IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII BRONSON NAKAAHIKI, CIVIL NO. 25-00401 DKW-KJM #A6001816, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST Plaintiff, AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND vs.
KAUAI POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS,
Defendants.
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Bronson Nakaahiki’s First Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (FAC) brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 ECF No. 5. In the FAC, Nakaahiki asserts claims against an unspecified number of unnamed Kauai Police Department (“KPD”) officers based on various events that occurred during unidentified years. ECF No. 5 at PageID.37-39, 41-43. After conducting the required screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), the Court DISMISSES the FAC with leave to amend. If Nakaahiki wants to proceed, he must file an amended pleading that cures the noted
1Nakaahiki is currently incarcerated at the Halawa Correctional Facility. See VINE, https://vinelink.vineapps.com/search/HI/Person (select “ID Number”; enter “A6001816”; and select “Search”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2025). deficiencies in his claims on or before November 7, 2025. Alternatively, instead of filing an amended pleading, Nakaahiki may inform the Court in writing on or
before November 7, 2025 that he would like to voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).2
I. STATUTORY SCREENING The Court is required to screen all in forma pauperis prisoner complaints filed against government officials, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018).
Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from defendants who are immune from suit must be dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same standard as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
2In general, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from filing a civil action in forma pauperis if he or she has on three or more occasions brought an action in federal court that was dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief
from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id. In conducting this screening, the Court liberally construes pro se litigants’ pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Court must grant leave to amend if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d
1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013). II. BACKGROUND The FAC alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for the
purposes of screening. See Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014). On March 15 of an unspecified year, three men “mob[b]ed” Nakaahiki and called the police. ECF No. 5 at PageID.37. Nakaahiki’s eyes were swollen shut, his jaw was “messed up,” and his shoulder was dislocated. Id. When unnamed KPD
officers arrived at the scene, Nakaahiki stated that the three men had assaulted him, but they were not arrested. Id. During a second undated incident, KPD officers stopped Nakaahiki while he
was driving and told him that he had an outstanding arrest warrant. Id. at PageID.38. When Nakaahiki asked to see the warrant, he was “slam[m]ed to the ground.” Id. While being held down, Nakaahiki told the officers that he could not
breathe, but they did not stop. Id. Nakaahiki also alleges that “every day” since his release following this incident, he has been “harassed.” Id. at PageID.39. Nakaahiki commenced this lawsuit by signing the original Complaint on
September 1, 2025. Id. at PageID.8. The Court granted Nakaahiki in forma pauperis status on September 19, 2025. ECF No. 3. On September 22, 2025, the Court dismissed the original Complaint with partial leave to amend. ECF No. 4. The Court explained, among other things, that Nakaahiki could not sue the KPD,
he had not alleged a plausible municipal liability claim against the County of Kauai, and he could not rely on state criminal statutes to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at PageID.24-30.
The Court received the FAC on October 2, 2025. Id. at PageID.25. In the FAC’s six counts, Nakaahiki again asserts various claims against an unspecified number of unnamed KPD officers based on the same undated events described in the original Complaint. Id. at 37-39, 41-43. Nakaahiki seeks $900 billion in
damages. Id. at PageID.40. III. DISCUSSION A. Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under color of’ law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.’” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020). B. Rule 8 Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8. Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710
F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires every pleading to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). One of the reasons for this requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court has explained that “the pleading standard Rule 8
announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (cleaned up). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the FAC does not meet the requirements of Rule 8. Although Nakaahiki alleges that various KPD officers violated his rights, he does not say in what year these events occurred. See Tamayo v. City of Glendale, No. 19-cv- 10284, 2020 WL 136633, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020) (“Plaintiff fails to allege
the basic who, what, when, where, and why of his claims against Defendants.”); see also McGinnis v. Halawa Corr. Facility, No. 20-00567, 2021 WL 115654, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 12, 2021) (concluding that pleading did not satisfy Rule 8
because it did not state, among other things, when the complained-of conduct occurred). Nakaahiki also does not state how each KPD officer allegedly violated his rights. For example, he does not say which KPD officer or officers used excessive
force, or which officer or officers have been harassing him and why. If Nakaahiki decides to file another amended pleading, he must specify what each officer did or failed to do to violate his rights under federal law. If he has the name or names of
the officers at issue, he should clearly state as much. All Nakaahiki’s claims are therefore DISMISSED with leave to amend. In choosing between filing a second amended pleading or dismissing this action without incurring a strike, Nakaahiki
should also consider the following procedural and substantive standards. C. Joinder When a single defendant is named, a party may bring as many claims as it
has against that defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). “To name different defendants in the same lawsuit, however, a plaintiff must satisfy Rule 20, governing joinder of parties.” Weeks v. Espinda, No. 10-00305, 2010 WL 2218631, at *3 (D. Haw. June 2, 2010). Rule 20(a)(2) allows multiple defendants to be joined in one action
only if (1) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (2) any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A), (B). “Unrelated claims involving different defendants belong in different suits.” What v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, No. 13-00373, 2014 WL 176610, at *4 (D. Haw. Jan. 13, 2014). If Nakaahiki decides to file an amended complaint, he should make clear the
connection, if any, between different claims. Nakaahiki may state several claims against a single defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18. He may also add any additional claims against other defendants, if those claims arise from the same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions as his original claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Nakaahiki may not pursue a combination of unrelated claims in a single suit. See Char v. Kaiser Hosp., No. 18-00345, 2019 WL 80890, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 2,
2019) (“Unrelated claims involving different defendants must be brought in separate actions.”). Any attempt to join claims that are not permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will result in those claims being dismissed as
improperly joined. D. Statute of Limitations Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. Instead, “[a]ctions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the forum state’s
statute of limitations for personal injury actions.” Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985)). In general, the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Hawaii is two years.
