J-A32028-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
M.Y. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
A.D.P.
Appellant No. 486 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order January 27, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at No(s): 1511V7330
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2017
Appellant, A.D.P., appeals from the order entered on January 27,
2016, granting a petition for a protection from abuse order (“PFA”) filed by
Appellee, M.Y. We affirm.
We adopt the following statement of facts from the trial court’s
opinion, which in turn is supported by the record. See Trial Court Opinion
(TCO), 5/13/16, at 2-4. Appellant and Appellee began their romantic
relationship in 2011 and have a minor child together. They cohabited in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and were engaged to be married. However, on
November 16, 2015, Appellant and Appellee had an argument that escalated
to physical violence.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A32028-16
Appellant punched Appellee in the side of the face with such force that
he knocked her off the bed. Appellant pulled Appellee by the hair and
banged her head against a bench. He kicked Appellee in the head, side, and
ribs as she tried to protect herself. Appellee attempted to reach her cell
phone but Appellant forcibly took it from her, cracked the glass, and threw
the phone against the toilet. Appellee threw the phone back at Appellant,
striking him in the face.
As Appellee tried to reach a second phone, Appellant grabbed her by
the neck and strangled her. Appellee could not breathe and felt as though
she might pass out. Finally, Appellee freed herself and screamed. Appellant
let go of her neck, and Appellee dressed, left the apartment, and called the
police.
An ambulance arrived, but Appellee declined transportation due to her
lack of health insurance. Police did not arrest either party at that time but
issued a report. The next day, Appellee felt drowsy and went to the
emergency room at Jeanes Hospital. She was discharged with a diagnosis of
closed head trauma and abrasions. Appellee suffered a head injury, cuts to
her fingers, rug burns, and a bruise in her eye. These injuries were
corroborated by photographs taken a week after the incident.
On November 19, 2015, Appellee filed a PFA against Appellant. After
an ex parte hearing, the court granted Appellee a full temporary PFA that
ordered Appellant have no contact with Appellee, evicted him from their
shared apartment, and ordered him to stay away from that address. On
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November 25, 2015, Appellee filed a petition for contempt, alleging that
Appellant had violated the terms of the temporary PFA.
On January 27, 2016, the court held a trial on the PFA petition and a
hearing on the civil contempt petition. Both Appellant and Appellee
appeared and testified. Appellee testified that the November 16, 2015
incident was not the first time Appellant had seriously assaulted her, but she
did not report due to fear. Appellant testified that Appellee had a drinking
problem, stayed out three nights a week, and that he had never assaulted
Appellee. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Appellee a final
PFA for a period of three years and denied the petition for contempt.
Appellant timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.
Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial
court issued a responsive opinion.
On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue for our review:
Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion in finding that there was no evidence to sustain the entry of a protection from abuse order?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the entry
of a three-year PFA order. See Appellant’s Brief at 16. Essentially,
Appellant contends a final PFA was not needed where both parties had
agreed they were not interested in living together in the future. See
Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant argues that the only remedy needed for a
-3- J-A32028-16
cessation of abuse was an order directing the parties to quit the shared
domicile, with a provision that Appellant was not to have contact with
Appellee. Id. at 19.
In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court's legal
conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion. Hood-O'Hara v.
Wills, 873 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. Super. 2005). When a claim is presented
that the evidence is not sufficient to support a PFA order,
we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, and granting her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ferri v. Ferri, 854 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. Super. 2004). We “defer[] to the
credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who appeared
before it.” Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The Protection from Abuse Act is designed “to bring about a cessation
of abuse of the plaintiff.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108. It defines “abuse” as “(i)
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury; [or] (ii) placing
another in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury.” Id. at § 6102. The
trial court has discretion in choosing between remedies afforded by the Act.
See Commonwealth v. Snell, 737 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 1999).
