MYERS v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC

District Court, S.D. Indiana·Decided July 28, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-00392·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

JOHN D. MYERS, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:20-cv-00392-JMS-DLP ) EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, ) LLC, ) EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, ) INC., ) TRANS UNION, LLC, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER

On January 13, 2020, Plaintiff John Myers initiated this Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") lawsuit in Rush County Superior Court against credit reporting agency ("CRA") Defendants Equifax Information Services, LLC ("Equifax"), Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian"), and Trans Union, LLC ("Trans Union"). (Dkt. 1-2 at 4). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are falsely reporting a reaffirmed loan account as discharged in bankruptcy. (Dkt. 1-2 at 4). This inaccurate reporting, the Plaintiff contends, is a violation of § 1681e(b) of the FCRA and warrants actual, statutory, and punitive damages for Plaintiff's injuries. (Dkt. 1-2 at 6). On February 4, 2020, Trans Union removed the case to this Court. (Dkt. 1). On March 13, 2020, this Court entered a case management plan setting the deadline to amend pleadings on May 29, 2020. (Dkt. 26 at 4). On May 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 35). Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint includes a more detailed factual background regarding the reaffirmation of Plaintiff's loan account and notification

to the Defendants, and adds class action lawsuit allegations. (See Dkt. 35-1 at 3-4, 9-12). On June 9, 2020, Defendant Trans Union filed a response in opposition, arguing that the Court should deny the Plaintiff's proposed amendment because it is futile and does not cure the deficiencies in the original Complaint. (Dkt. 40 at 4). Defendants Equifax and Experian did not file responses. On June 23, 2020, Plaintiff

filed a reply in support of the Motion to Amend. (Dkt. 47). The Motion is now fully briefed and ripe for decision. I. Legal Standard

After the opportunity to amend the pleadings as a matter of course has passed, a party may amend a complaint only with the consent of the opposing party or leave of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Generally, motions to amend pleadings are treated favorably under Rule 15's liberal amendment policy. See id. Leave to amend should be "freely given," absent considerations such as "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of amendment." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Here, Defendant Trans Union opposes Plaintiff's Motion to Amend on the ground that the proposed amendment to the complaint is futile. An amendment is futile if the amended pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss. McCoy v.

Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 685 (7th Cir. 2014). To survive a motion to dismiss, the amended complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Id. at 685 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Before denying a motion to amend, however, it should be "clear" that the proposed amended complaint "is deficient" and would not survive such a motion. Johnson v. Dossey, 515 F.3d 778, 780 (7th Cir.

2008); see Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2015) ("Unless it is certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted, the district court should grant leave to amend.") (quoting Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Mun. Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004)). II. DISCUSSION

In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that in March 2019, he received a bankruptcy discharge in the Southern District of Indiana. (Dkt. 35-1 at 3- 4). The bankruptcy discharge, however, did not include an Ally Financial automobile loan account because the account was reaffirmed in bankruptcy. (Dkt. 35-1 at 3). Plaintiff asserts that Ally Financial "reported to the [CRA] Defendants that the account was current and paid as agreed and was never late," and that "Defendants were on notice that Plaintiff had reaffirmed the Ally Financial automobile loan." (Dkt. 35-1 at 4). Moreover, the proposed amended complaint adds class action lawsuit allegations against all three Defendants. (See Dkt. 35-1 at 9- 12). Defendant Trans Union contends that the Plaintiff's proposed

amendment is futile and does not cure the deficiencies alleged in the original Complaint. (Dkt. 40 at 4). Specifically, Trans Union asserts that the Plaintiff's complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss because he has failed to allege the notice requirement of § 1681e(b) of the FCRA. (Dkt. 40 at 5). Trans Union further argues that because the Plaintiff's claims are futile, the class action allegations also fail on futility grounds. (Dkt. 40 at 3).

A. Futility of the Proposed Amended Complaint In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are liable for willfully and negligently violating 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) of the FCRA, (Dkt. 35-1 at 9), which requires: Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.

15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). To state a claim under § 1681e(b) of the FCRA, "a consumer must sufficiently allege that a CRA prepared a report containing inaccurate information." Washington v. Equifax Credit Bureau, No. 1:16-cv-01016-SEB-MJD, 2018 WL 780506, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 8, 2018) (citing Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991)). The FCRA, however, does not demand strict liability. If a CRA follows reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, it is not liable for reporting inaccurate information. Washington, 2018 WL 780506, at *3 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)). Thus, the Seventh Circuit has found that a CRA is not liable under the FCRA for reporting inaccurate information

obtained from a court’s judgment docket, Henson, 29 F.3d at 280, or records from financial institutions, Sarver v. Experian Info. Sols., 390 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2004), without the consumer providing prior notice that the information may be inaccurate. In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to ensure that reasonable procedures were in place to prevent inaccurately

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MYERS v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, (S.D. Ind. 2020).

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