Myron Dakeem Brown a/k/a Myron Brown v. State of Mississippi
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Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2023-KA-00299-COA
MYRON DAKEEM BROWN A/K/A MYRON APPELLANT BROWN
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/10/2023 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAL WILLIAMSON COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: ZAKIA BUTLER CHAMBERLAIN FARRIS LEE FRANCIS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: CASEY BONNER FARMER DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BRAD THOMPSON NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/20/2024 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Following a jury trial in the Jones County Circuit Court, Myron Dakeem Brown was
convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated
section 97-37-5 (Rev. 2020). Brown appeals, asserting that section 97-37-5 is
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied
to him.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2. In June 2018, Brown pleaded guilty in state court to possessing ten units of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to eight years “with the Mississippi Department of
Corrections [(MDOC)], with three years to serve in the Intensive Supervision Program [(i.e.,
“house arrest”)] and the remaining time suspended [on certain conditions].” As part of the
house arrest, Brown wore a global positioning system (GPS) ankle monitor so that the
MDOC would know his location at all times. After about six months, Brown was reported
for violating the terms of his house arrest when he left his property. He was apprehended by
police, and they found a firearm in his pants pocket.
¶3. Brown was charged with (1) possessing a firearm as a felon under section 97-37-5 and
(2) possessing a stolen weapon because the firearm had been reported as stolen. A one-day
jury trial was held on February 8, 2023.
¶4. At trial, the testimony and evidence showed that in December 2018, the Jones County
Circuit Court issued a warrant for Brown’s arrest after his supervising officer at the MDOC
reported him for a house arrest violation. Brown had left his property. Officers Carroll
Windham and Mike Sumrall responded by driving to Brown’s home and discovered he had
left through a side door. They continued to search for him by tracking the GPS signal.
Eventually, Brown cut off his ankle monitor so that the officers were then unable to locate
him.
¶5. Weeks later, Officer Windham received a tip that Brown was sleeping in a car outside
his home. Officer Windham, Officer Sumrall, and another officer found Brown and two
other men asleep in the car. Although Brown cooperated with the officers by getting out of
2 the car, Brown’s brother, who was one of the other men sleeping in the car, began “yelling”
and the scene became “chaotic.” To avoid the chaos, the officers handcuffed Brown, placed
him in a patrol car, and drove away. About a quarter of a mile from the scene, they stopped
again to pat Brown down. Brown was wearing coveralls over his other clothing. During the
pat down, the officers found a handgun in Brown’s pants under his coveralls. A cell phone
video of the pat down taken by Officer Sumrall was shown to the jury.
¶6. Investigator James Evans interviewed Brown after his arrest. The videotaped
interview was played for the jury. Brown waived his Miranda1 rights. During the interview,
Brown admitted possessing the handgun. He told Investigator Evans that he had the gun for
protection. Brown said he had been shot before and was “terrified” because the person who
shot him was still “out there.”
¶7. After the State rested, the defense unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict on both
counts against Brown. Regarding count one (felon in possession), the defense argued that
the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Brown possessed the handgun because his
face was not shown in the cellphone video footage taken of the pat down. Regarding count
two (possession of a stolen firearm), the defense argued that there was no evidence presented
that Brown “knowingly or intentionally knew the gun was stolen.”
¶8. Brown did not testify in his own defense, and the defense did not present any other
witnesses.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 ¶9. At no time during the course of the trial did Brown argue that section 97-37-5 (the
felon-in-possession statute) was unconstitutional.
¶10. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Brown on the felon-in-possession count
but acquitted him of the possession-of-a-stolen-weapon count. The trial court sentenced
Brown to nine years in the MDOC’s custody, with six years and six months to serve and two
years and six months suspended on the condition that he successfully complete two years and
six months of post-release supervision.
¶11. Brown filed a “Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alterative,
Motion for a New Trial.” He did not argue that section 97-37-5 is unconstitutional in that
motion. The trial court denied Brown’s post-trial motion. Brown appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶12. “When addressing a statute’s constitutionality, we apply a de novo standard of review,
bearing in mind (1) the strong presumption of constitutionality; (2) the challenging party’s
burden to prove the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) all doubts
are resolved in favor of a statute’s validity.” Clark v. Bryant, 253 So. 3d 297, 300 (¶8) (Miss.
2018). In this regard, the statute in question “must be shown to be in direct conflict with the
clear language of the constitution.” Id. “The courts are without the right to substitute their
judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and policy of the act and must enforce
it, unless it appears beyond all reasonable doubt to violate the Constitution.” Id.
DISCUSSION
4 ¶13. In Francis v State, the defendant, like Brown in this case, challenged the
constitutionality of section 97-37-5 on appeal by asserting that it violated the Second
Amendment and Article 3, Section 12 of the Mississippi Constitution. Francis v. State, 377
So. 3d 952, 954 (¶6) (Miss. 2023). The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the
defendant’s “constitutional claims are barred from review on appeal . . . [because the
defendant] did not raise such claims in the circuit court.” Id. at 955 (¶17).
¶14. The supreme court also held that “[p]rocedural bar notwithstanding, this Court has
upheld Section 97-37-5’s prohibition of possession of firearms by felons as constitutional.”
Id. (citing James v. State, 731 So. 2d 1135, 1137 (Miss. 1999)). In James, the supreme court
analyzed this issue under Article 3, Section 12 of the Mississippi Constitution and concluded:
[Section] 97-37-5 is constitutional as a reasonable exercise of police power. As stated by this Court in Great South Fair v. City of Petal, 548 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Miss.
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