See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-7; Bird v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019). Under federal law, which governs the accrual of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a cause of action generally accrues when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.” Belanus v. Clark,
796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, Nakaahiki does not say in what year any of the alleged events occurred. He must be mindful of the statute of limitations if he chooses to file an
amended pleading. E. Doe Defendants Doe defendants are generally disfavored because it is effectively impossible
for the United States Marshals to serve an anonymous defendant. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Sometimes, however, a plaintiff cannot know the names of all defendants prior to bringing suit. In such instances, a
plaintiff may refer to unknown defendants as John or Jane Doe, alleging specific facts showing how each Doe defendant violated his rights. The plaintiff may then use the discovery process to obtain the names of Doe defendants and, once they are identified, seek leave to amend to name those defendants. But a plaintiff may not
use “Doe” placeholders if it is clear that discovery will not uncover their identities, or that the complaint will be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642).
Here, for any claims against unnamed KPD officers to proceed, Nakaahiki must refer to the unknown officers as John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and so on, and he must allege facts to show how each officer violated his federal rights. F. Law Enforcement
In Count I, Nakaahiki alleges that KPD officers chose not to arrest three men who had “mob[b]ed” him. ECF No. 5 at PageID.37. In general, Nakaahiki cannot pursue any claims based solely on a police officer’s decision regarding an
investigation or arrest. See Van Hook v. Idaho, No. 1:21-CV-00199, 2022 WL 344439, at *9 (D. Idaho Feb. 4, 2022) (“Plaintiff has no constitutional or common law right to have his civil rights complaints and potential criminal complaints
investigated or prosecuted by the FBI, the United States Attorney General, or any other governmental entity.”); see also Est. of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It is well established that there is no constitutional right to be
protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen.”) (cleaned up). G. Excessive Force In Count II, Nakaahiki alleges that two KPD officers used excessive force.
ECF No. 5 at PageID.38. “The operative question in excessive force cases is whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of search or seizure.” Cnty. of Los
Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 427–28 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (brackets in original). “The reasonableness of the use of force is evaluated under an ‘objective’ inquiry that pays careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. at 428 (quotation marks omitted).
“Whether a use of force was reasonable will depend on the facts of the particular case, including, but not limited to, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to anyone, whether the suspect resisted or attempted to evade arrest, and the
severity of the crime at issue.” S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019). In addition, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “That inquiry is dispositive: When an officer carries out a seizure that is reasonable, taking into account all relevant circumstances, there is no valid excessive force claim.”
Mendez, 581 U.S. at 428. Nakaahiki is reminded that before any excessive force claim can proceed, he must provide additional details regarding the circumstances of his arrest. See Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that courts must
consider “the type and amount of force inflicted,” the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest).
H. Equal Protection In Count VI, Nakaahiki again refers to “equality of rights equal protection.” ECF No. 5 at PageID.43. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all similarly situated people equally.” Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In general, “[t]o state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or
purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Nakaahiki still has not plausibly alleged that he is a member of a protected
class, nor has he plausibly alleged that any KPD officer intentionally or purposefully discriminated against him because of that membership. I. State Criminal Law Although Nakaahiki seeks relief solely pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he
again appears to base some his claims on state criminal statutes. See ECF No. 5 at PageID.41-42 (referring to “negligent injury in the first” and “negligent injury in the second”). As the Court has already explained to Nakaahiki, he cannot do this.
See Buckheit v. Dennis, 713 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“As a general rule, a violation of state law does not lead to liability under § 1983.”); see also Beitch v. Wheeler, No. CV 15-00872-VBF (GJS), 2015 WL 13752415, at *5 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015) (stating that a violation of a state criminal law provision
is not a basis for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 15-00872-VBF (GJS), 2015 WL 13762928 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2015). If Nakaahiki chooses to file an amended pleading, he must plausibly allege that a defendant’s conduct caused a violation of his federal civil rights, not a violation of state criminal law.
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND The FAC, ECF No. 5, is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Nakaahiki must file any amended pleading on or before November 7, 2025. Nakaahiki may not
expand his claims beyond those already alleged herein or add new claims, such as those against individual police officers, without explaining how those new claims relate to the claims alleged in the FAC. Claims that do not properly relate to those in the FAC are subject to dismissal.
Nakaahiki must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the District of Hawaii. Local Rule 10.4 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself, without reference to any prior pleading. An
amended complaint must be short and plain, comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and be submitted on the Court’s prisoner civil rights form. See LR99.2(a). An amended complaint will supersede the FAC. See Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015).
Defendants not renamed and claims not realleged in an amended complaint may be deemed voluntarily dismissed. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). V. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) If Nakaahiki fails to file an amended complaint or is unable to amend his
claims to cure their deficiencies, this dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. §1915(g). Under this “3-strikes” provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis,
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). VI. CONCLUSION (1) The Court DISMISSES the FAC, ECF No. 5, with leave to amend. (2) If Nakaahiki wants to proceed, he must file an amended pleading that cures the noted deficiencies in his claims on or before November 7, 2025. (3) ALTERNATIVELY, instead of filing an amended pleading, Nakaahiki may inform the Court in writing on or before November 7, 2025, that he would like to voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), and such a dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (4) Failure to comply with these deadlines may result in AUTOMATIC DISMISSAL of this suit without further notice, and Nakaahiki may incur a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (5) The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Nakaahiki a blank prisoner civil rights complaint form so that he can comply with this order if he elects to file an amended pleading. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: October 10, 2025 at Honolulu, Hawai‘1.
dot. : Derrick K. Watson Ro “sf Chief United States District Judge
Bronson Nakaahiki v. Kauai Police Department; Civil No. 25-00401 DK W-KJM; ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND