RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1586-24
N.A.B.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
W.E.,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted November 18, 2025 – Decided January 30, 2026
Before Judges DeAlmeida and Torregrossa-O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FV-04-1389-25.
Law Offices of Frankie Fontanez, attorneys for appellant (Zachary Hashmi, on the brief).
Christine M. D'Elia, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
1 We use initials to protect the domestic violence victim's privacy. R. 1:38- 3(d)(10). Defendant W.E. appeals from the December 19, 2024 final restraining
order (FRO) entered against him and in favor of plaintiff N.A.B. under the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in finding plaintiff established both the
predicate act of assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1, and the need for permanent restraints
under Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). Following
a review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we affirm.
I.
Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant
on October 24, 2024. The complaint alleged a predicate act of assault, claiming
that day defendant "physically remov[ed]" plaintiff from his car, "dragged" her
"on the blacktop ground," and "us[ed] his right arm to hook around the front of
[her] neck," blocking her airway and obstructing her ability to breathe. The
following facts are derived from the FRO hearing, during which both plaintiff
and defendant testified.
Plaintiff testified she began dating defendant in January 2024. According
to plaintiff, although the two did not live together, defendant spent significant
A-1586-24 2 time at her home until she ended the relationship after discovering defendant's
relationship with another woman,2 on October 20.
Plaintiff explained she learned this information after defendant failed to
pick her up on her birthday, October 18, for a trip they had planned. Plaintiff
testified she became concerned when he did not arrive, and "called and
called . . . and texted [defendant]," receiving only a single response from
defendant indicating he was on the phone with his mortgage company. She
described defendant as going "radio silent" as she "kept calling." Call logs and
text messages admitted at the hearing showed plaintiff repeatedly attempted to
contact defendant over the next few days.
Plaintiff recounted discovering two days later on defendant's phone bill
an unknown number appearing as frequently as her own. Plaintiff explained she
"made contact with the individual," Alice, who confirmed her relationship with
defendant. Plaintiff then ended her relationship with defendant.
Plaintiff testified, on October 21, she went to Alice's home to retrieve
"[her] car keys and [shoes]" because she left those items in defendant's car and
2 To protect confidentiality, we use the fictitious name Alice when referring to this individual. Although the testimony is unclear as to the precise status of her relationship with defendant, the parties occasionally reference Alice as defendant's "fiancé." A-1586-24 3 he never returned on her birthday weekend. Plaintiff indicated defendant later
came to her house to return her belongings and retrieve his Wi-Fi box. Once
there, defendant gave plaintiff her shoes and keys, but plaintiff did not give
defendant the Wi-Fi box because she was on a work call and believed he wanted
to impede her ability to work.
Plaintiff testified she next saw defendant driving on October 24. She
explained that she was returning from "[defendant's] brother's office," because
she was trying to return the Wi-Fi box "to [defendant's] brother, but his brother
was not there and [she] didn't want to leave it with some stranger." Specifically,
while driving, plaintiff "look[ed] to [her] left" and saw defendant in the car next
to her. Plaintiff explained that "[they] got to one of the lights and [defendant]
signaled [her] . . . telling [her] to pull over."
Plaintiff stated she and defendant parked beside each other at "Ferry
Station." According to plaintiff, "[they] both started getting out of the car" and
defendant said, "leave your phone." When plaintiff asked why, defendant
responded "because I don't trust you." According to plaintiff, she responded,
"you're the person who can't be trusted because you're the one who's engaged,
you've been engaged and lying this whole time."
A-1586-24 4 Plaintiff also testified that she began recording the interaction on her
phone. They stood in front of their cars "having an argument," and defendant
became "[i]rate." During this exchange, plaintiff asked defendant if he was
engaged. Plaintiff testified when defendant denied the relationship she said,
"let's call [Alice]" and "proceeded to call her" until "[defendant] snatched [her]
telephone from [her]." Plaintiff started yelling "give me back my phone." As
she headed back to her car, she "s[aw] that [defendant's] phone [wa]s on the
floor . . . of his car" and "grabbed" it. Plaintiff admitted at some point she was
in defendant's car.
Plaintiff testified she got back to her car and defendant "started running
over to [her]" and she tried to start her car "so [she] could get away." She
recounted "[defendant] reache[d] in . . . put[] his arm around [her] neck and
start[ed] choking [her]." Plaintiff clarified that defendant's arm was "touching"
her neck and that "[she] was gasping" and "could not breath[e]." Plaintiff said
that she started beeping her car's horn "so that anybody that was around could
hear me."
