Nakia Woodson v. James Leestma

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 17, 2024
• Docket: 23-55063
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NAKIA WOODSON, No. 23-55063

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-08843-CAS-JEM v.

JAMES LEESTMA; ADVANCE MEMORANDUM* INHERITANCE LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 12, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: IKUTA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and ANELLO,*** District Judge.

Nakia Woodson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of James Leestma and Advance Inheritance LLC. Woodson alleges Leestma

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Michael M. Anello, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. and Advance Inheritance intentionally and negligently interfered with her efforts to

obtain a loan to improve a piece of property, which had been deeded to her by

Patricia Gleason as administrator of the estate of Carole Gleason, Patricia’s

mother.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Woodson’s tort claims did

not require the district court to probate or annul a will, administer an estate, or

distribute property from an estate; therefore, the district court erred in applying the

probate exception to federal jurisdiction. See Silk v. Bond, 65 F.4th 445, 450 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 91 (2023). Because the district court had jurisdiction,

we may review its rulings in the alternative, which we affirm.

After Carole’s death, Leestma and Advance Inheritance provided Patricia’s

brother Kevin with an advance on his inheritance from Carole. Leestma petitioned

the state probate court to have Patricia removed as administrator of Carole’s estate

in order to force a sale of the property and satisfy Kevin’s advance. When

Leestma discovered Patricia had deeded the property to Woodson without

consideration or notice to the heirs, he filed a lis pendens. Leestma was

subsequently contacted by an escrow company seeking to resolve the lis pendens,

and when Leestma explained the circumstances of the property’s transfer to

Woodson and the pending probate action, the escrow company refused to proceed

with Woodson’s loan.

2 We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Woodson.

See Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that

a district court’s ruling on summary judgment is reviewed de novo). Woodson

does not challenge on appeal the district court’s finding that the only evidence she

presented in support of her opposition to summary judgment was Leestma’s

recording of the lis pendens and his conversation with escrow agent Olivia Mercer.

We agree with the district court that this evidence is privileged under California’s

litigation privilege, as codified in California Civil Code § 47(b), and therefore

cannot give rise to tort liability. See Alpha & Omega Dev., LP v. Whillock

Contracting, Inc., 200 Cal. App. 4th 656, 665 (2011) (holding that a lis pendens is

covered by California’s litigation privilege if it “identifies an action ‘previously

filed’ in a court of competent jurisdiction that . . . affects title or right to possession

of real property” (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b)(4))); see, e.g., Chang v.

Lederman, 172 Cal. App. 4th 67, 87–88 (2009) (in suit for intentional infliction of

emotional distress by widow against trust attorney, letter from attorney to widow

instructing her to vacate house per trust provisions fell under the litigation

privilege because it was sent to further the probate proceedings initiated by a third

party).

We affirm the district court’s denial of Woodson’s request for a continuance

of summary judgment. Woodson did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil

3 Procedure 56(d)’s requirement to provide an affidavit or declaration which

explained why she was unable to discover the information she sought at an earlier

time. In addition, Woodson failed to set forth specific facts she would have

obtained from discovery that would have defeated summary judgment. See Family

Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th

Cir. 2008).

We also affirm the district court’s denial of Woodson’s request for leave to

amend, because Woodson’s claims rest solely on communications which fall under

California’s litigation privilege. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] district court may dismiss without leave

where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading

deficiencies and amendment would be futile.” (citing Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc.

v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam))).

Further, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the prior exclusive

jurisdiction doctrine did not apply, because in deciding Woodson’s tort claims, it

would not be exercising jurisdiction over a res. See Chapman v. Deutsche Bank

Nat’l Tr. Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The prior exclusive

jurisdiction doctrine holds that ‘when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction

4 over a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res.’”

(quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006))).

AFFIRMED.1

1 Leestma and Advance Inheritance’s motion for judicial notice, Dkt. 51, is granted.