Nahum Renfrow v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 21, 2022
DocketPH-315H-16-0381-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Nahum Renfrow v. Department of the Navy (Nahum Renfrow v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nahum Renfrow v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

NAHUM R. RENFROW, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-315H-16-0381-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: April 21, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Nahum R. Renfrow, Newport, Rhode Island, pro se.

Andrew M. Wallace, Newport, Rhode Island, for the agency.

BEFORE

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we c onclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 The facts material to the dispositive jurisdictional issue are undisputed. The appellant received a career-conditional appointment to the competitive-service position of Transportation Assistant, subject to the completion of a 1-year probationary period beginning on September 8, 2015. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 13. Effective December 13, 2015, he received a management-directed reassignment to an Administrative Support Assistant position in the competitive service. IAF, Tab 7 at 5. On June 17, 2016, the agency terminated the appellant from service for inattention to duties and failing to demonstrate an acceptable level of performance. IAF, Tab 5 at 9-12. The termination notice informed the appellant of his limited Board appeal rights, based upon his status as a probationary employee. Id. at 11-12. ¶3 The appellant filed the instant appeal, challenging his termination, and he requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, 3. The administrative judge explained the Board’s limited jurisdiction and directed the appellant to meet his jurisdictional burden of proof. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-5. The agency responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that the appeal was outside the Board’s purview because the appellant was terminated during his probationary period, he had no prior creditable Federal civilian service, and he was not an employee with Board appeal 3

rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. IAF, Tab 5 at 5-6. The agency also argued that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant did not allege one of the limited regulatory grounds for appeal un der 5 C.F.R., part 315, subpart H; specifically, he did not allege that the agency discriminated against him based on his marital status or partisan political affiliation, or that he was terminated for preappointment reasons without the required procedures. Id. The appellant did not respond to either the administrative judge’s order or the agency’s motion to dismiss. IAF, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 3. ¶4 Without holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 1. In dismissing the appeal, the administrative judge found it undisputed that the appellant was hired to serve in a competitive-service position, subject to a 1-year probationary period, effective September 8, 2015. ID at 3. The administrative judge also found it undisputed that the appellant received a management-directed reassignment to an Administrative Support Assistant position on December 13, 2015, that he was still required to complete his probationary period in his new position, and that he was terminated on June 17, 2016, for postappointment reasons before completing his probationary period. ID at 3-4. ¶5 The administrative judge found that the appellant did not argue or allege any facts that meet the definition of an “employee” under chapter 75 with the right to appeal his termination to the Board as an adverse action. Id. The administrative judge also found that the appellant did not have a regulatory right of appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806, because he did not allege that his termination was based on preappointment reasons or that the agency discriminated against him based on his marital status or for partisan political reasons. ID at 4; see 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805-06. Based on the foregoing, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over his appeal. ID at 4. The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision dismissing his 4

appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the agency has responded in opposition to his petition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. ¶6 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The appellant bears the burden of proving Board jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). An appellant is entitled to a jurisdictional hearing only if he makes a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction. Francis v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 138, ¶ 14 (2013). A nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction is an allegation of fact that, if proven, could e stablish that the Board has jurisdiction over the matter at issue. Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). For the following reasons, we find that the appellant has failed to nonfrivolously allege any facts that, if proven, could establish that the Board has jurisdiction over his termination appeal. ¶7 It is undisputed that, as a probationary employee in the competitive service with less than 1 year of current continuous service, the appellant has no statutory right of appeal to the Board under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. 2 ID at 3-4; see 5 U.S.C.

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Nahum Renfrow v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nahum-renfrow-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2022.