Myrna de Jesus v. UnitedHealth Group

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00532
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Myrna de Jesus, No. CV-22-00532-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 UnitedHealth Group,

13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is pro se Plaintiff Myrna de Jesus’s (“Plaintiff”) two Motions to Seal Case 16 (Docs. 36 & 37). While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s objective in attempting to 17 seal her case, the Court denies both Motions. 18 I. Background 19 Plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Defendant UnitedHealth Group 20 (“UnitedHealth”) alleging that she was defamed, slandered, and terminated in violated of 21 Arizona defamation laws and Arizona breach of contract laws. (Doc. 8 at 8–9 & 16–22). 22 In response, UnitedHealth filed a Motion to Dismiss and Petition for Confirmation of 23 Arbitration Award. (Doc. 11). Therein, UnitedHealth argued that Plaintiff’s claims were 24 governed by the parties’ Arbitration Agreement. (Doc. 11 at 1–2). Not only was there a 25 controlling Arbitration Agreement, but the parties had already resolved the dispute in 26 arbitration, UnitedHealth argued. (Id.) In responding to the Motion, Plaintiff contested 27 the arbitration proceedings and stated she would like to vacate the arbitration award. 28 (Doc. 16). Ultimately, the Court granted UnitedHealth’s Motion to Dismiss and affirmed 1 the arbitration award in UnitedHealth’s favor. (Doc. 31). Plaintiff appealed the Court’s 2 decision to affirm the arbitration award, and the Court was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit 3 on November 21, 2024. (Doc. 35). Now, Plaintiff has filed two identical Motions to Seal 4 Case. (Docs 36 & 37). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny both. 5 II. Legal Standard 6 The citizenry’s right to inspect public records creates a “strong presumption” that 7 documents filed with federal courts shall be open to the public. Kamakana v. City & 8 County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). A party seeking to seal a 9 judicial record must generally produce “compelling reasons” that the record ought to be 10 kept secret. Id. at 1178–79. In order to satisfy the compelling reasons standard, a party 11 must adduce specific facts demonstrating that the party’s interest in privacy outweighs 12 the strong public policy favoring disclosure. Id. Ordinarily, the compelling reasons 13 standard is satisfied when a party establishes that a document has been submitted for an 14 improper purpose, such as harassment. Id. “The mere fact that the production of records 15 may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation 16 will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. 17 III. Discussion 18 According to Plaintiff, if the case remains unsealed, she will be at risk of identity 19 theft because “court records containing sensitive personal data significantly increases the 20 likelihood of identity theft or the unauthorized use of such information.” (Doc. 36 at 2). 21 She says that a leak of her personal information might “lead to additional reputational 22 harm and emotional distress . . .” (Id.) Without specifying, Plaintiff attests that she has 23 already been subject to “significant embarrassment and humiliation.” (Id.) She is also 24 concerned that information about the lawsuit is readily accessible to the public via an 25 internet search. (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiff opines that sealing her case aligns well with federal 26 privacy law. (Id. at 3). 27 The Court is not persuaded that compelling reasons exist to warrant the sealing of 28 this case. Plaintiff’s fear that some unspecified “personal data” may be exploited lacks || the specificity needed to outweigh the public’s right to access court documents. Indeed, 2|| Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific facts or documents that have been submitted in || this litigation for the improper purpose of harassing her. In fact, she has not pointed to 4|| anything that justifies sealing, and embarrassment cannot be standalone basis for granting || her request. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. Typically, when a court is faced with a 6 || request like this, the court must evidence a factual basis for granting that request. See 7\| Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) 8 || (articulating that the court is required to provide a factual basis for its decision without 9|| relying on “hypothesis or conjecture’). Here, Plaintiff relied on conclusory statements || about her need for privacy and her fear of having her personal information stolen but 11 || never outlined for the Court what specific information she was referring to. Therefore, the Plaintiff's request is denied. 13 Accordingly, 14 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motions to Seal Case (Docs. 36 & 37) are || denied. 16 Dated this 16th day of October, 2025. 17 18 ip Gur SL 13 norable’Dian¢g4. Hurfetewa 0 United States District Fudge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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