Nahum v. The Boeing Company

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 4 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 5 ) 6 SETONDJI NAHUM, ) ) CASE NO. 2:19-cv-1114-BJR 7 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 8 v. ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 9 THE BOEING COMPANY, et al., ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) 10 Defendants. ) ____________________________________) 11

12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Pro se Plaintiff Setondji Nahum accuses his former employer, Defendant The Boing 14 Company, and his former supervisor, Defendant Jeffrey Dillaman, of discrimination, harassment, 15 and defamation based on his termination from employment. Before the Court are the parties’ 16 Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 90 (“Defs.’ 17 Mot.”); Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 98 (“Pl.’s Mot.”).1 Having reviewed the Motions, the 18 oppositions thereto, the record of the case, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will grant 19 20 Defendants’ Motion and deny Plaintiff’s Motion.2 The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 21

23 1 Plaintiff requests oral argument to address the pending motions. Pl.’s Mot. at 2. The Court finds that the Motions can be resolved on the briefing and that oral argument is unnecessary. See Local Rules WD. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4) 24 (“Unless otherwise ordered by the court, all motions will be decided by the court without oral argument.”). 25 2 Plaintiff contends that summary judgment is premature as there are outstanding discovery disputes regarding “[m]ultiple interrogatories . . . directly addressed to Boeing Management” which he claims Defendants have failed 1 II. BACKGROUND 1 A. Factual Background 2 Plaintiff was hired by Boeing on February 16, 2018 as an Industrial Engineer Level 2, 3 4 which entails “developing implementing, and evaluating processes to optimize efficiency during 5 aircraft production.” Defs.’ Mot. at 4; see also Decl. of Jeffrey Dillaman, Dkt. No. 92 ¶¶ 2–4 6 (“Dillaman Decl.”). Mr. Dillaman became Plaintiff’s manager shortly thereafter on March 9, 7 2018. Defs.’ Mot. at 5. Plaintiff describes himself as an African and Black male. See, e.g., Am. 8 Compl., Dkt. No. 47 at 5. 9 Defendants claim that from the very beginning of Plaintiff’s employment it was apparent 10 that he was “unable to successfully coordinate with other teams or deliver results in accordance 11 12 with the expectations of his role.” Id. at 5. According to Defendants, Plaintiff was unable to work 13 collaboratively, maintained an argumentative, sarcastic, and mocking tone, and was unresponsive 14 to both constructive criticism and direct orders from his supervisors. Defendants have submitted 15 16

18 to produce. Pl.’s Reply in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Dkt. No. 106 at 20–22 (“Pl.’s Resp.”). First, Plaintiff’s request fails to raise with specificity what he claims Defendants have failed to produce, merely that they 19 “produced whatever they wished which included nothing but duplicate and reprinted materials and non-genuine materials.” Id. at 22. Defendants deny that they have failed to turn over any evidence. Defs.’ Reply in Support of 20 Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 108 at 17–18 (“Defs.’ Reply”). Further, this Court held a telephonic discovery dispute hearing on August 24, 2020 to address Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants failed to fully answer Plaintiff’s interrogatories. 21 See Min. Entry, Dkt. No. 85. That day, the Court published an order resolving the dispute and announcing that the Order “resolves all current discovery disputes between the parties.” Order re Disc. Hr’g, Dkt. No. 86 at 2. 22 Discovery in this matter closed on September 2, 2020. Order Setting Trial Date and Related Dates, Dkt. No. 58. As such, Plaintiff’s request to delay discovery is both untimely and does not identify the evidence he seeks with 23 sufficient specificity to warrant a delay. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d); InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 662 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (“To prevail on a request for additional 24 discovery under Rule 56(d), a party must show that: (1) it has set forth in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose 25 summary judgment.”). 2 numerous contemporaneous emails from Plaintiff’s supervisors and coworkers attesting to, and 1 demonstrating, the difficulty in working with Plaintiff. See, e.g., Dillaman Decl., Exs. 3, 5, 7, 10, 2 3 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42. These concerns were 4 expressed in Plaintiff’s one, and only, performance evaluation while employed with Boeing. See 5 Dillaman Decl., Ex. 6, Dkt. No. 92 at 28–33 (“2018 Performance Evaluation”). The Evaluation 6 includes “Interim Manager Insights” from Mr. Dillaman signed June 29, 2018, which include the 7 comment that “[t]here are areas that need to improve to meet my expectations at the end of the 8 year (mostly in terms of taking direction and working effectively with others).” Id. at 32. The 9 Evaluation was finalized on November 14, 2018 and includes numerous performance based 10 11 criteria, for which Plaintiff was consistently ranked as “met expectations” except for the relevant 12 categories of Communication, Customer Satisfaction, and People Working Together for which he 13 was ranked “Met Some Expectations.” Id. 14 Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s intransigence quickly led to workplace issues. In mid- 15 August 2018, for example, Defendants claim that Plaintiff seven times refused to complete a work 16 task, assembling a Production Planning Change Request (“PPCR”), which Mr. Dillaman expressly 17 18 charged him with completing. Defs.’ Mot. at 6–8. Plaintiff rejects this claim and argues that, 19 based on company policy, a PPCR was not necessary. See Pl.’s Mot. at 6; Pl.’s Resp. at 13–14. 20 Defendants responds that a PPCR was both necessary and that, whether or not it was necessary, 21 Plaintiff’s refusal to complete the work even after direct instruction from his supervisor created 22 workplace issues. Mot. at 7–8. Mr. Dillaman submitted the incident to Boeing’s Human 23 Resources for investigation and possible discipline. Dillaman Decl. ¶ 28; Decl. of Tami R. Foxe, 24 Dkt. No. 93 ¶ 3 (“Foxe Decl.”). Tami Foxe, a Human Resources Generalist, conducted a fact- 25 3 finding investigation, interviewing various employees involved in the dispute, and concluded that 1 Plaintiff failed to comply with management expectations. Foxe Decl. ¶¶ 5–7; see also Foxe Decl., 2 3 Ex. 44, Dkt. No. 93 (Investigation Case Notes). Based on that finding, Plaintiff was issued a 4 Corrective Action Memo (“CAM”) on September 4, 2018. See Dillaman Decl., Ex. 15, Dkt. No. 5 92 at 86 (First Employee Corrective Action Memo). 6 According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s combative and dismissive behavior continued after 7 his first CAM. Defendants report that he continued to refuse to follow directions from Mr. 8 Dillaman and other team members concerning simple tasks such as sorting out confusion in 9 statements of work, creating workflow documentation in project management tools, and refusing 10 11 to attend team meetings. Mot. at 8–10. Mr. Dillaman again submitted this insubordination to 12 Boeing HR. Id. at 10; Decl. of Janet Bishop, Exs. 45 (Fact-Finding Investigation Request Form); 13 46 (Incident Details), Dkt. No. 94 (“Bishop Decl.”). The matter was assigned to Timothy Saner, 14 another Human Resources Generalist, who conducted another fact-finding investigation. Dillaman 15 Decl. ¶¶ 47–48; Bishop Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; see also Bishop Decl., Exs. 47 (Investigation Case Notes); 16 48 (Plaintiff’s Edits to Mr. Saner’s Written Summary). Based on his investigation, Mr. Saner 17 18 concluded that Plaintiff failed to comply with management directions and expectations to complete 19 required tasks. Bishop Decl. ¶ 8. On February 7, 2019, Plaintiff was issued his second CAM. See 20 Dillaman, Decl., Ex. 26, Dkt. No. 92 at 123 (Second Employee Corrective Action Memo). 21 Based on his belief that the two CAMs issued against him were unwarranted, Plaintiff 22 submitted three complaints to Boeing’s ethics team on April 10, 2019. Mot. at 14–15. Review of 23 the complaints reveals no allegation of discrimination. See Decl. of Carl E. Weaver, Exs. 50, 51, 24 50 (Case Detail Reports), Dkt. No. 95 (“Weaver Decl.”). The complaints were compiled and 25 4 assigned to Carl Weaver of Boeing’s Corporate Investigations Team, who conducted an internal 1 investigation. 2 3 Meanwhile, according to Defendants, Plaintiff’s second CAM did not resolve his 4 behavioral issues. For example, in January of 2019, Defendants claim that Plaintiff refused to 5 complete another PPCR, despite being directed to do so multiple times by Mr. Dillaman. Mot. at 6 10–11. Further in March of that year, Defendants claim Plaintiff was unable to complete a task 7 assigned to him, despite specific directions from Mr. Dillaman, leading to frustration throughout 8 the assigned team and delay in the project. Mot. at 11–12. When given constructive feedback on 9 the assignment, Mr. Dillaman claims that Plaintiff was dismissive and unyielding. Id. at 11; see 10 11 also Dillaman Decl., Ex. 31, Dkt. No. 90 at 190–92 (March 22, 2019 Email Chain between Mr. 12 Dillaman and Plaintiff). This incident led Mr. Dillaman to submit Plaintiff to HR for a third time. 13 Mot. at 13–14; Dillaman Decl. ¶ 69; see also Decl. of Kima Lima, Exs. 54 (Fact-Finding 14 Investigation Request Form); 55 (Incident Details), Dkt. No. 96 (“Lima Decl.”). 15 The matter was assigned to a third Human Resources Generalist, Kim Lima, who 16 conducted a third fact-finding investigation. Mot. at 15; Lima Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5–11; see also Lima 17 18 Decl., Exs. 56–59 (investigation materials). Based on her review of the facts, Ms. Lima concluded 19 that Plaintiff had failed to comply with management direction in violation of company policy. 20 Lima Decl. ¶ 12. Since this was his third violation in the same year, Plaintiff was issued a third 21 CAM and terminated on May 13, 2019. See Dillaman Decl., Ex. 43, Dkt. No. 92 at 249 (Third 22 Employee Corrective Action Memo). This decision corresponded with the conclusion of Mr. 23 Weaver’s investigation of Plaintiff’s internal complaints. On May 8, 2019, Mr. Weaver concluded 24 that, based on his investigation, there was insufficient evidence to substantiate Plaintiff’s claims 25 5 of unfair treatment. Mot. at 15; Weaver Decl. ¶ 9. 1 Defendants produce affidavits and contemporaneous emails from the third investigation 2 3 attesting to the brimming frustrations among supervisors and colleagues with Plaintiff’s inability 4 to complete his assignments, dismissive attitude, and refusal to take responsibility. Mot. at 13–14. 5 One email from this timeframe is instructive, in which Steve Simpkins, the manufacturing lead for 6 the project to which Plaintiff was assigned, wrote to Mr. Dillaman on March 22, 2019: 7 I’m through with Setondji V Nahum. It has become quite apparent to me that he 8 has made no effort to even research the door package to any level of understanding. At this point he is a waste of my time, that I am quite short of these days. I resent 9 the fact that I have been made to deal with an obvious problem child for the IE world, that you have saddled with one of the most difficult packages to manage. 10

11 Dillaman Decl., Ex. 41, Dkt. No. 92 at 241 (“Simpkins Email”).

12 After his termination, Plaintiff applied to the Washington Employment Security 13 Department (“ESD”) for unemployment benefits. Defs.’ Mot. at 15–16. ESD contacted Boeing 14 with a claim form, which was handled by Boeing’s authorized unemployment compensation agent, 15 TALX UCM Services Inc. (“TALX”). On June 10, 2019, TALX informed ESD that Plaintiff had 16 been discharged for violation of a reasonable and knowable company policy. Decl. of Amy C. 17 18 Evans, Dkt. No. 97 ¶ 4; see also id., Ex. 62, Dkt. No. 97 at 5–6 (TALX Cover Letter to ESD). This 19 included brief summaries of Plaintiff’s three CAMs and supporting materials. ESD, nevertheless, 20 approved Plaintiff’s application for unemployment benefits. Pl.’s Mot., Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 98-1 at 21 252. 22 B. Procedural History 23 On July 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court advancing seven self-styled causes of 24 action, including: (1) racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 25 6 (2) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (3) wrongful termination through abuse of power and 1 authority; (4) harassment in violation of Title VII; (5) libel and defamation per se; (6) conspiracy 2 3 against rights; and (7) retaliation though act of discrimination and abuse of office. Compl., Dkt. 4 No. 1. He appears in this matter pro se. 5 On December 17, 2019, this Court granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss 6 submitted by Defendants. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 7 No. 42 (“December 17 Order”). Specifically, the Court denied dismissal of Plaintiff’s 8 discrimination and harassment claims (Claims 1 and 4); granted dismissal of Plaintiff’s libel and 9 defamation claim without prejudice (Claim 5); and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s Title VII 10 11 retaliation, wrongful termination, conspiracy against rights, and retaliation though act of 12 discrimination and abuse of office claims (Claims 2, 3, 6, and 7). Plaintiff filed a motion to 13 reconsider the Court’s holdings on December 26, 2019, Mot. for Recons., Dkt. No. 43, and shortly 14 thereafter filed an amended complaint on January 9, 2020, repleading his libel and defamation 15 claims, Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 47. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. 16 Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 51. 17 18 In one order resolving both motions, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Motion for 19 Reconsideration and Defendants’ second Motion to Dismiss, leaving the same three claims as had 20 survived Defendants’ original Motion to Dismiss. Order Denying Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. and 21 Denying Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 61 (“April 2 Order”). Now before the Court are both 22 parties’ cross-motions seeking summary judgment as to these final three claims. 23 III. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a district court shall grant summary 25 7 judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 1 2 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “An issue of material 3 fact is genuine” where there is “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 4 non-moving party,” Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of California, 956 F.3d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020) 5 (quoting Tauscher v. Phoenix Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 931 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2019)), and a fact 6 is “material,” where it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” Anderson 7 v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 8 The standard for summary judgment does not change in the context of cross-motions. 9 Thus, in reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, “each motion must be considered on its 10 11 own merits.” Acosta v. City Nat’l Corp., 922 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fair Hous. 12 Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court 13 must “consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted in support of both 14 motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of them.” Tulalip Tribes of 15 Wash. v. Washington, 783 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2015); See also AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. 16 Expeditors Int’l Ocean, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1216 (W.D. Wash. 2020). The Court must 17 18 rule on each motion “on an individual and separate basis determining, for each side, whether a 19 judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” AGCS Marine Ins., 470 F. 20 Supp. 3d at 1216 (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 21 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2720 (3d ed. 1998))). 22 In doing so, the Court considers each motion according to the familiar burden shifting 23 scheme wherein the movant bears the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of 24 material fact, which the nonmovant must then rebut. See AGCS Marine Ins., 470 F. Supp. 3d at 25 8 1215–16; see also Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Walflor Indus., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1156 1 (W.D. Wash. 2019). In reviewing the parties’ Motions, the Court is cognizant of the deference 2 3 paid to pro se plaintiffs, which it has already elaborated. See December 17 Order at 3–4; April 2 4 Order at 4–5. At the same time, as the Court stated in the December 17 Order and reiterated in the 5 April 2 Order, the Court cannot “supply essential facts that the pro se plaintiff has failed to plead.” 6 December 17 Order at 3–4 (citing Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)); April 2 7 Order at 5. 8 Similarly, on summary judgment, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of 9 procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d on 10 11 other grounds, Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012); see also In re Greenstein, 12 589 B.R. 854, 861 (C.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d, 788 F. App’x 497 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Pro se litigants must 13 comply with basic procedural requirements, despite not being represented by an attorney.”). As 14 such, the familiar standard of evidentiary support applies wherein a nonmovant “must do more 15 than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. 16 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A nonmovant cannot defeat summary 17 18 judgment “by resting upon the allegations or denials of [his] own pleading” but, instead, “‘must 19 set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a 20 genuine issue for trial.’” City of Fresno v. United States, 709 F. Supp. 2d 934, 938–39 (E.D. Cal. 21 2010) (quoting Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007)). 22 Furthermore, “[a] nonmovant’s bald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence in his favor are both 23 insufficient to withstand summary judgment.” F.T.C. v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 24 2009); See also Byron v. Inst. for Envtl. Health, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 3d 467, 469 (W.D. Wash. 2019) 25 9 (quoting City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Although 1 the Court must reserve for the jury genuine issues regarding credibility, the weight of evidence, 2 3 and legitimate inferences, the ‘mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non- 4 moving party’s position will be insufficient’ to avoid judgment.”)). Thus, “[w]here the record 5 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 6 genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586 (internal citation and quotation 7 omitted). 8 IV. DISCUSSION 9 A. Discrimination 10 Plaintiff’s first claim is for discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e– 11 12 2(a). During summary judgment, claims for discrimination are reviewed under the familiar 13 McDonnell Douglas scheme. Weil v. Citizens Telecom Servs. Co., LLC, 922 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th 14 Cir. 2019) (referencing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Under 15 this scheme, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing that (1) he is a member of 16 a protected class; (2) he was performing his job satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse 17 employment action; and (4) his employer treated him differently than a similarly situated employee 18 19 who does not belong to the same protected class. Id. at 1003; see also Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. 20 Dist., 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1242 (W.D. Wash. 2020). If he is able to do so, the burden shifts to 21 the Defendants to provide a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for the alleged discriminatory 22 action. Kennedy, 443 F. Supp. 3d at 1242. If they are able to do so, the burden shifts back to 23 Plaintiff to “demonstrat[e] that the [D]efendant[s’] reason is actually pretextual.” Id. In this case, 24 there is no dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class or that he experienced an adverse 25 10 employment action in his termination based on three CAMs. 1 Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff is unable to 2 3 establish the second (satisfactory work) and fourth (comparator) prongs of discrimination’s prima 4 facie requirement and, even if he is, he is unable to establish that the company’s non-discriminatory 5 reason for firing him, i.e. inability to follow management instruction, is pretextual. Defs.’ Mot. at 6 19–22. 7 Plaintiff claims he is entitled to summary judgment, arguing that Defendant’s “fictitious 8 corrective actions” demonstrate that he was treated differently than non-minority employees. Pl.’s 9 Mot. at 6.3 He claims that Defendants intentionally constructed barriers and provided him with 10 11 false information when conducting his work designed to ensure that he failed as a pretext for his 12 discriminatory termination. Id. at 8–9. He also claims that Mr. Dillaman intentionally rated him 13 lower on his 2018 Performance Evaluation and terminated him despite the fact that he “met 14 expectations” or “met some expectations” in all of the rated categories. Pl.’s Resp. at 4–5. 15 1. Satisfactory Work 16 In assessing whether an employee was satisfactorily performing his or her work, the 17 employee “must produce evidence, not just pleadings or argument.” Weil, 922 F.3d at 1004. In 18 19 other words, “[a]n employee’s self-assessment of his performance, though relevant, is not enough 20 on its own to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.; see also Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & 21 22

