Nahouraii v. Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of SSA

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * 4 DANIEL E. NAHOURAII, Case No. 3:21-cv-00456-CLB 5 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND AND GRANTING CROSS- 6 v. MOTION TO AFFIRM

7 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, [ECF Nos. 22, 23] Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 8 9 Defendant. 10 This case involves the judicial review of an administrative action by the 11 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying Daniel E. Nahouraii’s 12 (“Nahouraii”) application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to Title II of the 13 Social Security Act. Currently pending before the Court is Nahouraii’s motion for reversal 14 and/or remand, (ECF No. 22), and the Commissioner’s cross-motion to affirm and 15 opposition, (ECF Nos. 23, 24). Having reviewed the pleadings, transcripts, and the 16 Administrative Record (“AR”), (ECF No. 16), the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s 17 finding that Nahouraii could perform past relevant work was supported by substantial 18 evidence. Therefore, the Court denies Nahouraii’s motion for remand, (ECF No. 22), and 19 grants the Commissioner’s cross-motion to affirm, (ECF No. 23). 20 I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 21 A. Judicial Standard of Review 22 This court’s review of administrative decisions in social security disability benefits 23 cases is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 24 (9th Cir. 2002). Section 405(g) provides that “[a]ny individual, after any final decision of 25 the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, 26 irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 27 action . . . brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which 28 1 a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 2 Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Id. 3 The court must affirm an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) determination if it is 4 based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence 5 in the record. Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006); see 6 also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, 7 if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”). “Substantial evidence is more 8 than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 9 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “It means such 10 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 11 conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated 12 Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 13 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). 14 To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the court must look at the 15 administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and 16 undermines the ALJ’s decision. Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995) 17 (citation omitted). Under the substantial evidence test, a court must uphold the 18 Commissioner’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the 19 record. Batson v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 20 “However, if evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, the decision 21 of the ALJ must be upheld.” Orteza, 50 F.3d at 749 (citation omitted). The ALJ alone is 22 responsible for determining credibility and for resolving ambiguities. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 23 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). 24 It is incumbent on the ALJ to make specific findings so that the court does not 25 speculate as to the basis of the findings when determining if substantial evidence supports 26 the Commissioner’s decision. The ALJ’s findings should be as comprehensive and 27 analytical as feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of subordinate 28 factual foundations on which the ultimate factual conclusions are based, so that a 1 reviewing court may know the basis for the decision. See Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 2 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990). 3 B. Standards Applicable to Disability Evaluation Process 4 The individual seeking disability benefits bears the initial burden of proving 5 disability. Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995). To meet this burden, the 6 individual must demonstrate the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 7 reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 8 expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 9 423(d)(1)(A). More specifically, the individual must provide “specific medical evidence” in 10 support of their claim for disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1514. If the individual establishes 11 an inability to perform their prior work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show 12 that the individual can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national 13 economy. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998). 14 The first step requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual is currently 15 engaging in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). 16 SGA is defined as work activity that is both substantial and gainful; it involves doing 17 significant physical or mental activities, usually for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a)- 18 (b), 416.972(a)-(b). If the individual is currently engaging in SGA, then a finding of not 19 disabled is made. If the individual is not engaging in SGA, then the analysis proceeds to 20 the second step. 21 The second step addresses whether the individual has a medically determinable 22 impairment that is severe or a combination of impairments that significantly limits the 23 individual from performing basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). An 24 impairment or combination of impairments is not severe when medical and other evidence 25 establish only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that would have 26 no more than a minimal effect on the individual’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 27 416.921; Social Security Rulings (“SSRs”) 85-28 and 96-3p. If the individual does not have 28 a severe medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments, then a finding 1 of not disabled is made. If the individual has a severe medically determinable impairment 2 or combination of impairments, then the analysis proceeds to the third step. 3 The third step requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual’s impairment or 4 combination of impairments meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed 5 in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 