Nahum v. LMI Aerospace, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedMay 1, 2023
Docket4:20-cv-01524
StatusUnknown

This text of Nahum v. LMI Aerospace, Inc. (Nahum v. LMI Aerospace, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nahum v. LMI Aerospace, Inc., (E.D. Mo. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

SETONDJI VIRGILE NAHUM, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 4:20 CV 1524 RWS ) LMI AEROSPACE, INC., et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Setondji Virgile Nahum (“Nahum”) filed this employment discrimination suit against his former employer, LMI Aerospace, Inc. (“LMI”).1 LMI terminated Nahum’s employment in May 2020. In his Amended Complaint Nahum alleges that LMI discriminated against him because of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. LMI has filed a motion for summary judgment. Because Nahum has failed to establish his claims of employment discrimination I will grant LMI summary judgment.

1 In his Amended Complaint Nahum asserted claims under Title VII and § 1981 against three managers at LMI, Tad DeWalt, Beverly Green, and Brandy Hagedorn. On February 11, 2021, I dismissed the Title VII claims brought against the individual managers. On June 28, 2021, I dismissed the § 1981 claims against the individual managers. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Lynn v. Deaconess Medical Center, 160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1998)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When such a motion is made and supported by the movant, the nonmoving party may not rest on

his pleadings but must produce sufficient evidence to support the existence of the essential elements of his case on which he bears the burden of proof. Id. at 324. In resisting a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has an affirmative burden to designate specific facts creating a triable controversy.

Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004). Direct evidence of employment discrimination is rare, therefore, most cases rely on circumstantial evidence. In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, courts employ the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)(Title VII case).2

Under the burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Bashara v. Black Hills Corp., 26 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1994). If the plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination is established and the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 411 U.S. at 802. The defendant need not persuade the court that the articulated reason was the basis of

the employer’s action; rather, it must simply provide some evidence of a non- discriminatory reason or reasons for its action. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).

Upon the proffer of such evidence, the presumption of discrimination established by the prima facie case “simply drops out of the picture.” Id. at 510- 11. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the reason articulated by the employer was really a pretext for discrimination. Aucutt v. Six Flags Over

Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1316 (8th Cir. 1995). A rejection of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason by itself or combined with

2 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is also used in analyzing race discrimination claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307, 320 (8th Cir. 2014). elements of the prima facie case may be enough to establish, but does not compel, an inference of intentional discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at

511. The burden of proving discrimination remains on the plaintiff at all times. Id. at 515-16. It is not enough to merely discredit defendant’s articulated reason

for the adverse employment action. A plaintiff must always establish that the real reason for defendant’s action was impermissible discrimination. Id.; see also Huston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1995). To avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must present evidence that, when viewed in its

entirety: (1) creates a fact issue as to whether the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual, and (2) creates a reasonable inference that a discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision (Title VII claims) or the

but-for factor in the adverse employment decision (ADEA, Section 1981, and retaliation claims). Background The following background information is taken from the parties’ statements

of uncontroverted facts,3 their responses thereto, and from the exhibits filed by the parties.

3 A close reading of LMI’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and Nahum’s responses thereto shows that the vast majority of LMI’s statements are all admitted by Nahum. LMI submitted 128 undisputed facts. Nahum did not respond to eight of them, admitted 12 of them, and disputed 89 of them but Nahum’s disputes are unsupported by LMI is a supplier of structural assemblies and components and a provider of engineering services to commercial and military aerospace markets. Nahum, who

describes himself as “African/Black,” received an offer of employment at LMI’s facility in Washington, Missouri on December 31, 2019. He was hired as a Manufacturing Engineer and began work on March 2, 2020. Nahum’s

employment was terminated twelve weeks later, on May 22, 2020. During this period, Nahum and 100 other LMI employees were furloughed for three weeks due to the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result, Nahum only worked at the LMI facility for nine weeks before his employment was terminated.

Prior to Nahum’s start date, LMI had several personnel changes that resulted in an immediate need for an engineer in the Quality Department (“Quality”). Chris

Lager, the Operations Manager at the facility, recommended to Tad DeWalt, the General Manager, that Nahum be placed in Quality when he started.

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Related

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court, 1973)
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
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Ronell Williams v. Lindenwood University
288 F.3d 349 (Eighth Circuit, 2002)
Ellis Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation
355 F.3d 1112 (Eighth Circuit, 2004)
Harris v. Hays
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Takele v. Mayo Clinic
576 F.3d 834 (Eighth Circuit, 2009)
Jaryl Ellis v. Robert Houston
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Cedric Williams v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
963 F.3d 803 (Eighth Circuit, 2020)
Wanda Walker v. First Care Management Group
27 F.4th 600 (Eighth Circuit, 2022)

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