NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0560n.06
No. 25-1120
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 04, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk NABIL SALAMEY; SONIA SALAMEY, ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) v. ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) HOUSSAM SALAMI, et al., COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendants, ) ) OPINION CARTER-JONES COMPANIES, INC., d/b/a Carter ) Lumber, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Nabil and Sonia Salamey engaged Houssam Salami to build a
house for them. But, after a dispute over project funds, the Salameys sued Salami and other
individuals and entities, including Carter Lumber, a lumber and materials supplier. The Salameys
claimed that Carter Lumber aided in Salami’s conversion of their property in violation of Michigan
law and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district
court granted summary judgment to Carter Lumber on both claims. The Salameys now appeal.
We AFFIRM.
I.
Nabil and Sonia Salamey hired Houssam Salami and his company, SS Designs, LLC, to
build a house for them in Canton, Michigan. The parties didn’t enter into a written contract but No. 25-1120, Salamey v. Salami
instead operated pursuant to an oral understanding. Nabil Salamey opened an account at a credit
union and authorized Salami to withdraw funds from the account to pay for construction costs.
Carter Lumber, a lumber and materials supplier, employed Salami as an outside sales
representative. SS Designs, Salami’s company, was also a customer of Carter Lumber and had a
credit account with the lumber company that allowed it to purchase building materials on credit
for its various projects. SS Designs had other projects with Carter Lumber in addition to the
Salameys’ home. Generally, when Salami made a payment to Carter Lumber, he indicated the
project to which the payment should be applied. If he didn’t, Carter Lumber would apply the
payment to the oldest open invoice in SS Designs’ credit account pursuant to company policy. As
a result, some of the Salameys’ funds were applied to invoices for projects unrelated to their home.
The Salameys sued Salami, Carter Lumber, and others in state court, but Carter Lumber
removed the case to federal court. Pertinent to this appeal, the Salameys raised claims against
Carter Lumber for aiding in conversion in violation of Michigan law and for violating RICO.
Carter Lumber moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.1 The
Salameys now appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Naji v. City of Dearborn,
120 F.4th 520, 523 (6th Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine dispute
1 Salami and SS Designs are not parties to this appeal. Below, they also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment on the RICO claim against Salami and SS Designs. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims raised by the Salameys against Salami and SS Designs and remanded those claims to state court. The Salameys appealed the district court’s decision. But on October 30, 2025, the appeal was dismissed upon the parties’ stipulation. -2- No. 25-1120, Salamey v. Salami
of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
Conversion. The district court didn’t err by granting summary judgment to Carter Lumber
on the Salameys’ Michigan law claim for aiding in statutory conversion. Michigan’s statutory
conversion law allows a person to sue if damaged by “[a]nother person’s buying, receiving,
possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property
when the person buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen,
embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted.”
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a(1)(b). Constructive knowledge that the property was stolen,
embezzled, or converted is not enough. Echelon Homes, L.L.C. v. Carter Lumber Co., 694 N.W.2d
544, 549 (Mich. 2005). Actual knowledge is required. Id.
Carter Lumber didn’t have actual knowledge of the alleged conversion. Salami was
authorized to withdraw funds from the credit union account established by the Salameys. The
checks Carter Lumber received from the credit union account listed Salami as an owner/authorized
signer. And there is no evidence in the record that Carter Lumber knew of any limitation on
Salami’s authority to make payments from the account.
For their part, the Salameys don’t argue that Carter Lumber had direct knowledge of any
conversion. They contend, however, that the company had institutional knowledge because its
employee (Salami) knew of the conversion. But that argument fails because Salami was not a
supervisor or manager at Carter Lumber, a prerequisite to imputing knowledge by an employee to
his or her employer. See Travis v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 551 N.W.2d 132, 173–74 (Mich.
1996) (“[P]laintiff may establish a corporate employer’s actual knowledge by showing that a
-3- No. 25-1120, Salamey v. Salami
supervisory or managerial employee had actual knowledge . . . .”). Without actual knowledge of
the alleged conversion by Carter Lumber, the Salameys’ Michigan law conversion claim fails.
