Nadlin v. Starick

194 N.E.2d 81, 92 Ohio Law. Abs. 35, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 1963 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 224
CourtMontgomery County Court of Common Pleas
DecidedAugust 23, 1963
DocketNo. 122879
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 194 N.E.2d 81 (Nadlin v. Starick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Nadlin v. Starick, 194 N.E.2d 81, 92 Ohio Law. Abs. 35, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 1963 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 224 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1963).

Opinion

McBride, J.

In this taxpayer’s suit, John Q. Public asks what right Mr. Starick has to legalize gambling. The answer is that he has no right to do so. The court will explain why not and point out the dangers of such personalized law.

The legal problem is whether the court shall temporarily restrain the defendant, Herbert Starick, Manager of the City of Dayton, from enforcing the regulations and controls he estab[36]*36lished for tbe conduct of bingo in tbe City of Dayton and for tbe use of the Division of Police to enforce his program.

No other question is involved.

TAXPAYER’S ACTION

The plaintiff, as a taxpayer, made formal demand upon the city to take action. This factor was stipulated. A statutory demand was made upon the Law Director on July 9, 1963, and he failed to take action.

That the Law Director did not and could not do so is apparent from the City Charter. Section 47 and 48 invests the City Manager with the power and the duty 11 to see that the laws and ordinances are enforced” and places both the Law Department and the Police Department under his control with power to remove directors and employees of such departments. Initiation of legal action by the City of Dayton was impossible under the conditions shown in this case because to do so would amount to insubordination and possible dismissal of anyone who disobeyed the City Manager.

NATURE OF THE QUESTION

The law and public policy regarding lotteries is clear and well established. Lotteries are not only illegal but no agency of the state can directly or indirectly approve that which is prohibited. The Supreme Court held that local authorities cannot legalize or regulate lotteries. This court in 801 Recreation Association v. City of Dayton, No. 103551, recently held in effect that the restraining power of the court cannot be used to legalize or protect the conduct of lotteries. Thus it is clear that the legislative and the judicial power may not be used to legalize, regulate or protect lotteries. If the City Manager has attempted to do so, the only question is whether he, as an officer of the executive branch of local government, can legalize, regulate or protect the conduct of lotteries by affirmative action of any nature, in this case by establishing conditions and restrictions and by staying law enforcement officers of the City of Dayton in the performance of their duties.

MORAL ASPECTS

The court eliminates the “moral and ethical aspects” of the problem, referred to in the executive order of the City Manager. There is a difference of opinion on the moral aspects. The [37]*37desire to gamble and to avoid or (as tbe Manager suggests) to “reasonably compromise” the law on gambling has many friends who at times close their eyes to the law. The Manager’s order is not simple neglect to enforce the law. On the contrary, it is a definite, affirmative step to legalize gambling. This is not neglect to enforce the law but rather an attempt to legalize limited gambling to be conducted by operators who are paid to do so, as outlined in the Manager’s directive.

The fact is that the people of Ohio adopted and have accepted for generations a constitutional provision that gambling is wrong and unlawful under any circumstances and the people have stamped lotteries as “mala prohibita,” forbidden whether right or wrong. Anyone who discusses the ethical or moral aspects or the existence of criminal acts by others in connection with the law is ready to justify his own disrespect for the law or his violation of the law.

The failure to amend the constitution and the laws on lotteries suggests that the number and interest of those concerned, including the city commission, has not been sufficient to initiate proper, democratic action.

An unpopular law may be changed by the people. It cannot be changed by those who are charged with the duty of administering it. It is the sworn duty of public officials to administer the law. It cannot be changed by the courts. It is the sworn duty of the courts to follow the law.

Legislation that is constitutional and regularly adopted by the general assembly or by the city commission cannot be disregarded because of personal opinions, because of “moral and ethical aspects” (to quote the Manager’s letter), because “the members of the city commission are sympathetic to the resumption of charity bingo” or because of a personal desire to open the door to criminal acts but not to open the door “too wide.” (Letter, p. 3.)

FINDING AND ORDER

As will be hereinafter indicated, the court finds that the program of regulation and enforcement of limited (not wide open) bingo, contained in the letter and order of the City Manager constitutes legalized gambling, is unconstitutional, void, contrary to public policy, and not binding upon any city [38]*38director or employee. In addition the court finds that it is in violation of the ordinances of the City of Dayton adopted by the city commission which ordinances are still in full force and effect.

The request for a temporary order is granted forthwith. Counsel will prepare an entry within three days or the court will thereafter draft and file an entry.

The court fixes the compensation for services on the preliminary action only for counsel for the plaintiff at $1500.00 to be taxed as costs and paid by the City of Dayton when this action is terminated on the merits in plaintiff’s favor or is otherwise terminated by consent.

In a summary action the court seldom writes an opinion. However the public nature of this case suggests additional comment.

THE LAW

The “moral and ethical aspects” of lotteries and the “sympathy” of the friends of gambling for some but not for others has so clouded the problem that it is necessary to discuss the law in Ohio and more particularly in the City of Dayton, and to apply this law to the directive of the City Manager to bingo operators and to the law enforcement branches of the city government.

“LOTTERIES, AND THE SALE OF LOTTERY TICKETS, FOR ANY PURPOSE WHATEVER, SHALL FOREVER BE PROHIBITED IN THIS STATE.” OHIO CONSTITUTION (1851), ART. XV, SEC. 6.

The word lottery is a generic term. It embraces all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance for a consideration. This includes bingo.

The general assembly, municipal commissions, boards and public officers have no power or authority, directly or indirectly, to legalize, regulate, license, control or to otherwise take any affirmative action to approve, accept, or recognize as lawful any form of lottery, gambling or schemes of chance. This is true even though some of the income be set aside for charity. As the Supreme Court pointed out in the Cleveland and Columbus cases, such regulation is prohibited even though the so-called charity or Kane amendment attempted to remove the [39]*39penalty if the game was not conducted for a personal profit or consideration. (Section 2915.12, Revised Code.) That amendment did not repeal other statutes and it did not by inference authorize lotteries for charitable purposes. Subsections 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 14 and 15 of Chapter 2915. Columbus v. Barr, 160 Ohio St., 209; Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler, 64 Ohio App., 105; Kraus v. Cleveland, 89 Ohio App., 504; Kraus v. Cleveland, 42 Ohio Opinions, 490 (CP), appeal dismissed 154 Ohio St., 80;

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Bluebook (online)
194 N.E.2d 81, 92 Ohio Law. Abs. 35, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 272, 1963 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/nadlin-v-starick-ohctcomplmontgo-1963.