Nabatanzi v . NH Dept. of Corrections CV-99-180-M 08/25/00 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Elizabeth M. Nabatanzi, Plaintiff
v. Civil N o . 99-180-M Opinion N o . 2000 DNH 165 New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Hillsborough County House of Corrections, New Hampshire State Prison for Women, Henry Risley, Jane Coplan, Daurice Ducharme, Gregory Wheeden, and Robert Stanley, Defendants
O R D E R
Pro se plaintiff, Elizabeth Nabatanzi, brings this action
against various state and municipal entities, as well as their
employees, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for alleged
violations of her federally protected rights. Although it is
unclear from the record precisely who has been served as a
defendant in this proceeding, it appears that all defendants of
record have moved for summary judgment.1 Plaintiff objects.
1 Plaintiff’s dispositive and responsive papers make reference to a number of people whose names do not appear in Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals “no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). When ruling upon a party’s motion for summary judgment,
the court must “view the entire record in the light most
hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Griggs-Ryan v .
Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990).
The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v . Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the
either her complaint (document n o . 1 ) , her amended complaint (document n o . 7 ) , or her supplemental amended complaint (document n o . 3 6 ) . Moreover, it is difficult to discern from the record precisely which of the defendants who are named in the various iterations of plaintiff’s complaint have actually been served. The names appearing in the case caption are those defendants who appear to be proper parties to this litigation.
2 moving party carries its burden, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to demonstrate, with regard to each issue on
which it has the burden of proof, that a trier of fact could
reasonably find in its favor. See DeNovellis v . Shalala, 124
F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997).
Background
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
and liberally interpreting the allegations in her pro se
complaint, the material facts in this proceeding are, as best as
the court can determine, as follows. Following what appears to
have been a state court conviction for larceny, plaintiff was
incarcerated at the Massachusetts State Prison at Framingham
(“FSP”). On April 9, 1998, she slipped on snow-covered stairs at
FSP and injured her shoulder. She was treated at the prison
infirmary, where she received x-rays that revealed she had no
broken bones. Plaintiff was given Tylenol or aspirin for pain
and a sling to help immobilize her arm.
3 When she was released from the custody of Massachusetts
corrections officials, the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”) began deportation proceedings
against her. Plaintiff was taken into INS custody and
transferred to the Hillsborough County House of Correction
(“Valley Street”). Approximately three months after her arrival
at Valley Street, plaintiff was released on her own recognizance.
Following her release, however, plaintiff did not receive any
medical treatment for her shoulder, other than Tylenol.
Notwithstanding her claim that Valley Street officials should
have performed an MRI on her shoulder while she was in their
custody, she did not obtain such testing once she was released,
nor did she have her injured shoulder surgically repaired.
During that time, she worked as a full-time charge nurse (when
sufficient work was available) and concedes that her shoulder
injury did not preclude her from performing any of the tasks
associated with that position.
4 It appears that in early 1999, plaintiff was ordered
deported to her native country of Uganda. Pending appeal, bail
was set at $1500. In March of 1999, when plaintiff was unable to
post the required surety, the INS again took her into custody.
Initially, she was held at the Goffstown Women’s Prison, which is
part of the New Hampshire State Prison System. There, she claims
to have been classified as a “C” inmate but, due to what she
describes as racial discrimination, was required to live on the
more restrictive “D” tier for longer than she believes was
appropriate. Plaintiff remained at Goffstown for approximately
two months. On May 4 , 1999, she was transferred back to Valley
Street, where she remained until September of 1999, when she was
released on bail. Notwithstanding her claims that her shoulder
injury constituted a serious medical condition that caused her
substantial discomfort, as was the case following her first
release from custody, plaintiff did not undergo any medical
treatment for her shoulder after her most recent release from
Valley Street.
5 In her amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that various
defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical
needs, both while she was held at Goffstown and at Valley Street.
Among other things, she claims that she was denied proper and
adequate clothing to protect her from the cold, denied access to
medical treatment that defendants knew (or should have known) she
desperately needed, and denied access to prescribed pain, anti-
nausea, and anti-diarrhea medications.