As a result, plaintiff indicated defendant "t[ook] his arm[] off [her] neck"
and "snatched [her] keys." She described the two "tr[ied] to give each other the
phone like at the same time," but defendant "just snatched his phone and then
A-1586-24 5 started walking off with [her] phone." Plaintiff yelled, demanding defendant
return her phone and keys, and defendant "thr[ew her] phone and it . . . ended
up landing inside of [her] car." After retrieving her phone, plaintiff said she
stopped the recording that was running on her phone and "called 911."
Plaintiff explained her leg was injured during the encounter.3
Specifically, she stated "when [defendant] was choking [her] . . . . [She] fell out
[of] the car" because defendant was "pulling" her. Plaintiff said that the
resulting injury to her ankle "was awful swollen" and she was "limping the
whole time" when she arrived at the police station. Plaintiff also testified that,
although there weren't any marks on her neck, "[her] throat was sore for a few
days."
Plaintiff played the audio recording of the incident, which, although
unintelligible at times, reflected a heated encounter and the parties arguing. In
part, the recording captured defendant calling plaintiff a "f[***]ing liar," and
plaintiff calling defendant a liar as he denied her accusations. Plaintiff at one
point stated, "let's call her," and defendant responded, "see you later" and "don't
3 Photographs of plaintiff's injuries were admitted into evidence and included in her appendix on appeal. A-1586-24 6 get in my car." The recording contained non-verbal sounds, including plaintiff
yelling and crying, and a car horn honking. Police then arrived at the scene.
Plaintiff testified defendant worked as a toll taker, sometimes on the Ben
Franklin Bridge, which she crosses "Monday through Friday" for work; she does
not have an E-ZPass. She said she encountered defendant at the toll booth two
weeks before the hearing without incident, and defendant clearly knew her car
because he helped her purchase it. According to plaintiff, during their
relationship, plaintiff walked the bridge daily for exercise, and defendant
photographed her car in the parking lot and "sent it to[her] while [she] was
walking." She indicated, "he watches [her]."
Plaintiff explained her fear of defendant since the assault. She feared he
would harass or hurt her, as he knew her address and where she works, her
apartment security code, and her family members. She noted she is missing her
car's remote starter but has at times found her car running outside her house.
Defendant testified plaintiff initiated the October 24 contact when she
"signal[ed] to [him] to pull over," and "[he] didn't even respond to her."
Defendant also explained that, after plaintiff "pulled right beside [him]" at Ferry
Station, "[plaintiff] took [his] phone first when she reached in [his] car."
Defendant claimed he was trying to drive away from the situation, and "[plaintiff
A-1586-24 7 tried] to get in [his] car again" as he "pulled off." Defendant explained that "[he]
was on the phone with the police at that time . . . driving with [his] door open
and everything." Defendant suspected that plaintiff sustained injuries to her
ankle "when she fell out of [his] car trying to get back in it the second time."
Defendant denied ever choking plaintiff and stated he had no interest in a
relationship with her. He described their earlier relationship as a friendship,
although admitting it was also sexual. He testified he had no intention of
contacting plaintiff in the future, and there was no need for a restraining order.
In summation, defendant's counsel argued plaintiff was not credible, as
the parties' relationship was over when plaintiff called and texted defendant
repeatedly, and defendant did not wish to communicate with her. The court
interjected "[t]he failure to respond to 80 text communications is annoying
conduct on . . . defendant's part." The court indicated it "[did not] know why he
would not do that. Sometimes you . . . text repeatedly because you're concerned
is the person dead, did they get in a horrible car accident. That is appropriate
communication."
Plaintiff's counsel argued defendant's conduct in assaulting and choking
plaintiff was "egregious" and warranted imposition of a restraining order.
A-1586-24 8 The court then rendered oral findings and granted permanent restraints.
The court, having heard and observed both parties testify, found plaintiff "[wa]s
a much more credible witness." The court credited plaintiff's testimony and
found she established a predicate act of assault after an "altercation" on October
24. It found defendant "t[ook] plaintiff's phone first," and stated, "[i]t
[was] . . . plaintiff who's then pursued by . . . defendant. . . . I'm not sure exactly
why she winds up in . . . defendant's car, but she's in . . . defendant's car." The
court noted plaintiff recorded the "melee," which confirmed "the altercation."