6 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926. If the individual’s impairment or combination of 7 impairments meets or equals the criteria of a listing and meets the duration requirement 8 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909), then a finding of disabled is made. 20 C.F.R. §§ 9 404.1520(h), 416.920(h). If the individual’s impairment or combination of impairments 10 does not meet or equal the criteria of a listing or meet the duration requirement, then the 11 analysis proceeds to the next step. 12 Prior to considering step four, the ALJ must first determine the individual’s residual 13 functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The RFC is a function- 14 by-function assessment of the individual’s ability to do physical and mental work-related 15 activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from impairments. SSR 96-8p. In making 16 this finding, the ALJ must consider all of the symptoms, including pain, and the extent to 17 which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical 18 evidence and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929; SSRs 96-4p, 96-7p. 19 To the extent that objective medical evidence does not substantiate statements about the 20 intensity, persistence, or functionally-limiting effects of pain or other symptoms, the ALJ 21 must make a finding on the credibility of the individual’s statements based on a 22 consideration of the entire case record. The ALJ must also consider opinion evidence in 23 accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927 and SSRs 96- 24 2p, 96-5p, 96-6p, and 06-3p. 25 After making the RFC determination, the ALJ must then turn to step four to 26 determine whether the individual has the RFC to perform their past relevant work. 20 27 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Past relevant work means work performed either as the 28 individual actually performed it or as it is generally performed in the national economy 1 within the last 15 years or 15 years prior to the date that disability must be established. In 2 addition, the work must have lasted long enough for the individual to learn the job and 3 performed at SGA. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b), 404.1565, 416.960(b), 416.965. If the 4 individual has the RFC to perform their past work, then a finding of not disabled is made. 5 If the individual is unable to perform any past relevant work or does not have any past 6 relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. 7 The fifth and final step requires the ALJ to determine whether the individual is able 8 to do any other work considering their RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 9 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the individual is able to do other work, then a finding 10 of not disabled is made. Although the individual generally continues to bear the burden of 11 proving disability at this step, a limited evidentiary burden shifts to the Commissioner. The 12 Commissioner is responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that other work 13 exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the individual can do. Lockwood 14 v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). 15 II. CASE BACKGROUND 16 A. Procedural History 17 Nahouraii applied for DIB on December 17, 2018, with an alleged disability onset 18 date of April 3, 2018. (AR 232-34.) Nahouraii’s application was denied initially on May 20, 19 2019, and upon reconsideration on September 13, 2019. (AR 162-66, 171-73.) Nahouraii 20 subsequently requested an administrative hearing. (AR 174-75.) On December 16, 2020, 21 Nahouraii and his attorney appeared at a telephonic hearing before an ALJ. (AR 35-59.) 22 An impartial vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared at the hearing by telephone. (Id.) The 23 ALJ issued a written decision on January 21, 2021, finding that Nahouraii was not disabled 24 because he could perform past relevant work as actually and generally performed. (AR 25 14-29.) Nahouraii appealed, and the Appeals Council denied review on August 19, 2021. 26 (AR 1-3.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 27 Having exhausted all administrative remedies., Nahouraii filed a complaint for judicial 28 review on October 22, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) 1 B. ALJ’s Decision 2 In the written decision, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process 3 set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. (AR 17-29.) Ultimately, the ALJ disagreed 4 that Nahouraii has been disabled from April 3, 2018, the alleged onset date, through the 5 date of the decision. (AR 29.) The ALJ held that Nahouraii could perform past relevant 6 work, which does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by his 7 RFC. (Id.) 8 In making this determination, the ALJ first determined Nahouraii meets the insured 9 status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2023. (AR 19.) The 10 ALJ then went to step one of the five-step sequential evaluation, where the ALJ found 11 Nahouraii had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of 12 April 3, 2018. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ found Nahouraii had the following severe 13 impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine – status-post anterior cervical 14 discectomy and fusion (ACDF); degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine – status- 15 post L2-L5 laminotomies and redo compression with durotomy repair; reconstructive 16 surgery and dysfunction of major joints – right hip and left shoulder; and osteoarthrosis. 17 (AR 19-22.) At step three, the ALJ found Nahouraii did not have an impairment or 18 combination of impairments that either met or medically equaled the severity of those 19 impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appx. 1; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 20 404.1525, 404.1526. (AR 22.) 21 Next, the ALJ determined Nahouraii has the RFC to perform sedentary work as 22 defined by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) except: 23 [T]wo hours of standing and walking in an eight-hour workday; six or more hours of sitting in an eight-hour workday; occasionally climb ramps and 24 stairs; never climb ladders or scaffolds; frequently balance; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders or scaffolds; frequently balance; 25 occasionally stoop, kneel, and crouch; never crawl; frequently reach 26 overhead and above the shoulder with the left arm; avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, and vibration; and avoid all 27 exposure to dangerous moving mechanical parts and unprotected heights.