She also claims that various defendants discriminated
against her on the basis of her race. As a result, she claims to
have been forced to remain in Goffstown in a more restrictive
classification (i.e., “D” tier) well beyond any appropriate
frame, denied access to privileges to which she was otherwise
entitled, and forced to live in portions of both Goffstown and
Valley Street that were inhabited by violent and dangerous
inmates. Finally, although her amended complaint is fairly
confusing, plaintiff appears to raise claims sounding in common
law defamation and invasion of privacy. She also raises a claim
6 that is somehow related to her assertion that her inmate
identification card at Goffstown bore an incorrect social
security number and that her “prisoner’s right to a proper
identity was violated.” Amended complaint at 9 (document n o . 7 ) .
Discussion
I. Claims Against the State and State Actors.
Plaintiff’s claims against the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections, the New Hampshire State Prison for Women at
Goffstown, and defendants Risley, Coplan, Ducharme, Stanley, and
Wheeden (collectively, the “Goffstown Defendants”) all relate to
incidents she claims occurred while she was held at Goffstown,
from March 2 , 1999 through May 4 , 1999. Defendant Henry Risely
was, at all times material to this proceeding, Commissioner of
the New Hampshire Department of Corrections. Defendant Jane
Coplan has been employed by the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections for approximately 20 years and, for the past five
years, she has been the Superintendent of Goffstown. See
Affidavit of Jane Coplan, Exhibit F to defendants’ memorandum.
7 Defendant Daurice Ducharme has been employed at Goffstown for
approximately 10 years as a social worker. See Affidavit of
Daurice Ducharme, Exhibit D to defendants’ memorandum. Defendant
Gregory Wheeden is employed by the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections as the shop manager at Goffstown. See Affidavit of
Gregory Wheeden, Exhibit E to defendants’ memorandum. Defendant
Robert Stanley has been employed at Goffstown for approximately 8
years. For the past six years, he has acted as a case manager
and classification officer. See Affidavit of Robert Stanley,
Exhibit C to defendants’ memorandum.
A. The New Hampshire Department of Corrections, The State Prison for Women at Goffstown, and Official Capacity Defendants.
The New Hampshire Department of Corrections and the New
Hampshire State Prison for Women at Goffstown correctly assert
that they are agencies of the State of New Hampshire and,
therefore, are not subject to liability under § 1983. See
generally Will v . Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989).
8 With regard to plaintiff’s “official capacity” claims, it is
impossible to determine precisely which defendants she has sued
in their official capacities. Defendants suggest that she has
sued only Henry Risley (the Commissioner) and Jane Coplan
(Goffstown’s Superintendent) in their official capacities. See
Defendants’ memorandum in support of summary judgment (document
n o . 69) at 9.
Plaintiff’s claims against various state actors in their
official capacities are, in effect, claims against the State.
See Negron Gaztambide v . Hernandez Torres, 145 F.3d 410, 416 (1st
Cir. 1998) (“Official-capacity suits . . . generally represent
only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which
an officer is an agent. . . [A]n official-capacity suit i s , in
all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity.”) (quoting Kentucky v . Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1149 (1999)). Plaintiff cannot bring a §
1983 claim for monetary relief against the New Hampshire
Department of Corrections, the Goffstown Prison, or any of the
9 employees of Goffstown in their official capacities because they
are shielded by the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Consequently, the New Hampshire Department of Corrections,
its Commissioner (named in his official capacity), the New
Hampshire State Prison for Women at Goffstown, and all employees
and administrators of Goffstown named in their official
capacities are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
B. Goffstown Employees in their Individual Capacities.
1. Inadequate Medical Care.
While plaintiff was housed at Goffstown, she was a detainee
of the INS. Accordingly, the constitutional obligations owed to
her by the various defendants flow from the provisions of the
Fourteenth, rather than the Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless, the
protections available to detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment
“are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections
available to a convicted prisoner.” City of Revere v .
Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (citing
10 Bell v . Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). Thus, at a minimum,
defendants had a constitutional duty not to be “deliberately
indifferent” to Nabatanzi’s serious medical needs. See Estelle
v . Gamble, 429 U.S. 9 7 , 106 (1976). See also Torraco v . Maloney,
923 F.2d 2 3 1 , 234 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the Constitution
also protects against deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
serious mental health needs).
In order to prove a § 1983 claim for medical mistreatment,
an inmate or detainee must show that prison officials
demonstrated “deliberate indifference to [her] serious medical
needs.” Estelle v . Gamble, 429 U.S. 9 7 , 106 (1976). This test
has both subjective (state-of-mind) and objective components.