RICO. The district court also didn’t err by granting summary judgment to Carter Lumber
on the Salameys’ RICO claim. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), a “person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce” may not “conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” So, to establish a RICO claim, the
Salameys had to show “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (footnote omitted).
The district court concluded that the Salameys had failed to establish an “enterprise”
because Carter Lumber could not simultaneously be both the RICO “enterprise” and liable under
RICO as a “person.” On appeal, the Salameys challenge this conclusion, arguing that Salami was
the “distinct person who operated the enterprise.” Appellants Br. at 34. We need not decide
whether the Salameys have established an enterprise because, their RICO claim fails on a different
ground—the failure to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. See Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist.,
972 F.3d 853, 877 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that this court may affirm for any reason supported by
the record).
The Salameys must show “that the RICO enterprise engaged in a ‘pattern of racketeering
activity’ consisting of at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity occurring within a ten-
year period.” Moon v.
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0560n.06
No. 25-1120
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 04, 2025 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk NABIL SALAMEY; SONIA SALAMEY, ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ) v. ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) HOUSSAM SALAMI, et al., COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendants, ) ) OPINION CARTER-JONES COMPANIES, INC., d/b/a Carter ) Lumber, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Nabil and Sonia Salamey engaged Houssam Salami to build a
house for them. But, after a dispute over project funds, the Salameys sued Salami and other
individuals and entities, including Carter Lumber, a lumber and materials supplier. The Salameys
claimed that Carter Lumber aided in Salami’s conversion of their property in violation of Michigan
law and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The district
court granted summary judgment to Carter Lumber on both claims. The Salameys now appeal.
We AFFIRM.
I.
Nabil and Sonia Salamey hired Houssam Salami and his company, SS Designs, LLC, to
build a house for them in Canton, Michigan. The parties didn’t enter into a written contract but No. 25-1120, Salamey v. Salami
instead operated pursuant to an oral understanding. Nabil Salamey opened an account at a credit
union and authorized Salami to withdraw funds from the account to pay for construction costs.
Carter Lumber, a lumber and materials supplier, employed Salami as an outside sales
representative. SS Designs, Salami’s company, was also a customer of Carter Lumber and had a
credit account with the lumber company that allowed it to purchase building materials on credit
for its various projects. SS Designs had other projects with Carter Lumber in addition to the
Salameys’ home. Generally, when Salami made a payment to Carter Lumber, he indicated the
project to which the payment should be applied. If he didn’t, Carter Lumber would apply the
payment to the oldest open invoice in SS Designs’ credit account pursuant to company policy. As
a result, some of the Salameys’ funds were applied to invoices for projects unrelated to their home.
The Salameys sued Salami, Carter Lumber, and others in state court, but Carter Lumber
removed the case to federal court. Pertinent to this appeal, the Salameys raised claims against
Carter Lumber for aiding in conversion in violation of Michigan law and for violating RICO.
Carter Lumber moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.1 The
Salameys now appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Naji v. City of Dearborn,
120 F.4th 520, 523 (6th Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine dispute
1 Salami and SS Designs are not parties to this appeal. Below, they also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment on the RICO claim against Salami and SS Designs. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims raised by the Salameys against Salami and SS Designs and remanded those claims to state court. The Salameys appealed the district court’s decision. But on October 30, 2025, the appeal was dismissed upon the parties’ stipulation. -2- No. 25-1120, Salamey v. Salami
of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
Conversion. The district court didn’t err by granting summary judgment to Carter Lumber
on the Salameys’ Michigan law claim for aiding in statutory conversion. Michigan’s statutory
conversion law allows a person to sue if damaged by “[a]nother person’s buying, receiving,
possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property
when the person buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen,
embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted.”
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2919a(1)(b). Constructive knowledge that the property was stolen,
embezzled, or converted is not enough. Echelon Homes, L.L.C. v. Carter Lumber Co., 694 N.W.2d
544, 549 (Mich. 2005). Actual knowledge is required. Id.
