Nacogdoches County Hospital District D/B/A Nacogdoches Memorial Hospital v. Charles Ray Newman and Jimmy Wayne Curtis

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 23, 2007
• Docket: 12-06-00375-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

                                                NO. 12-06-00375-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

NACOGDOCHES COUNTY HOSPITAL  §          APPEAL FROM THE

DISTRICT d/b/a NACOGDOCHES

MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

APPELLANT

§          COUNTY COURT AT LAW

V.       

CHARLES RAY NEWMAN and

JIMMY WAYNE CURTIS,

APPELLEES §          NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Nacogdoches County Hospital District, doing business as Nacogdoches Memorial Hospital, appeals the adverse portions of the trial court’s final judgment entered in its suit against Charles Ray Newman and Jimmy Wayne Curtis.  In three issues, the District contends the trial court erred in granting Newman’s motion for summary judgment, denying the District’s motion for summary judgment against Newman, and in partially granting Curtis’s motion for summary judgment against the District.  We affirm.

Background

            On August 27, 2001, Newman drove his vehicle into the path of Curtis’s vehicle, causing a collision.  Curtis sustained personal injuries and was taken to Nacogdoches Memorial Hospital for treatment.  He had to return to the hospital for treatment numerous times.  The District filed a lien pursuant to Chapter 55 of the Texas Property Code to secure payment of Curtis’s unpaid hospital bill.  Curtis neither paid his hospital bill nor initiated litigation against Newman.  However, the District sued both Curtis and Newman asserting that Newman is liable because he negligently caused the accident and that Curtis, the recipient of goods and services, defaulted by failing to pay the account.  The District prayed for judgment against Curtis and Newman, jointly and severally, in the amount of $31,146.95.

            Newman filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the District’s claims against him fail as a matter of law because it does not have a valid cause of action against him and does not have standing to bring a suit against him for negligence that allegedly harmed Curtis.  Further, Newman  asserted that any claim regarding the Chapter 55 lien is not ripe because Curtis has not asserted a cause of action against Newman, and there is neither a settlement agreement nor a judgment entered in any case arising out of the automobile accident.  The motion was supported by a copy of the lien and an affidavit by Curtis stating that he has not filed suit against Newman, there is no settlement agreement, and he is not in possession of any settlement proceeds from Newman or his insurance carrier.  The court granted Newman’s motion for summary judgment.

            The District filed a motion for summary judgment asserting entitlement to judgment as a matter of law as to Curtis.  The motion was supported by Curtis’s deposition testimony and an itemized statement of the goods and services provided to Curtis, together with the affidavit of the District’s Director of Patient Financial Services stating that the District had not been paid.  The court granted this motion.

            The District filed a separate motion for summary judgment asserting entitlement to judgment as a matter of law as to Newman.  This motion was supported by the itemized statement and affidavit of the Director of Patient Financial Services, Curtis’s deposition testimony, and Newman’s stipulation that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.  The court denied this motion.

            Finally, Curtis filed a motion for summary judgment against the District, which is virtually identical to Newman’s motion for summary judgment.  Curtis asserted that the District does not have a valid cause of action against Newman and does not have standing to bring suit against Newman for negligence that allegedly harmed Curtis.  Further, he argued that any claim the District has regarding its lien is not ripe because there has been no cause of action asserted against Newman by Curtis, no settlement agreed to or entered into, and no judgment entered in any case arising out of the automobile accident.  His motion is supported by the lien and his affidavit stating that he has not filed suit against Newman, has not agreed to or entered into a settlement agreement with Newman, and is not in possession of any settlement proceeds from Newman or his insurance carrier.  The court partially granted and partially denied this motion without specifying which parts were granted and which parts were denied.

            The court ordered Curtis to pay the District $31,146.95 plus postjudgment interest and ordered him to pay court costs.  It ordered that the District recover nothing from Newman.  Further, the court declared that, while the District’s hospital lien was properly filed and may be enforced or foreclosed as allowed by law in the event settlement payments or proceeds are made in the future, the lien is not presently ripe for foreclosure because Curtis has not received settlement payments or proceeds from Newman.  Finally, the court ordered that, unless specifically granted, all relief requested by any party is denied.

Summary Judgments

            In three issues argued together, the District asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Newman and partial summary judgment in favor of Curtis based on claims that the District did not have a viable cause of action, lacked standing to bring suit, had no justiciable interest, and could not enforce its lien because it was not ripe for foreclosure.  Additionally, the District contends the trial court erred in overruling its motion for summary judgment against Newman.

Standard of Review

            We review the trial court’s summary judgment de novo.  Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. 2005).  To prevail on a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).  A movant who conclusively negates at least one essential element of a cause of action is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.  Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002).  

            In a no evidence summary judgment, a party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).  If the nonmovant presents more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the disputed issue, summary judgment for the movant is improper.  King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).  More than a scintilla of evidence exists if it would allow reasonable and fair minded people to differ in their conclusions.  Id. 