See DesRosiers v . Moran, 949 F.2d 1 5 , 18 (1st Cir. 1991). In a
1994 opinion, Justice Souter explained the state-of-mind element
of deliberate indifference in the context of an Eighth Amendment
claim. See Farmer v . Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-847 (1994). A
prison official is liable “only if he knows that inmates face a
11 substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id., at 847.
Accordingly, an Eighth Amendment medical mistreatment claim
cannot be premised upon a theory of simple negligence or medical
malpractice; a physician’s conduct must go beyond negligence in
diagnosing or treating a prisoner’s medical condition.
Similarly, an Eighth Amendment violation does not occur merely
because a prisoner happens to disagree with a physician’s
decision regarding the proper course of medical treatment. See
Watson v . Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The courts
have consistently refused to create constitutional claims out of
disagreements between prisoners and doctors about the proper
course of a prisoner’s medical treatment, or to conclude that
simple medical malpractice rises to the level of cruel and
unusual punishment.”).
With regard to the objective component of the deliberate
indifference test, the prisoner must show that he or she has
12 suffered a serious deprivation of a fundamental right or basic
human need. See DesRosiers, 949 F.2d at 1 8 . As the Supreme
Court has observed, the Constitution “does not mandate
comfortable prisons, and only those deprivations denying the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently
grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”
Wilson v . Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Rhodes v . Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981) (“Conditions must not involve the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting
imprisonment. . . . But, conditions that cannot be said to be
cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not
unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”).
In support of her claim that she was denied appropriate
medical care while detained at Goffstown, Nabatanzi alleges that
13 her medical examinations were deliberately delayed, x-rays of her
injured shoulder were never taken, she was denied appropriate
(i.e., stronger, possibly narcotic) medications, and she was
“deliberately and maliciously” forced to participate in physical
therapy. See Amended complaint (document n o . 7 ) at 3 .
Plaintiff has, however, failed to allege facts which might
even arguably suggest that defendants’ conduct amounted to
anything more than, at the very worst, negligence. See, e.g.,
Amended complaint at 3-4 (“My right hand and shoulder is now
limited in range of motion due to the negligence, malpractice and
given [sic] work assignments that were medically inappropriate,
very unsafe - beyond my physical capabilities.”) (emphasis
supplied). Moreover, she has failed to allege that the Goffstown
defendants actually knew that she faced “a substantial risk of
serious harm” and, nevertheless, “disregard[ed] that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Farmer v .
Brennan, 511 U.S. at 847.
14 During her two month stay at Goffstown, plaintiff was seen
by members of the prison medical staff approximately 10 times and
received various forms of medical treatment. See Affidavit of
Dr. John Hill, Exhibit B to defendants’ memorandum. Nothing in
the record suggests that plaintiff received care that might even
arguably have fallen below the standard established by the
Constitution. At the very most, plaintiff’s allegations (if
taken at face value and credited as true) might support a claim
that she received negligent medical care. Such a claim i s ,
however, not viable under § 1983.
Even the expert report plaintiff submitted in opposition to
defendants’ motion for summary judgment makes clear that, at
best, her claim is one for medical malpractice. In the summary
of his findings and medical conclusions, Dr. Richard Fraser told
plaintiff:
In reviewing the various memoranda from March 2 , 1999 to May 4th 1999 you were seen multiple times by the prison health care providers and there is clearly a demonstrable care plan. Trials of Tylenol, Motrin and Naprosyn along with physical therapy and rest are
15 appropriate treatments. One medication was not controlling your pain and another was prescribed. A two week trial of one medication and rest seems appropriate as well. An MRI was ordered in an appropriate fashion after a trial of various medications. Sick call hours were on a regular basis and my understanding is that there was a protocol for emergencies.
* * *
Overall I see the care that you received by the physician and nurse practitioner as being appropriate. You were clearly dissatisfied with the care provided and there were certainly communication problems. In my opinion it is wrong that you did not receive a short course of stronger pain medication but this does not necessarily mean negligence or malpractice.
Exhibit F to plaintiff’s opposition memorandum (document n o . 7 1 ) ,
Medical Report of Dr. Richard Fraser.
