancy Alonso (“Ms. Alonso”), filed her petition for damages

against Appellee, the City of New Orleans by and through the New Orleans

Aviation Board (the “City”), on January 23, 2025. At the conclusion of her

petition, she requested service on the City. However, because Ms. Alonso failed to

remit payment to the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office (the “Sheriff’s Office”) to

effectuate service, the Sheriff’s Office did not attempt service.

1 On May 13, 2025, over three months after the petition had been filed, Ms.

Alonso’s counsel contacted the Orleans Clerk of Court’s Office to inquire about

service and then learned that the Sheriff’s Office never attempted service due to the

nonpayment of the service fee. As soon as Ms. Alonso’s counsel discovered this,

her counsel requested that citation and service be reissued, and he remitted

payment of the required fee. The City was finally served on May 28, 2025, 125

days after the petition was filed.

The next day, the City filed a Motion for Involuntary Dismissal on the basis

that Ms. Alonso failed to properly request service within ninety days of the filing

of the petition, as required under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C), because she did not pay

the required service fee when she made the request. Following a hearing on July

11, 2025, the district court granted the City’s motion and dismissed Ms. Alonso’s

suit without prejudice. The district court issued its written judgment on July 23,

2025, and this timely devolutive appeal followed.

While this appeal was pending, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Remand,

wherein the parties agreed that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence controls the

outcome of this appeal. The motion to remand was deferred to the appellate panel,

and we now rule as follows.

DISCUSSION

Both parties in their joint motion and appellate briefs direct this Court’s

attention to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in DaRouse v. P.J.’s Coffee of

New Orleans, LLC, 2025-00078 (La. 10/24/25), 421 So. 3d 885. DaRouse is

similar to the present case in that the plaintiff had requested service but failed to

timely remit payment of the Sheriff’s Office fees. However, unlike the present

case, the district court denied the defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal,

2 finding that the payment of fees is not required under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C). In

reviewing the language of La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C) on appeal, the Louisiana

Supreme Court determined, “A plain reading of the statutory provisions reveals

that all that is required for compliance is that service be requested. . . . The

pertinent statutory provisions do not provide that payment of any related filing fees

and costs must be made within a stipulated time period.” DaRouse, 2025-00078, p.

4, 421 So. 3d at 887-88 (quoting Jenkins v. Larpenter, 2004-0318, pp. 1-2 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So. 2d 656, 659 (Guidry, J., dissenting)). Ultimately, the

Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s judgment and ruled that the

payment of fees is not required by La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C). See id. at pp. 6-7, 421

So. 3d at 889-90.

At the time the district court ruled on the City’s Motion for Involuntary

Dismissal, the Louisiana Supreme Court had not yet issued its opinion in DaRouse.

In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling and the parties’ Joint Motion to

Remand, we vacate the district court’s July 23, 2025 judgment and remand this

case for the district court to reconsider the motion in light of the DaRouse ruling.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the parties Joint Motion to Remand,

vacate the district court’s July 23, 2025 judgment granting the City’s Motion for

Involuntary Dismissal, and remand this matter back to the district court for

reconsideration.