23 3 Plaintiff also claims that his termination was discriminatory because it came subsequent to his filing of a charge of 24 discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Pl.’s Mot. at 7–8; see also Pl.’s Resp. at 7, 15. This allegation sounds as a claim for retaliation, not discrimination, and the Court has already 25 dismissed Plaintiff’s retaliation claim with prejudice. December 17 Order at 6–7; April 2 Order at 5–6. 11 Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (“an employee’s subjective personal judgments of her 1 competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of material fact”)). 2 3 Here, Defendants present a slew of evidence attesting to the fact that Plaintiff was 4 insubordinate, uncooperative, and unable to perform the tasks assigned to him in a timely manner 5 including three independent investigations by Human Resources and countless emails between 6 coworkers documenting Plaintiff’s combative behavior and inability to satisfactorily complete 7 projects. Defendants also present an independent investigation of Plaintiff’s complaints of an 8 unfair work environment, which found no support for his claims. The Court has reviewed every 9 email submitted by both parties and finds ample support for the proposition that Plaintiff was not 10 11 satisfactorily performing his duties. See, e.g., Simpkins Email. 12 Plaintiff offers no evidence outside of his own assertions that he was satisfactorily 13 performing his duties. He presents no evidence that the tasks he was assigned were unreasonable 14 or different from other Industrial Engineers. Further, he presents no evidence that his fellow 15 Industrial Engineers were unable to complete the same tasks and assignments he did not complete 16 which Defendants present as evidence of his inability to satisfactorily perform his duties. In fact, 17 18 a later part of the Simpkins email evidences that other Industrial Engineers were often called on to 19 complete work Plaintiff was unable to do. See Simpkins Email. 20 Additionally, while he claims the three CAMS were “fictitious,” the email chains produced 21 by Defendants amply support the independent investigations’ conclusions. These emails also 22 support Mr. Dillaman’s performance evaluation, which found Plaintiff lacking in categories 23 contingent on collaboration and collegiality. Simply put, Plaintiff has presented no evidence 24 demonstrating a genuine dispute of fact as to whether he was satisfactorily performing his duties. 25 12 2. Comparator 1 In order to raise an inference of discrimination, a Plaintiff must be able to identify “either 2 3 (a) one or more valid comparators, or (b) other circumstances surrounding the adverse action that 4 create an inference of discrimination.” McDaniels v. Grp. Health Co-op., 57 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 5 1311 (W.D. Wash. 2014). In order to be valid, a comparator “must be similar to the plaintiff ‘in 6 all material respects’” except that they do not belong to the same protected class. Id. (quoting 7 Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006)). When considering a comparator’s fit, the 8 Ninth Circuit looks to factors such as “whether the proposed comparator and the plaintiff were 9 subject to the same policies, worked at the same jobs, committed similar violations, and had similar 10 11 disciplinary records.” Id. (international citations omitted). 12 Here, Plaintiff has produced no comparators and no “other circumstances.” As noted 13 above, he fails to allege that other Industrial Engineers were unable to complete similar work 14 assignments, leaving no evidence regarding his claim that Defendants intentionally constructed 15 barriers to prevent him from completing his work. He is also unable to point to other Industrial 16 Engineers who exhibited the same intransigence towards management and constructive feedback 17 but were not disciplined. At its base, Plaintiff is unable to produce any evidence, except his own 18 19 insistence, that the treatment he received at management’s hands was based on his race. 20 3. Non-Discriminatory, Non-Pretextual Reason for Termination 21 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 22 under the McDonnell Douglas scheme. In the interest of comprehensiveness, the Court will 23 examine Defendants’ claim to a non-discriminatory, non-pretextual reason for Plaintiff’s 24 termination. 25 13 Defendants claim that the legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-pretextual reason for 1 Plaintiff’s termination was his insubordination, inability to follow directions, and inability to 2 3 satisfactorily complete his work assignments. As evidence for these reasons, as discussed earlier, 4 they present three CAMs resulting from independent investigations of Plaintiff’s conduct as well 5 as a host of emails from managers and colleagues. This suffices to establish Defendants’ reason 6 for Plaintiff’s termination. 7 In order to establish pretext, a plaintiff must come forward with “specific, substantial 8 evidence.” Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983). A plaintiff, however, may 9 demonstrate pretext “either ‘directly by persuading the court that a [retaliatory] reason more likely 10 11 motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is 12 unworthy of credence.’” Campbell v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 892 F.3d 1005, 1022 (9th Cir. 2018) 13 (quoting Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Shokri v. Boeing 14 Co., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1213 (W.D. Wash. 2018), aff’d, 777 F. App’x 886 (9th Cir. 2019). In 15 other words, “[e]vidence of pretext may be direct or circumstantial,” Hotchkiss v. CSK Auto Inc., 16 918 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1128 (E.D. Wash. 2013), and if direct evidence is available “very little . . . 17 18 is sufficient,” Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 19 2001). “[B]ut if circumstantial evidence is offered, such evidence has to be ‘specific’ and 20 ‘substantial.’” Id. (quoting Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998), as 21 amended (Aug. 11, 1998)). 22 Plaintiff presents no direct evidence of pretext. Instead, he relies on his own subjective 23 insistence that Defendants’ proffered explanation is pretextual. This does not suffice to create a 24 dispute of fact. 25 14 Based on this finding, and the finding that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case 1 for discrimination, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion on this claim and deny Plaintiff’s 2 3 Motion. 4 B. Harassment 5 Plaintiff’s next claim is for harassment, which in Title VII parlance constitutes a claim for 6 hostile workplace environment based on his race. To prevail on such a claim, a Plaintiff must 7 show that “because of [his] race . . ., [he] was subjected to unwelcome conduct that was 8 ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive 9 working environment.’” Campbell, 892 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Fuller v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 865 10 11 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017)); see also Perez v. U.S. Postal Serv., 76 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1186– 12 87 (W.D. Wash. 2015). Such conduct must have been both “subjectively and objectively perceived 13 as abusive.” Campbell, 892 F.3d at 1016. When determining whether a work environment was 14 hostile, the Court looks at “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 15 physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 16 interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Djitte v. Delta Glob. Serv., No. 19-cv-00480, 17 2020 WL 1689732, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2020) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 18 19 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998)); see also Campbell, 892 F.3d at 1017 (“We consider all 20 circumstances, with a particular focus on issues such as the frequency and severity of the conduct, 21 whether the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating, and the extent to which it 22 unreasonably interfered with Campbell’s work performance.”). 23 Defendants claim they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to 24 show he was subject to race-based conduct or that any of the conduct he complains of was 25 15 sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment. Defs. Mot. at 22–28. 1 Plaintiff argues he is entitled to summary judgment because he claims there is no genuine 2 3 dispute of fact that Boeing employees and management used derogatory and insulting terms 4 directed at him. Pl.’s Mot at 5. For example, Plaintiff highlights the use of the term “problem 5 child” in the Simpkins Email, id., but also claims he was referred to as a “dog,” “bulldog,” “rat,” 6 a “carpet to be stepped on with approval of management,” and a “slave worker.” Pl.’s Resp. at 13. 7 He also claims he was subject to false accusations of incompetence as a form of harassment. Pl.’s 8 Resp. at 10. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants harassed him when Mr. Dillaman forced him 9 to sign a discriminatory performance evaluation. Pl.’s Mot. at 7; see also Pl.’s Resp. at 6, 9, 14. 10 11 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue 12 of fact that he was subject to a hostile work environment. First, as it relates to his claim that being 13 referred to as a “problem child” by Mr. Simpkins created a hostile work environment, it is clear 14 from the context of the email that the term was not racially-based, but instead referred to the real 15 and persistent issues Plaintiff’s performance raised. See Simpkins Email. Plaintiff can point to no 16 other instances in which he was referred to a as “problem child” let alone that the term was used 17 18 in a racially derogatory way on other occasions. 19 As for the other terms Plaintiff alleges he was called, he provides no details of the 20 circumstances of these events. In an attempt to fill in these missing details, Defendants questioned 21 Plaintiff about each term during his deposition. Based on his answers, Defendants conclude— 22 convincingly—that each term was not being used in a derogatory fashion as they were not based 23 24 25 16 on racial animus or often even directed at him. See Defs.’ Mot. at 16–17, 23.4, 5 For example, 1 Defendants point out that the comment regarding “slaves” was uttered in a conversation Plaintiff 2 3 was not a part of and was actually about “working the damn [assignment] until we break it” and 4 that the two coworkers in conversation would need a “slave worker” to complete the assignment. 