Even charitably construing plaintiff’s pleadings, the court
cannot conclude that she has demonstrated that she suffered from
“serious medical needs,” o r , even assuming she suffered from a
serious medical need, that the Goffstown Defendants were in any
way “deliberately indifferent” to i t . See, e.g., Exhibit F to
plaintiff’s memorandum, Expert medical report of Dr. Fraser. In
16 short, the record shows that the Goffstown Defendants did not
deny Nabatanzi any of the “minimal civilized measure[s] of life’s
necessities,” Wilson v . Seiter, 501 U.S. at 2 9 8 , nor did their
conduct amount to an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”
or qualify as “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Estelle
v . Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-106. Accordingly, the Goffstown
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to
plaintiff’s medical claims.
2. Discriminatory Housing Claim.
Plaintiff also alleges that her constitutional rights were
violated when the Goffstown Defendants intentionally
discriminated against her on the basis of her race by holding her
in the more restrictive “D tier” longer than was appropriate.
Although not clear from her complaint, plaintiff’s recent filings
also suggest that she claims to have been transferred from
Goffstown to Valley Street as part of a conspiracy among a number
of the Goffstown defendants, aimed at retaliating against her
because of her race. Evaluating her discrimination claim under
the burden-shifting analysis discussed in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
17 v . Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the court concludes that
plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim cannot survive the
Goffstown Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Even assuming plaintiff has set forth the elements of a
viable prima facie claim for racial discrimination, the Goffstown
Defendants have responded by articulating a legitimate and non-
discriminatory reason for detaining plaintiff in the more
restrictive confines of D-tier. In his affidavit, defendant
Robert Stanley testified that upon her admission to Goffstown,
plaintiff was classified as a C-3 (medium security) inmate and
was slated to be housed in B-tier. See Affidavit of Robert
Stanley, Exhibit C to defendants’ memorandum. However, because
of a shortage of bed space, plaintiff was initially housed on the
more restrictive D-tier, which is normally used to house C-4
inmates. Stanley also testified that the prison’s normal
practice is to move C-3 inmates from D-tier to the less
restrictive B-tier as space becomes available, in the order in
which they entered the prison, provided they are not experiencing
18 any behavioral or disciplinary problems. Stanley said he decided
to keep plaintiff on D-tier because she was experiencing
“behavioral difficulties.” Specifically, she was having
difficulty getting along with other inmates, her roommates did
not want to live with her, and she was not attending any work
program. Stanley explicitly denied that the decision to hold
plaintiff on D-tier was in any way racially motivated.
In response, plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence
suggesting that defendants’ proffered explanation is either false
or might be a pretext for racial discrimination. Plaintiff
appears to believe that the most compelling piece of evidence in
support of her racial discrimination claim (which she also
describes as a conspiracy) is the “Inmate Final Clearance
Certificate,” dated May 4 , 1999, on which plaintiff claims her
signature was forged. Even assuming plaintiff did not actually
sign that form, it is difficult to see how that fact would
advance her claim that her transfer was improperly motivated by
issues of race. The form merely represents a final checklist, on
19 which responsible prison authorities place their initials as
various tasks (such as dispensing the contents of the inmate’s
prison account, placing a notice of forwarding address in the
prison mail room, making certain that the inmate returns all
prison property, etc.) are completed. That plaintiff might not
have signed that form (and that someone might have “forged” her
signature) does not even remotely suggest that plaintiff’s
transfer, which was initiated well before the May 4 , 1999
“forgery”, was improperly motivated.
In the absence of any evidence from which one might
reasonably infer that plaintiff’s treatment while housed at
Goffstown or her transfer from Goffstown to Valley Street was
unlawfully motivated by her race, the Goffstown Defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to plaintiff’s racial
discrimination claims.
20 3. Remaining Claims against the Goffstown Defendants.
As to the remainder of plaintiff’s complaints, it is
difficult to tell whether she believes that they are actionable
under § 1983 or whether she is pursuing state law claims over
which she believes the court should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction (e.g., claims of defamation, invasion of privacy,
failing to provide her with appropriate work while in custody,
and maintaining inaccurate prison records by providing her with
an inmate identification card that bore an incorrect social
security number). To the extent she is pursuing those claims
under § 1983, she has failed to demonstrate that any of the
injuries she claims to have sustained give rise to a cognizable
claim under § 1983. To the extent she is pursuing state law
claims against the Goffstown Defendants, the court declines to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
See also Camelio v . American Federation, 137 F.3d 666, 672 (1st
Cir. 1998).
