MYLAND v. BURWELL

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedAugust 6, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-02454
StatusUnknown

This text of MYLAND v. BURWELL (MYLAND v. BURWELL) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MYLAND v. BURWELL, (E.D. Pa. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICHARD F. MYLAND : CIVIL ACTION : Plaintiff : : v. : : KILOLO KIJAKAZI, : No. 20-cv-02454-RAL Commissioner of Social Security,1 : : Defendant :

Richard A. Lloret August 5, 2021 U.S. Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Richard Myland, the plaintiff, quit a job as a stock clerk with Coca-Cola in 2013, when he was 43 years old. In 2016 Mr. Myland filed an application for disability insurance benefits (DIB), alleging disability as of 2013, when he quit his job, due to back pain and left leg weakness. R. 159, 173, 177-82. The state agency charged with making the initial disability determination denied his application, finding him not disabled. R. 79. Mr. Myland requested review, and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing in August of 2018, at which Mr. Myland and a vocational expert testified. R. 34- 63. The ALJ issued a decision in January of 2019 finding that Mr. Myland could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy, from 2013 through May 9, 2018,

1 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ms. Kijakazi should be substituted for the former Commissioner of Social Security, Andrew Saul, as the defendant in this action. No further action need be taken to continue this suit pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Social Security disability actions “survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office”). the date Mr. Myland turned 50. R. 26-28, Finding Nos. 7-10. Thus, Mr. Myland was not “disabled” at step five of the disability evaluation process.2 Id. But there was a twist. Because the ALJ found that Mr. Myland could only perform sedentary work, with some additional restrictions, as of May 9, 2018 (the date that Mr. Myland turned 50 years old) the applicable regulations created a presumption that no

jobs existed in the national economy that he could perform. Because this was so, Rule 201.14 directed a finding of “disabled” as of May 9, 2018. R. 29, Finding Nos. 11-12. What the parties are really fighting about is whether the ALJ was right to find Mr. Myland not disabled before he turned 50. The Appeals Council denied Mr. Myland’s request for review in April 2020. R. 1- 7. This timely appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW Mr. Myland has the burden of showing that the ALJ’s decision was not based on “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). Mr. Myland acknowledges this well-known standard. Plaintiff’s Brief (“Pl.Br.”), at 6-7 (Doc. No. 12). “Substantial evidence” is not a high standard. Biestek v.

Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). “It means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

2 The five-step disability evaluation process is described in Hess v. Commissioner Social Security, 931 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2019). “At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant ‘can make an adjustment to other work[,]’ considering his ‘[RFC,] ... age, education, and work experience[.]” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). That examination typically involves “one or more hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.’ Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If he cannot, he is disabled.” Id. at 202. DISCUSSION Despite acknowledging the correct standard of review, Mr. Myland argues that there is substantial evidence supporting a finding of disability before Mr. Myland turned 50. Pl.Br. at 7. This misses the point. I happen to agree with the ALJ’s disability assessment, but even if I did not, I could not reverse simply because I disagreed with the

ALJ. See Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). I may only reverse if I find that there is no substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. There can be, and often is, evidence both supporting and undercutting disability. The ALJ weighed the evidence, pro and con, and made a decision. That is not what I do on appeal. Instead, I just review to see if the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. It was, in this case, and because it was, I will affirm. Mr. Myland’s argument is unconvincing for two reasons. First, Mr. Myland bears the burden of demonstrating that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reject the ALJ’s determination. See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020). Mr. Myland’s conclusory argument that a finding of disability is supported by the record does not address or satisfy this burden. The district court is not “empowered to weigh

the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). By arguing a standard that does not apply, and by arguing it in conclusory fashion, rather than pointing out errors under the correct standard of review and supporting his argument with citations to the record, Mr. Myland fails to meet his burden of production and persuasion. See United States v. Grados, 2021 WL 231373, at *3 (W.D.Pa. 2021) (“I will not scour the record where movant has not cited it to see if the record might relate in some way to what he might be driving at”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The consequence is that Mr. Myland has forfeited3 a merits challenge focused on the correct standard of review. Second, my examination of the record based on the correct standard of review reveals that there was substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination. Mr. Myland’s argument is based on two contentions. His first contention is that

he “had significant bilateral hand issues affecting the use of both of his hands in 2016.” Pl.Br. at 7. Mr. Myland’s second contention is that he “suffered from severe lumbar and cervical issues prior to his 50th birthday which affected his ability to walk and stand.” Id. at 8. Mr. Myland suggests that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the “totality of the record.” Id. at 8. My own review convinces me that the ALJ did a thorough job of evaluating all the evidence and that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ carefully analyzed the evidence about Mr. Myland’s hand and back conditions and concluded that the conditions were not disabling. R. 17-18 (hand); 21-26 (lumbar and cervical spine). As for Mr. Myland’s purported hand condition, the ALJ noted that Mr. Myland’s reported grip strength was 5/5 on both the left and the right,

and that he reported driving a riding lawn mower for 25 minutes while mowing his lawn. R. 17.

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MYLAND v. BURWELL, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/myland-v-burwell-paed-2021.