28 1 The ALJ found Nahouraii’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 2 be expected to cause some of the symptoms alleged; however, Nahouraii’s statements 3 concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not 4 entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Id.) In 5 reaching this conclusion, the ALJ reviewed and discussed Nahouraii’s subjective 6 complaints, symptom evaluation, the objective medical evidence, and physical opinions. 7 (Id.) 8 The ALJ then determined that Nahouraii could perform past relevant work as a 9 Telephone Solicitor, as actually or generally performed. (AR 29.) Accordingly, the ALJ held 10 that Nahouraii had not been under a disability since the alleged onset date of April 3, 2018, 11 through the date of the decision, and denied Nahouraii’s claim. (Id.) 12 III. ISSUE 13 Nahouraii now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying 14 DIB under Title II of the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 22.) Nahouraii raises a single issue 15 for this Court’s review: whether the ALJ properly rejected Nahouraii’s testimony 16 concerning pain, symptoms, and level of limitation. (Id. at 6-16.) 17 IV. DISCUSSION 18 A. The ALJ articulated clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Nahouraii’s subjective testimony. 19 20 Nahouraii argues the RFC is contrary to law and not supported by substantial 21 evidence because the ALJ did not properly evaluate Nahouraii’s pain, ignoring probative 22 evidence and failing to discuss the factors required by the regulations. (ECF No. 22 at 6- 23 16.) Nahouraii argues the ALJ’s errors are errors of “omission”, and the only appropriate 24 remedy is remand. (Id. at 16.) 25 By contrast, the Commissioner argues the ALJ provided multiple valid reasons for 26 discounting Nahouraii’s testimony, namely that: (1) objective medical findings did not 27 support the extent of his allegations; (2) Nahouraii’s activities contradicted his allegations 28 of disabling limitations; and (3) Nahouraii’s reports of improvement contradicted his 1 alleged limitations and claim that he was totally disabled. (ECF No. 23 at 7-18.) 2 An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s testimony 3 regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. “First, the ALJ must determine whether 4 there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably 5 be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 6 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The claimant is not required 7 to show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the 8 symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some 9 degree of the symptom.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 10 quotation marks omitted). 11 Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of 12 malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the 13 symptoms if [the ALJ] gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the rejection.” 14 Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 15 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must 16 identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 17 complaints.” Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)); Thomas v. 18 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ALJ must make a credibility 19 determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ 20 did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.”). 21 In making an adverse credibility determination, the ALJ may consider, inter alia, (1) 22 the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies in the claimant’s testimony 23 or between his testimony and his conduct; (3) the claimant’s daily living activities; (4) the 24 claimant’s work record; and (5) testimony from physicians or third parties concerning the 25 nature, severity, and effect of the claimant’s condition. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59. 26 A review of the record shows the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing 27 reasons for finding Nahouraii’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and 28 limiting effects of his symptoms less than credible. 1 1. Objective Medical Evidence 2 An ALJ “may not discredit the claimant’s subjective complaints solely because the 3 objective evidence fails to fully corroborate the degree of pain alleged.” Coleman v. Saul, 4 979 F.3d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 5 1998)). But an ALJ may discredit a plaintiff’s testimony when it contradicts evidence in the 6 medical record. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). 7 The ALJ relied on objective medical evidence that supports the RFC rather than 8 Nahouraii’s allegations of pain. Although the ALJ cannot cherry pick objective medical 9 evidence from the record, they can consider contrary objective medical evidence in making 10 a credibility determination. Here, the ALJ provided a thorough summary of the medical 11 evidence in which he highlighted specific objective findings that support the assigned RFC. 12 (AR 24-28.) Because those findings conflicted with Plaintiff’s pain and symptom testimony, 13 the ALJ found his testimony was not credible because it was inconsistent with the objective 14 medical evidence. Based on these findings, the ALJ assigned a reduced RFC with postural 15 and environmental limitations. Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ provided clear and 16 convincing reasons for finding Nahouraii not credible to the extent his testimony exceeds 17 the RFC. 18 2. Nahouraii’s Daily Activities 19 An ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when he reports participation in 20 everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting. See Molina, 21 674 F.3d at 1112-13; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). Further, the inconsistency between a 22 claimant’s alleged symptoms and his daily activities, is sufficient to support a finding that 23 a plaintiff was not entirely credible. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040 (in determining 24 credibility, an ALJ may consider “whether claimant engaged in daily activities inconsistent 25 with alleged symptoms”). Specifically, daily activities may be grounds for discrediting a 26 claimant’s testimony when a claimant “is able to spend a substantial part of his day 27 engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferrable 28 to a work setting.” Fair v. Brown, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Even when such 1 activities suggest some difficulty functioning, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony 2 to the extent they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment. See Turner, 613 3 F.3d at 1225. 