5 Id. at 17 (citing Decl. of Emily A. Bushaw, Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 91 at 158:22–161:21). Plaintiff admits 6 that the speakers never mentioned his name or pointed at him, and that he merely assumed they 7 were talking about him because they were talking nearby. Id. at 160:18–20. Plaintiff himself 8 admits he did not report the incident because it was not clear the coworkers were talking about 9 him. Id. at 165:22–166:9. 10 11 Another example, “bulldog,” Plaintiff stated in his deposition was used by two coworkers 12 to describe his “resilience.” Id. at 140:2–143:3. Thus, from the incident as described by Plaintiff 13 in his deposition, the term’s use had everything to do with his unyielding personality and nothing 14 to do with his race. 15 Plaintiff offers nothing to contradict Defendants’ version of events. The exhibits he 16 references in his brief as evidence do not contain the terms he alleges he was called. See Pl.’s 17 18

20 4 Plaintiff objects to the Court’s consideration of his deposition because transcripts of the deposition were not made 21 available to him until after the close of discovery and he was not provided an opportunity to review and approve the transcripts. Pl.’s Resp. at 19. Defendants assert that Plaintiff could have ordered his transcript on the day of his 22 Deposition, and Plaintiff has not produced evidence to show this was not the case. Defs.’ Reply at 17. Additionally, he does not claim that there are any inaccuracies within the transcript calling into question its authenticity. As such, 23 the Court denies this objection. 5 Plaintiff appears to object to Defense counsel’s taking of his deposition because “counsel does not have or has not 24 demonstrated the required manufacturing/Industrial engineering credentials to discuss and understand the technical materials she used during the deposition.” Pl.’s Resp. at 19. This argument is only presented in a heading, however, 25 and there is no legal support or argumentation presented. As such, the Court denies this objection. 17 Resp. at 13.6 As such, the Court finds that the exhibits fail to support his claims. Without 1 evidentiary support, Plaintiff merely continues to insist based on his own subjective belief that the 2 3 terms were racially motivated and directed at him. So much is not enough to create a genuine 4 dispute of material fact. See Robertson v. Dodaro, 767 F. Supp. 2d 185, 2011 WL 768111, at *7 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2011) (“It is the plaintiff’s burden to provide evidence beyond his or her own 6 subjective assertions of discrimination suggesting that a facially neutral term or phrase was, in 7 fact, discriminatory.”). 8 As for his claim that he was subject to false accusations of incompetence as a form of 9 harassment, as mentioned earlier, Plaintiff produces no evidence other than his subjective belief in 10 11 his competence that he was, in fact, competent. See supra at 11–12. This fails to create a dispute 12 of fact. 13 Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that he was forced to sign a derogatory performance evaluation as 14 a form of harassment does not hold up in light of the facts presented. First, as the Court has 15 determined, the Performance Evaluation’s conclusions were legitimate in the face of the evidence 16 presented. See supra at 12. Furthermore, it is clear from the Performance Evaluation submitted 17 18

19 6 This is a consistent issue with Plaintiff’s briefing as both the exhibits he attached to his Motion for Summary 20 Judgment, Dkt. No. 98-1, and to his Opposition, Dkt. No. 106-1, consist of one document, with 255 and 338 pages respectively, without an index or identifiable organizational scheme. Often, the appendices within each file contain 21 documents unrelated to each other and Plaintiff’s in text citations do not serve to aid the reader in navigating to what exactly within each appendix he intends his reference to refer. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 101 at 3 n.1 22 (“Defs.’ Resp.”); Defs.’ Reply at 4, 4 n.2, 4 n.3, 5 n.5 (both complaining of the lack of organization and clear reference within Plaintiff’s exhibits). The Court has done its best to review the pro se Plaintiff’s exhibits for the 23 support he alleges, but the old adage that “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs” applies. Clark v. Chappell, 936 F.3d 944, 982 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 24 1991) (per curiam)); see also Californians for Renewable Energy v. California Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 922 F.3d 929, 935–36 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (“On summary judgment, 25 ‘it is not our task . . . to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.’”). 18 to the Court that he was not forced to sign it, as his signature does not appear on it and it contains 1 a note affirming the fact that he was not forced to sign. See 2018 Performance Evaluation at 32. 2 3 The Court has found that Defendants have produced sufficient evidence to show that the 4 criticism Plaintiff received regarding his work was legitimate and not based on his race. For his 5 part, Plaintiff has produced no evidence on which a trier of fact could conclude either that the 6 criticism was unfounded or based on his race. The Court, therefore, will grant Defendants’ Motion 7 and deny Plaintiff’s Motion as to this claim. 