In this case, several factors counsel against the exercise
21 of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims
against the Goffstown defendants. First and perhaps most
notably, her foundational federal claims against those defendants
have been dismissed. Additionally, plaintiff’s state claims
against the Goffstown Defendants do not arise out of the same
common nucleus of operative facts as her claims against the
remaining defendants. Rather, her state law claims against the
Goffstown Defendants relate exclusively to her treatment while
housed at Goffstown, while her claims against the remaining
defendants relate to her subsequent detention at the Valley
Street facility.
In light of the foregoing, the court, in the exercise of its
discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s state law claims against the Goffstown Defendants.
II. Claims Against The Hillsborough County House of Corrections and its Employees.
Following her transfer from Goffstown, plaintiff was housed
at Valley Street for approximately four and one-half months (May
22 4 through September 2 1 , 1999, when she was released on bail).
While there, plaintiff alleges that the Valley Street
correctional facility and various individuals employed there
(collectively, the “Valley Street Defendants”) violated her
constitutionally protected rights by exposing her to unsanitary
conditions, treating her differently than white inmates,
providing her with disproportionate access to property and
employment opportunities, and by acting with deliberate
indifference to her serious medical needs.
A. Failure to Conduct an MRI.
Shortly before her release from Valley Street in September
of 1999, plaintiff was taken to Elliot Hospital to undergo an MRI
on her shoulder. However, because she had not previously been
provided with an anti-anxiety medication, the test was not
performed. Plaintiff claims it was rescheduled for the following
day and says that the Valley Street Defendants’ failure to take
her to the rescheduled test prior to her release on September 2 1 ,
23 1999, constitutes deliberate indifference to her serious medical
needs. The court disagrees.
Like her claims against Goffstown, plaintiff’s claim
relating to her failure to receive an MRI while housed at Valley
Street fails to state a viable cause of action. Plainly,
defendants made an effort to obtain an MRI of plaintiff’s
shoulder. That the test was not performed when originally
scheduled or that the test was not subsequently administered
prior to plaintiff’s release a few days later does not amount to
a constitutional violation. Again, plaintiff’s claim with regard
to the MRI testing i s , at best, one for negligence and as such is
not actionable under § 1983.
B. Plaintiff’s Remaining § 1983 Claims.
Unlike her claim(s) relating to the MRI, plaintiff’s
remaining claims against Valley Street and its employees are more
substantial. She alleges that she was repeatedly denied timely
and effective treatment for severe and bloody diarrhea,
24 notwithstanding several requests for help. In response,
defendants have simply denied that they were deliberately
indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Alternatively,
they claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. They
have not, however, submitted plaintiff’s medical records from
Valley Street, nor have they provided affidavits or deposition
testimony of any of the medical staff from Valley Street relating
to the care provided to plaintiff.
In response to plaintiff’s claim that she was subjected to
racial discrimination, the Valley Street Defendants represented
that they would provide the court with supplemental affidavits
and/or deposition testimony supporting their assertion that no
such discrimination took place. See Defendants’ memorandum
(document n o . 58) at 4 . They have, however, failed to submit any
such supplemental documentation.
Consequently, on the current record, the court cannot
conclude that Valley Street or its employees are entitled to
25 judgment as a matter of law as to plaintiff’s claims that she was
subjected to unlawful discrimination and deprived of
constitutionally adequate medical care. The Valley Street
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment i s , therefore, denied as
to those claims, but without prejudice to filing a properly
supported and adequately briefed dispositive motion.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Goffstown Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment (document n o . 59) is granted as to all of
plaintiff’s federal claims against those defendants. As to her
state law claims against the Goffstown Defendants, the court
declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction and they are
dismissed without prejudice.
The Valley Street Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(document n o . 58) is granted in part and denied in part. As to
plaintiff’s claims relating to defendants’ failure to provide her
with an MRI in the days immediately preceding her release, the
26 Valley Street Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. In all other respects however, their motion for summary
judgment is denied.
Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment (documents n o . 19
and 46) are denied.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
August 2 5 , 2000
cc: Elizabeth M. Nabatanzi Andrew B . Livernois, Esq. John A . Curran, Esq.