            When both parties move for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and neither party can prevail because of the other’s failure to discharge his burden.  Guynes v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. 1993); State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Willliams, 791 S.W.2d 542, 549-50 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1990, writ denied).  We review the summary judgment evidence presented by both parties and determine all questions presented.  City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000).  When both parties move for summary judgment, we must indulge all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of the losing party.  University of Texas Health Sci. Ctr. v. Big Train Carpet of El Campo, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 792, 792 (Tex. 1987).    

Hospital Lien

            The predecessor to Property Code Chapter 55 was enacted in 1933 to provide for liens in favor of hospitals.  Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hermann Hosp., 664 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. 1984).  The purpose of the act was to encourage hospitals to provide immediate care and treatment to persons injured in accidents, and to compensate hospitals for the vast sums of money being lost when treating patients who were unable to pay.  Id.  When a person is hospitalized for personal injuries caused by an accident that is attributed to the negligence of another person, the hospital has a lien on a cause of action or claims the injured person may have against the one whose negligence caused the injuries.  Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 55.002 (Vernon 2007).  The lien attaches to a cause of action for damages arising from the injuries for which the injured individual was admitted, a judgment of a court in a proceeding brought by the injured individual to recover damages arising from those injuries, and the proceeds of a settlement of a cause of action or claim by the injured individual, or another person entitled to make the claim, arising from those injuries.  Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 55.003 (Vernon 2007).

Standing

            Standing is a prerequisite to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001).  Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.  Id.  The issue of standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action.  Id.  Whether a party has standing to maintain a suit is a question of law.  Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2003, no pet.).  In analyzing issues of standing, we focus on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a “justiciable interest” in the outcome.  Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005).  The standing doctrine requires that there be a “real controversy between the parties” that “will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.”  Id. at 849.  A person has standing if 1) he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the defendant’s wrongful act, 2) he has a direct relationship between the alleged injury and the claim being adjudicated, 3) he has a personal stake in the controversy, 4) the challenged action has caused him some injury in fact, either economic, recreational, environmental, or otherwise, or 5) he is an appropriate party to assert the public’s interest in the matter, as well as his own.  Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 249 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2005, no pet.).

Ripeness

            Ripeness, like standing, is a threshold issue that implicates subject matter jurisdiction and emphasizes the need for a concrete injury for a justiciable claim to be presented.  Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998).  While standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action, ripeness examines when that action may be brought.  Id.  At the time a lawsuit is filed, ripeness asks whether the facts have developed sufficiently so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote.  Id.  Ripeness thus focuses on whether the case involves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or may not occur at all.  Id.

Discussion

            Curtis had the right to sue Newman for damages for having negligently caused the accident in which Curtis sustained injuries.  Curtis, although unable to pay his hospital bill, chose not to sue Newman.  The District’s damages arose, not from the accident caused by Newman, but from Curtis’s failure to pay his hospital bill.  However, because Curtis’s injuries arose from an accident negligently caused by another person, the District had the right to invoke Chapter 55 in an attempt to procure payment of Curtis’s bill.  Because the District’s right to sue arises from Chapter 55, its rights are limited to those granted by the statute.  The statute authorizes the District to file a lien to reach money paid by the third party tortfeasor, Newman, to satisfy the patient’s debt.  Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 55.002-.003.  By virtue of Chapter 55, the District has a cause of action to enforce its lien.  See Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Borders, 581 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.–Dallas 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).  However, the District’s cause of action does not accrue until funds are paid in settlement or pursuant to a judgment.  Id.  Under the statute, it is Curtis’s cause of action, judgment, or settlement to which the District’s lien attaches. 

            The statute helps hospitals collect money to cover unpaid hospital bills from damage awards or settlement funds procured by the patient.  Specifically, the issue the statute speaks to is making sure the patient uses any monetary recovery to pay his hospital bill.  Thus, once liability is judicially determined, or the patient and tortfeassor have entered into an agreement or settlement, the hospital has the right to enforce its lien.  The statute does not give a hospital the right to directly sue a third party tortfeasor.  There is no controversy between the District and Newman.  The District’s injury was not a result of Newman’s wrongful act.  See Nauslar, 170 S.W.3d at 249.  The statute is based upon the assumption that the accident victim will attempt to collect money from the tortfeasor to cover expenses resulting from the tortfeasor’s negligent act.  The statute simply does not speak to situations such as this in which the patient declines to pursue his legal rights against the tortfeasor.  Here, the District attempted to try the issue of liability in the district court because Curtis did not sue Newman.  However, the District does not have standing to bring the liability issue.  See id.

            Furthermore, in the context of the application of Chapter 55, the facts have not developed sufficiently for the District to have incurred the anticipated injury.  A hospital is not wronged in a manner to which Chapter 55 can be used to address it until a fund has been produced to which the lien can attach.  See Borders, 581 S.W.2d at 734.  The District cannot act to enforce a lien on a cause of action the patient did not pursue or a judgment or settlement agreement that does not exist.  In other words, until liability is determined, the issue of who gets the money judgment is not ripe.  See Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442.  The trial court correctly ruled on the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment because the District lacked standing to bring suit against Newman under Chapter 55 and a suit to enforce a Chapter 55 lien was not ripe.  We overrule the District’s three issues.

Disposition

            We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                                    SAM GRIFFITH   

                                                                                                               Justice

Opinion delivered May 23, 2007.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)