8 C. Defamation 9 Plaintiff’s final cause of action is for defamation. Plaintiff claims that Defendants 10 11 disseminated false facts when TALX informed Washington’s ESD of the circumstances of 12 Plaintiff’s termination. The Court has twice previously elaborated the elements of defamation, 13 which require Plaintiff to establish (1) a false statement; (2) unprivileged publication; (3) fault; 14 and (4) damages. December 17 Order at 9; April 2 Order at 9 (both citing Duc Tan v. Le, 300 P.3d 15 356, 364 (Wash. 2013)). 16 Defendants argue that summary judgment on this claim is appropriate as the statements 17 were both true and privileged. Defs.’ Mot. at 28–32. 18 19 Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because, according 20 to Plaintiff, Defendants’ allegations of incompetence proffered as grounds for his termination and 21 TALX’s reporting of those allegations to the ESD were false and defamatory. Pl.’s Mot. at 9; Pl.’s 22 23 24 25 19 Resp. at 16–17.7 1 1. Truth 2 3 It is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate the falsity of Defendants’ statements. Seaquist v. 4 Caldier, 438 P.3d 606, 612 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). In order to do so, he must establish “either a 5 statement was false or a statement left a false impression by omitted facts.” Id. (citing Mohr v. 6 Grant, 108 P.3d 768, 773–74 (Wash. 2005)). Under the applicable state law standard, 7 [w]ith respect to falsity, Washington does not require a defamation defendant to 8 prove the literal truth of every claimed defamatory statement. A defendant need only show that the statement is substantially true or that the gist of the story, the 9 portion that carries the sting, is true. The sting of a report is defined as the gist or substance of a report when considered as a whole. 10

11 Mohr, 108 P.3d at 775 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Herron v. KING Broad. Co., 746 P.2d 295, 301 (Wash. 1987). 12 As established previously, Defendants have presented the results of four independent 13 investigations which found that the conclusions of the CAMs were well founded and Plaintiff’s 14 15 complaints that they were unfairly levied were unfounded. Plaintiff presents no evidence raising 16 a dispute of fact that the CAMs or other information sent to TALX were false, outside of his 17 subjective insistence that his performance was satisfactory. See supra at 11–12. Thus, Plaintiff 18 has failed to present sufficient evidence to contradict the veracity of the reports disclosed by 19 Boeing to TALX, entitling Defendants to summary judgment on this claim. 20 21

22 7 Plaintiff also claims that Defendants are liable for defamation based on false accusations that he attempted to 23 extract corporate documents from his work computer after his termination. Pl.’s Mot. at 9; Pl.’s Resp. at 10–11, 17. Defendants note that an internal investigation into this matter was conducted after Plaintiff’s termination as it was 24 believed he committed a security breach, but the investigation cleared Plaintiff of any wrongdoing on this account. Defs.’ Resp. at 10. Plaintiff presents no evidence that this incident was ever published, as all communications were 25 conducted between Boeing employees and the incident was not disclosed by TALX to ESD. See id. 20 2. Publication 1 The Court also finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish publication. The Court has already 2 3 found that Boeing’s communications with TALX constituted privileged, intracorporate 4 communications and TALX’s communication with ESD are immune from civil liability for 5 defamation. See December 17 Order at 9–10; April 2 Order at 9–11. Thus, in order to establish a 6 claim for defamation, Plaintiff must show that Boeing’s communication with TALX was made 7 with actual malice in order to overcome intercorporate privilege. See Armijo v. Yakima HMA, 8 LLC, 868 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139 (E.D. Wash. 2012) (“Intracorporate communications are not, 9 however, absolutely privileged; the privilege may be lost if the employee publishes a defamatory 10 11 statement to a co-employee not in the ordinary course of his or her work or if the employee made 12 the statement with actual malice.”).8 13 Actual malice exists when “a statement is made ‘with knowledge of its falsity or with 14 reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.’” Armijo, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 (quoting Doe v. 15 Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390, 398 (Wash. 2001). “Reckless disregard” means a “high degree of 16 awareness of . . . probable falsity” or “that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to 17 the statement’s truth.” Herron, 746 P.2d at 301 (internal quotations and citations omitted). When 18 19 examining actual malice, the standard is subjective, “focusing on the defendant’s belief in or 20 attitude toward the truth of the statement, not the defendant’s personal hostility toward the 21 plaintiff.” Id.; see also Herron, 776 P.2d at 105 (reiterating standard for actual malice during 22 23

24 8 The Court has already determined that Boeing’s communications with TALX were made inside the ordinary scope 25 of TALX’s work. April 2 Order at 10 n.6. 21 rehearing). 7 Based on the foregoing conclusions that Plaintiff has failed to raise a dispute of fact 3 || regarding veracity, Plaintiff has also failed to raise a dispute of fact regarding actual malice. See 4 || supra at 20. This failure entitles Defendants to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s defamation 5 | claim. 6 V. CONCLUSION ’ For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 10 DATED this 28th day of December, 2020. 11 12 firbae [leehcains BARBARA F ROTHSTEIN 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 22