Nagy v. Solvay Process Co.

166 N.W. 1033, 201 Mich. 158, 1918 Mich. LEXIS 722
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 28, 1918
DocketDocket No. 12
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 166 N.W. 1033 (Nagy v. Solvay Process Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nagy v. Solvay Process Co., 166 N.W. 1033, 201 Mich. 158, 1918 Mich. LEXIS 722 (Mich. 1918).

Opinion

Steere, J.

On March 7, 1916, plaintiff made application for employment as a common laborer at the plant of defendant and was accepted as such, without any physical examination. He is a native of Austria and his previous employment since coming to America had been in handling coal or wood. He was put at unloading stone from cars into a furnace, on a shift of nine hours a day at 27 y% cents per hour. On the fourth day of his employment he quit before his shift ended under circumstances somewhat in dispute. The foreman under whom he worked testified that no accident or injury occurred to his knowledge and plaintiff made no complaint Of having been hurt at the time he left; that he approached him and said he wanted another job because there was too much gas there, which was the only reason he gave for quitting; that he spoke in understandable English, walked straight with his hands down and said nothing then or at any other [160]*160time about being hurt. Plaintiff testified that he quit because he was hurt while putting back the cover of the furnace with an iron bar which slipped and struck' him on the stomach, causing such severe pain that he could not continue at work, and, on reaching his boarding- house, discovered a severe rupture had resulted from the accident.

About four days later, on March 14th, he appeared at defendant’s office, and, claiming to have been seriously injured at the time he quit work, asked to be sent to a hospital for treatment. Defendant sent him to Harper hospital where he was examined by Dr. McAlpin of that institution, who found that he was afflicted with a large, old scrotal hernia, for cure of which an operation was necessary. He found him otherwise in good physical condition, and the doctor operated upon him the following day, March 15th, finding conclusively,- as the doctor testified, that the rupture, was of long standing, without indications of recent injury, increase or inflammation. Plaintiff remained in the hospital three weeks and was discharged about April 5th as cured, Dr. McAlpin testifying:

“The condition of the man when I discharged him • was very good;.the wound was healed, the hernia was cured, entirely cured.”

Plaintiff testified that after he was discharged from the hospital he was unable to work for about two months; that he went back to work for defendant for about four days, at what time he does not state, but was unable to work longer because he was so weak and the place where he was operated upon hurt him badly. Defendant’s records, however, show that he- returned to work on April 29th, putting in one full day’s time, and then was absent until May 8th when he resumed his employment and worked until May 23d, quitting without notice or making any complaints about his work. Prior to this defendant had assumed [161]*161all his hospital expenses, amounting to $118, and, aside from his wages, given him $45.

On July 3, 1916, he made demand of defendant for compensation, and, liability being denied, on July 21st, filed his claim with the industrial accident board. A hearing was had on September 8th before a committee of arbitration which rejected his claim and refused to award him compensation. Upon appeal from the decision of the arbitration committee “to the industrial accident board the decision of the committee was affirmed, on January 8, 1917.

Prior to making return, to the writ of certiorari issued herein no written finding of facts was filed by the industrial accident board, and plaintiff’s principal claim is that the board’s denial of an award amounted to an erroneous conclusion of law, contrary to the undisputed facts in the case. In its return the board embodies a statement of the case dealing with the essential facts claimed by plaintiff, both conceded and disputed, saying in part as follows:

“Before the entry of said order, a copy of which is designated as Exhibit G, the industrial accident board found as a fact that no accident was suffered by claimant while he was working for defendant; that, the operation was made necessary by a pre-existing scrotal hernia, which was not in any manner caused or affected by claimant’s employment at the Solvay Process Company; that after recovering from the operation claimant was in'better physical condition than he was before, and that the Solvay Process Company owed him nothing.”

It is conceded that plaintiff was afflicted with a scrotal hernia requiring an operation for its cure. He claimed it was caused by an accident which he suffered while in defendant’s employ. This was denied. The burden of proof rested upon him to establish the fact. If there was conflicting evidence upon that affirmance [162]*162and denial, direct or circumstantial, fairly raising an issue of fact it was for the board to decide, and its decision upon that point disposes of the case.

While certain of plaintiff’s compatriots testified to what he showed and told them of the accident of which they saw indications, amongst which were that “it was black and blue where he got hurt,” he was the only direct witness to this claimed accident. He testified that when the bar slipped and struck the side of his stomach it hurt him so that he could not work and had to quit, that he “showed the boss the cause” and told him he would go home, .to which he answered “all right,” and “the fellows took me down in their own place.” The foreman testifies that he heard nothing of anything happening to plaintiff when he quit, who said nothing about being hurt, walked straight when he came to him and gave as his reason for quitting that he wanted another job because of too much gas there.

Plaintiff testified that he did not report at the company’s office until the third day after this because he was laid up and unable to walk, that he wanted to and did go to the hospital for treatment, where he was operated on and remained 21 days, but since the operation his left leg has been sore and he could do no heavy work because “that place always comes out just as soon as I work hard,” and he had gone to see two doctors about it, whom he did not call as witnesses; that before the accident his health was good and he never had a hernia.

The only medical witness plaintiff produced was Dr. McEwen who testified that once, on August 9, 1916, he was called to visit plaintiff and treated him for a cold, that he did not then complain of anything else being wrong with him nor show his leg or side where he was operated on, as the witnesses recalled, but witness did examine the place of operation later when a [163]*163fellow countryman brought plaintiff to his office, but was unable to testify whether or not that would reduce his working capacity.

Dr. McAlpin testified that when he examined plaintiff there were no black and blue marks or bruises on his body, nor signs of recent injury or inflammation, but he found signs of an old inflammation, or irritation, such as one might get from wearing a truss a good many years; that plaintiff had a large scrotal hernia of long standing which was not the result of an injury and could be easily reduced, and many men having that type of hernia work, with it supported by a truss; that the sac of a recent hernia is very thin and of pinkish color but as it gets older it always becomes thicker and greyish in color, and the operation disclosed the sac of this hernia was of a greyish color and greatly thickened, with no signs of recent inflammation, a condition found only in old hernias.

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Related

Barclay v. General Motors Corp.
16 N.W.2d 64 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1944)
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175 N.W. 129 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1919)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
166 N.W. 1033, 201 Mich. 158, 1918 Mich. LEXIS 722, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nagy-v-solvay-process-co-mich-1918.