Myers & Waterson v. Hunter Erwin & Co.

20 Ohio St. 381
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 15, 1851
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 20 Ohio St. 381 (Myers & Waterson v. Hunter Erwin & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Myers & Waterson v. Hunter Erwin & Co., 20 Ohio St. 381 (Ohio 1851).

Opinion

Spalding, J.

The plaintiffs in error claim that the judgment below shall be reversed, because, after issue joined on the plea in abatement and found against them, a respondeat ouster was not awarded. The common-law rule on this subject is well established.

“"When a plea in abatement is regularly put in, the plaintiff must reply to it or demur. If he reply, and an issue in fact be thereupon joined and found for him, the judgment is peremptory, quod recuperet; but if there be judgment for the plaintiff on demurrer to a plea in abatement, the judgment is only interlocutory, quod respondeat ouster.” 1 Tidd’s Prac. 6411

The principles lying at the foundation of this rule of practice are asserted in Eichorn v. Lemaitre, 2 Wilson, 367; Amcots v. Amcots, T. Raym. 118; Bonner v. Hall, 1 Ld. Raym. 338; Medina v. Stoughton, Ib. 593; Crosse v. Bilson, 2 Ld. Raym. 1022; 2 Wms. Saund. 211, n. 3.

The same rule is recognized in Massachusetts, in the case of the Boston Glass Manufactory v. Mary Langdon and Trustee, 24 Picker. 49. The syllabus of this case is as follows: “Where, in an action by a corporation upon a promissory note, the defendant pleaded in abatement, that there was no such corporation as was in the writ supposed, and issue was joined upon that fact, the defendant was not permitted, on the trial before the jury, to allege and prove, in reference to the damages, that there was no consideration for the note, the judgment against the defendant being peremptory in ease of his failing to support his plea in abatement.”

In New Hampshire the court ruled in Lodge v. Morse, *3 N. H. 232, that if issue be taken upon a plea in abatement, and the jury find for the plaintiff, they must assess the damages in the same manner as when an issuo is found for the plaintiff upon a plea in bar. So in Jewett v. Davis, 6 N. H. 518, where Chief Justice Richardson remarks: “ It is objected that there is error in the judgment of the court below, because judgment was rendered for the plaintiff to recover his damages, instead of a judgment of respondeat ouster. But in this respect the judgment was correct.”

In Vermont, the same final judgment is rendered, whether the issue is tried by the court or the jury. Peach v. Mills, 13 Vt. 561.

In New York, Marcy, Judge, lays down in Haight v. Holley, 3 Wend. 262 ; “ Where the judgment is on demurrer, it is a re[327]*327spondeat ouster, but where the issue of fact, on a plea in abatement,, is found against the defendant, the judgment is final.” McCartee v. Chambers, 6 Wend. 649, is another case directly in point.

In Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Indiana, the courts have come to the same result. W. Haffy v. Shore, 2 Penn. 361; Moore v. Morton, 1 Bibb, 234 ; John v. Clayton, 1 Black, 54.

In Ailing v. Shelton, 10 Conn. 436, the fact alleged in the plea in abatement was traversed by the plaintiff, on which issue was joined to the jury. After a trial on this issue, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The court accepted the verdict, and thereupon rendered judgment that the defendant answer over to the plaintiff’s declaration. This was assigned for error by plaintiff, and on this ground alone judgment was reversed. Williams. C. J., in pronouncing an opinion, distinguished for its depth of research, lays down the law distinctly on this subject, “that where the issue is joined to the jury, in a plea in abatement, and they find against the defendant, they must assess damages for the plaintiff.” The true reason, he says, is, “ that pleas of this description are usually merely dilatory pleas, which it is the policy of the law to discourage. *They are those required to be filed early, tried early, and not' allowed to be amended and made conclusive, if the defendant will risk a trial by jury thereon.”

It is proper to remark, however, in this connection, that by a practice long continued and peculiar to the courts of Connecticut, this common-law rule is varied in those cases where the issue has been tried by the court instead of the jury. Upon a finding by the court for the plaintiff, in an issue of fact, made up under a.plea in abatement, the judgments have been, for more than half a century, respondeat ouster. “A distinction,” says Judge Could, in his excellent Treatise on Pleading (page 300), for which it seems difficult to assign any satisfactory reason.”

In this state, an issue in fact, decided by the court, is followed by the same legal consequences as a verdict returned by the jury. The judges, pro hac vice, arc the jury.

The counsel for plaintiffs in error press upon our consideration the suggestion, that the common-law rule, in regard to the effect of pleas in abatement, is essentially modified by our statute.

It is said that pleas in abatement are not admitted without affidavits of their truth—that it permits the plaintiff to amend and [328]*328make now parties after plea of non joinder; and that where a plea in abatement shall be adjudged insufficient, it entitles the plaintiff to full costs to the time of overruling such plea. In reply, I have only to say that, if, at common law, it was an object to discourage false dilatory pleas, it may be more important, under the operation of our statute, to put a stop to dilatory pleas in which perjury may be assigned. The statute does not permit the plaintiff, after plea in abatement, to issue his summons for other defendants. It remains to be determined whether our courts will permit this to be done after verdict for defendant.

That a judgment for full costs follows the overruling of a plea in abatement, by no means signifies that the legislature designed thereby to change the rule of the common law, in ^regard to the effect of a finding against the defendant, upon such a plea. It evidently means the overruling of a plea for insufficiency, and upon demurrer. In all such cases,, even at common law, the defendant would be required to “ answer over and it is a reasonable requisition of our statute, that he be made to pay full costs. We are fully persuaded that the statute of Ohio has made no inroads upon the rule in question ; and hence the law is so, that if, under a plea in abatement, an issue in fact, tried by the court or the jury, be found for the plaintiff, final judgment must be awarded in his favor.

The judgment is affirmed.

I. The judgment on a plea in abatement is either,

1. That the writ or declaration be quashed—casseter breve, or narratio;

2. Respondeat ouster; and,

3. Einal, quod recuperet.

Judgment is rendered either,

1. Without issue taken on the plea; or,
2. With issue.

Issues are either,

1. Issues in law; or,
2. Issues in fact.

II. Issues on pleas in abatement are either,

1. Such as must be tried by the court; or,

2. Such as may be tried either by the court or jury.

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20 Ohio St. 381, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/myers-waterson-v-hunter-erwin-co-ohio-1851.