The trial court continued, "I'm satisfied . . . defendant thought he had the
right to choke . . . plaintiff to get her out of his car. He . . . does not. I'm
satisfied that he choked . . . plaintiff. I'm satisfied that is a clear assault under
[N.J.S.A.] 2C:12-1 and that is much more egregious than necessary." The court
concluded defendant's conduct constituted an "egregious act of domestic
violence."
Regarding the need for a restraining order, the court noted the parties
remained in proximity to each other as plaintiff travelled "across the bridge
every day . . . and runs into [defendant] paying a toll." The court also focused
on defendant's behavior surrounding the assault, in particular defendant's
"ignoring" plaintiff's telephone calls and attempts to reach him. It noted
A-1586-24 9 "[n]ormally that is annoying conduct on . . . plaintiff's part, but we don't have a
restraining order, a violation or a TRO filed by the defendant
against . . . plaintiff." However, in these circumstances, the court found
defendant's behavior "egregious" and "cruel," namely, his disappearing on her
birthday, keeping "secret" his relationship with Alice, and deliberately refusing
to contact plaintiff to explain or allay her concerns for his welfare. Finally, the
court found plaintiff in "need of protection," as "there's going to be continuing
connection and . . . defendant needs to do something with his job to avoid the
contact."
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court issued an FRO against
defendant. The restraints included prohibiting defendant from working at the
Ben Franklin Bridge location, although it noted it would reconsider this
restriction in the future if it "becomes an impossibility."
II.
Defendant appeals and argues the court erred in (1) finding plaintiff
established the predicate act of assault, (2) either finding a predicate act of
harassment or "giving some quantum of weight" to defendant's failure to answer
plaintiff's phone calls, and (3) issuing an FRO because plaintiff did not show
defendant's conduct was egregious and a pattern of controlling behavior.
A-1586-24 10 A.
An appellate court's review of an FRO is generally limited. See C.C. v.
J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). "We accord substantial
deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and
are 'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and
more ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" Ibid. (quoting J.D. v.
M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)); see also S.K. v. J.H., 426 N.J. Super. 230,
238 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998)).
"Appellate courts owe deference to the trial court's credibility determinations as
well because it has 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the
veracity of a witness.'" C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) (quoting Gnall
v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)).
Findings by a trial court "are binding on appeal when supported by
adequate, substantial, credible evidence." T.M.S. v. W.C.P., 450 N.J. Super.
499, 502 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12). We do not
disturb a court's findings unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by or
inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to
offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms
Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Further, we may
A-1586-24 11 review the FRO record to determine whether the record as a whole supports
issuance of the FRO. See J.D., 207 N.J. at 484-85. Legal conclusions are
reviewed de novo. C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 428-29 (citing Crespo v. Crespo,
395 N.J. Super. 190, 194 (App. Div. 2007)).
When determining whether to issue an FRO pursuant to the PDVA, trial
courts must engage in a two-step analysis. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-
27. The court "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a
preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts
set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. Upon finding a
predicate act of domestic violence, the court must then determine whether an
FRO is required to protect the party seeking restraints from future acts or threats
of violence. Id. at 126-27. "[T]here [must] be a finding that 'relief is necessary
to prevent further abuse.'" J.D., 207 N.J. at 476 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)).
B.
We first address defendant's challenge to the trial court's finding
defendant committed the predicate act of assault. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1)
provides in relevant part that a person commits simple assault by either
"attempt[ing] to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing] bodily
injury to another."
A-1586-24 12 We have reviewed the record and conclude the trial court did not misapply
its discretion in finding plaintiff established defendant committed the predicate
act of assault. Here, the court, after observing both parties testify and listening
to the recording of the encounter, found plaintiff's testimony more credible than
defendant's. Plaintiff testified she uncovered defendant's secreted relationship
after defendant failed to arrive as scheduled for a preplanned birthday trip,
stopped all communications, and failed to respond to plaintiff's communications.
She indicated she contacted Alice, clearly placing defendant on notice plaintiff
discovered his hidden relationship, which angered defendant.
After a limited contact between the parties to exchange and return
property, according to plaintiff, she saw defendant while driving, who signaled
her to pull over. They argued, she threatened to call Alice, and defendant
grabbed her phone. Plaintiff conceded she at one point got into defendant's car
and took his phone. Plaintiff testified defendant physically grabbed her, and
choked her by closing his arm around her neck, blocking her airway, and stopped
only when she sounded the car's horn. She also testified that defendant dragged
her out of the car, causing an injury to her leg. Photos corroborated that injury.