4 Here, the ALJ also found Nahouraii less credible because the account of his daily 5 activities was inconsistent with his alleged limitations. (AR 24-25); see Tommasetti, 533 6 F.3d at 1039 (inconsistency between a claimant’s alleged symptoms and his daily activities 7 may be a clear and convincing reason to find a claimant less credible). Nahouraii’s daily 8 activities included personal care and some household chores. (AR 24-25.) Nahouraii 9 testified he completed personal care approximately every three days. He also testified he 10 cleaned around the home and walked around the outside of his house with his dog. The 11 ALJ noted Nahouraii reported that his daily routine included walking around the yard, 12 calling friends, and going to local friends to visit. Nahouraii also reported snowmobiling in 13 March of 2020. Although the ALJ did not explain how all Nahouraii’s activities contradicted 14 his testimony, the above activities directly contradict Nahouraii’s testimony and the ALJ 15 was entitled to rely on them in discounting Nahouraii’s testimony. Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 16 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[w]here evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 17 interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld”) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 18 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)); Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 19 1997) (“If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the 20 Commissioner’s decision, this panel may not substitute its judgment for that of the 21 Commissioner”). Based on these, and other findings, the ALJ determined Nahouraii’s 22 subjective symptom testimony was inconsistent with his alleged impairments. 23 3. Improvement with Treatment 24 “Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling.” 25 Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006); see Bailey v. 26 Colvin, 669 Fed.Appx. 839, 840 (9th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (no error in discounting 27 claimant’s testimony where “medical evidence suggest[ed] that many of [her] impairments 28 had improved . . . or responded favorably to treatment”). Nahouraii’s providers, and 1 Nahouraii himself, reported some improvement, and his level of reported improvement 2 was entirely consistent with an ability to perform a very reduced range of sedentary work, 3 as Drs. Nickles and Addonizio also found (See AR 22, 27–28, 140–42, 156–58.) Here, the 4 ALJ reasonably relied on Nahouraii’s providers’ statements regarding the effectiveness of 5 his treatments and his own statements that he had some improvement with treatment. (AR 6 24.) 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)–(v). The ALJ “did not summarily dismiss [Plaintiff’s] 7 pain complaints but instead carefully considered them.” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 8 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It was because of the pain complaints that the ALJ made the finding 9 that [claimant] could not perform repetitive bending and stooping and staying in one 10 position.”) (emphasis in original); Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006) 11 (“questions of [symptom evaluation] and resolutions of conflicts in the testimony are 12 functions solely of the Secretary”) (citation omitted). The Court finds that this ALJ finding 13 is a specific, clear, and convincing reason to discredit Nahouraii’s testimony regarding his 14 limitations. 15 4. Work History 16 Finally, Nahouraii argues that the ALJ was required to discuss Nahouraii’s strong 17 work history but failed to do so. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) states that an ALJ will “consider 18 all of the evidence presented, including information about your prior work record” but does 19 not require an ALJ to include a discussion related to work history. See Thomas, 278 F.3d 20 at 958-59. Nonetheless, to the extent the ALJ’s failure to discuss Nahouraii’s work history 21 was error, such error would be harmless. The Court does not need to uphold all of an 22 ALJ’s reasons for discounting a plaintiff’s testimony to affirm the ALJ’s decision, so long 23 as the ALJ provided other reasons that were specific, clear, and convincing. See Batson, 24 359 F.3d at 1197 (holding that where one of an ALJ’s several reasons supporting an 25 adverse credibility finding is held invalid, the error is harmless if it “does not negate the 26 validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that [the claimant’s testimony] was not credible”); 27 Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding 28 an adverse credibility finding where the ALJ provided four reasons to discredit the 1 || claimant, two of which were invalid). As discussed above, the Court finds that the ALJ 2 || provided other reasons for discounting Nahouraii’s pain and symptom testimony which are 3 || specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. 4 Based on the above, the Court finds the ALJ provided “specific, clear and 5 || convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting Nahouraii’s 6 || credibility as to his subjective limitations. See Fair, 885 F.2d at 604 (“Where, as here, the 7 || ALJ has made specific findings justifying a decision to disbelieve an allegation of excess 8 || pain, and those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, our role is 9 || not to second-guess that decision.”). 10 || V. CONCLUSION 11 Having reviewed the Administrative Record as a whole and weighing the evidence 12 || that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, the Court finds that the 13 || ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. 14 Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Nahouraii’s motion to remand 15 || (ECF No. 22) is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion to affirm (ECF No. 23) is 16 || GRANTED; 17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk ENTER JUDGMENT and CLOSE THIS 18 || CASE. 19 || DATED: July 22, 2022 . 20 Z f .

21 UNITED ‘STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28