Carter Lumber didn’t have actual knowledge of the alleged conversion. Salami was
authorized to withdraw funds from the credit union account established by the Salameys. The
checks Carter Lumber received from the credit union account listed Salami as an owner/authorized
signer. And there is no evidence in the record that Carter Lumber knew of any limitation on
Salami’s authority to make payments from the account.
For their part, the Salameys don’t argue that Carter Lumber had direct knowledge of any
conversion. They contend, however, that the company had institutional knowledge because its
employee (Salami) knew of the conversion. But that argument fails because Salami was not a
supervisor or manager at Carter Lumber, a prerequisite to imputing knowledge by an employee to
his or her employer. See Travis v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 551 N.W.2d 132, 173–74 (Mich.
1996) (“[P]laintiff may establish a corporate employer’s actual knowledge by showing that a
-3- No. 25-1120, Salamey v. Salami
supervisory or managerial employee had actual knowledge . . . .”). Without actual knowledge of
the alleged conversion by Carter Lumber, the Salameys’ Michigan law conversion claim fails.
RICO. The district court also didn’t err by granting summary judgment to Carter Lumber
on the Salameys’ RICO claim. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), a “person employed by or
associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce” may not “conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” So, to establish a RICO claim, the
Salameys had to show “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering
activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (footnote omitted).
The district court concluded that the Salameys had failed to establish an “enterprise”
because Carter Lumber could not simultaneously be both the RICO “enterprise” and liable under
RICO as a “person.” On appeal, the Salameys challenge this conclusion, arguing that Salami was
the “distinct person who operated the enterprise.” Appellants Br. at 34. We need not decide
whether the Salameys have established an enterprise because, their RICO claim fails on a different
ground—the failure to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. See Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist.,
972 F.3d 853, 877 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that this court may affirm for any reason supported by
the record).
The Salameys must show “that the RICO enterprise engaged in a ‘pattern of racketeering
activity’ consisting of at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity occurring within a ten-
year period.” Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 723 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5)). Carter Lumber argues both that there were no predicate acts and no pattern of
racketeering. The Salameys respond to neither argument. Even assuming that the alleged
-4- No. 25-1120, Salamey v. Salami
conversion of the Salameys’ funds could constitute the predicate acts of bank, wire, or mail fraud
under RICO, we agree with Carter Lumber that there was no pattern.
The pleading of at least two predicate acts is “necessary to sustain a RICO claim.” Moon,
465 F.3d at 724. But even that “may not be sufficient because . . . there is something to a RICO
pattern beyond the number of predicate acts involved.” Id. (citation modified). “[T]he term pattern
itself requires the showing of a relationship between the predicates and of the threat of continuing
activity. It is the factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.” Id.
(quoting H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tele. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989)). At most, the Salameys offer
evidence of a single scheme involving Carter Lumber (misuse of the Salameys’ funds from the
credit union account) against a single victim (the Salameys). We have previously held that such
schemes do not constitute a pattern. In Moon, for instance, we found that alleged predicate acts
that occurred over a period of 30 months did not form a pattern of racketeering activity because
all of the predicates “were keyed to [the defendants’] single objective of depriving [the plaintiff]
of [certain healthcare] benefits.” Id. at 725 (emphasis added). Because there were “[n]o other
schemes, purposes, or injuries alleged” besides the time-limited one aimed at the plaintiff, there
was no threat of continuity. Id.; see also Bachi-Reffitt v. Reffitt, 802 F. App’x 913, 918 (6th Cir.
2020) (The plaintiff’s “complaint does not allege an actionable ‘pattern of racketeering activity’
because it pleads only a single scheme targeting a single victim.”). In such cases, “the purported
racketeering activity does not bear the markings of the long-term criminal conduct about which
Congress was concerned when it enacted RICO.” Moon, 465 F.3d at 725–26 (citation modified).
Accordingly, without a pattern, the Salameys’ RICO claim fails.
***
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