Because the court credited plaintiff's testimony over defendant's, we are satisfied
A-1586-24 13 the record as a whole supports the court's finding "[defendant] reache[d]
in . . . put[] his arm around [her] neck and start[ed] choking [her]."
Defendant cites the court's finding defendant choked plaintiff "to get her
out of his car," as inconsistent with plaintiff's testimony she was choked trying
to start her car. We are not persuaded any divergence undermines plaintiff's
credibility or the finding an assault occurred. The fluidity of the parties'
encounter throughout the scene is clear from the testimony of both plaintiff and
defendant, and the recording. The parties moved from their respective cars to
the area in front of both, to defendant's car, and to plaintiff's car in some
sequence. Further, we are satisfied the record supports the court's finding
defendant choked plaintiff by putting his arm around her neck.
We note, as did the trial court, the audio captured the encounter and
supported plaintiff's testimony in vital respects. The recording captured plaintiff
again confronting defendant about his deception, attempting to contact Alice,
screaming and crying in a manner consistent with fear and distress, and a horn
honking.
In light of the high deference that we afford a trial court's findings of fact,
and because we review the record as a whole when reviewing FRO
A-1586-24 14 determinations, we discern no reason to disturb the court's finding that defendant
assaulted plaintiff as a predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19.
We next address and reject defendant's argument the court improperly
found his failure to answer plaintiff's repeated calls and texts was a separate and
egregious predicate act among "several predicate acts." Although the court
referenced defendant's ignoring plaintiff as "egregious," we are unpersuaded it
ultimately found a predicate act of harassment in entering the FRO. Any
reference by the court to the events leading up to the physical encounter served
merely to contextualize the assault in considering the necessity of permanent
restraints. The court made no independent finding defendant committed
harassment in reaching its decision.
The trial court also found an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff under
prong two of Silver. We recognize the record reflects no history of domestic
violence involving the parties. However, in these circumstances, we also
conclude the court did not err in granting permanent restraints.
Determinations regarding the necessity of an FRO are based on a totality
of the circumstances analysis. C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 436; see also N.J.S.A.
2C:25-29. Significantly, however, "[w]hen the predicate act is an offense that
inherently involves the use of physical force and violence, the decision to issue
A-1586-24 15 an FRO 'is most often perfunctory and self-evident.'" A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J.
Super. 402, 414-17 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 122-25,
127-28) ("[A] factor that consistently appeared in most of the cases that upheld
the denial of restraints [was that] the predicate act did not involve physical
violence."). This is particularly true when the act is sufficiently "egregious."
Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 123.
Here, we are satisfied the court found defendant's conduct constituted a
particularly egregious assault, giving rise to concerns of future domestic
violence. This finding was supported by plaintiff's testimony defendant grabbed
her phone and choked her, restricting her ability to breathe, until she honked the
car's horn causing him to release his grip, throw her phone, and retreat . We see
no error in the court's finding defendant felt "entitled" to choke plaintiff to get
her out of his car, which is consistent with the record that also supports his doing
so to stop plaintiff's attempts to again call Alice.
We do not view the court's comments concerning defendant's failure to
respond to plaintiff's repeated messages and calls, or its references to defendant's
concealed relationship with Alice, as improper when placed in context. Instead,
the court referenced these circumstances to emphasize the seriousness of the
assault. The record supported the conclusion defendant, irate at plaintiff's
A-1586-24 16 exposing his dual relationships, attacked plaintiff by dragging and choking her
to prevent her from calling Alice. The court fairly noted a particular "cruelty"
in defendant's failure to respond to plaintiff's calls, his failure to appear on
plaintiff's birthday, and uncharacteristically ceasing contact without
explanation. The court noted concern in what it characterized as defendant's
sense of entitlement to physically attack plaintiff. These observations were
reasonable in assessing the totality of the circumstances.
Against that backdrop, the court then found the egregious assault
warranted concern for plaintiff's future safety, particularly as it found defendant
knew the details of plaintiff's residence, work, daily routine, security codes, and
family. The court noted defendant's employment as a toll-booth operator, at
times on the bridge plaintiff crosses every day for work, places them in
continued proximity, heightening the risk of future harm. We therefore
conclude the court properly exercised its discretion in entering permanent
restraints.
Affirmed.
A-1586-24 17