As noted above, Appellant claims that he is attacking the sufficiency of
the evidence. However, his argument does not address the sufficiency of
the evidence in any meaningful way. Instead, he argues that the entry of a
three-year PFA was unwarranted and an abuse of discretion, and a less
-4- J-A32028-16
restrictive remedy should have been implemented, as he stands to lose his
job. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. This is not an attack on the sufficiency
of the evidence so much as it is the appropriateness of the remedy. Further,
Appellant does not cite to any authority to support this position.
Accordingly, we find that Appellant has waived his arguments on appeal.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c); see also Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d
732, 748 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“[T]he argument portion of an appellate brief
must be developed with a pertinent discussion of the point which includes
citations to the relevant authority.”)
Even if we were not to find waiver, Appellant’s attacks on the
sufficiency of the evidence are meritless. Appellee testified that Appellant
punched her in the side of the face; pulled Appellee by her hair; slammed
Appellee’s head against a bench; kicked Appellee in the head, side, and ribs;
broke her phone to prevent her from calling for help; and choked her until
she almost lost consciousness.
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J-A32028-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
M.Y. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
A.D.P.
Appellant No. 486 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order January 27, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at No(s): 1511V7330
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2017
Appellant, A.D.P., appeals from the order entered on January 27,
2016, granting a petition for a protection from abuse order (“PFA”) filed by
Appellee, M.Y. We affirm.
We adopt the following statement of facts from the trial court’s
opinion, which in turn is supported by the record. See Trial Court Opinion
(TCO), 5/13/16, at 2-4. Appellant and Appellee began their romantic
relationship in 2011 and have a minor child together. They cohabited in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and were engaged to be married. However, on
November 16, 2015, Appellant and Appellee had an argument that escalated
to physical violence.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A32028-16
Appellant punched Appellee in the side of the face with such force that
he knocked her off the bed. Appellant pulled Appellee by the hair and
banged her head against a bench. He kicked Appellee in the head, side, and
ribs as she tried to protect herself. Appellee attempted to reach her cell
phone but Appellant forcibly took it from her, cracked the glass, and threw
the phone against the toilet. Appellee threw the phone back at Appellant,
striking him in the face.
As Appellee tried to reach a second phone, Appellant grabbed her by
the neck and strangled her. Appellee could not breathe and felt as though
she might pass out. Finally, Appellee freed herself and screamed. Appellant
let go of her neck, and Appellee dressed, left the apartment, and called the
police.
An ambulance arrived, but Appellee declined transportation due to her
lack of health insurance. Police did not arrest either party at that time but
issued a report. The next day, Appellee felt drowsy and went to the
emergency room at Jeanes Hospital. She was discharged with a diagnosis of
closed head trauma and abrasions. Appellee suffered a head injury, cuts to
her fingers, rug burns, and a bruise in her eye. These injuries were
corroborated by photographs taken a week after the incident.
On November 19, 2015, Appellee filed a PFA against Appellant. After
an ex parte hearing, the court granted Appellee a full temporary PFA that
ordered Appellant have no contact with Appellee, evicted him from their
shared apartment, and ordered him to stay away from that address. On
-2- J-A32028-16
November 25, 2015, Appellee filed a petition for contempt, alleging that
Appellant had violated the terms of the temporary PFA.
On January 27, 2016, the court held a trial on the PFA petition and a
hearing on the civil contempt petition. Both Appellant and Appellee
appeared and testified. Appellee testified that the November 16, 2015
incident was not the first time Appellant had seriously assaulted her, but she
did not report due to fear. Appellant testified that Appellee had a drinking
problem, stayed out three nights a week, and that he had never assaulted
Appellee. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted Appellee a final
PFA for a period of three years and denied the petition for contempt.
Appellant timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.
Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial
court issued a responsive opinion.
On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue for our review:
Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion in finding that there was no evidence to sustain the entry of a protection from abuse order?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the entry
of a three-year PFA order. See Appellant’s Brief at 16. Essentially,
Appellant contends a final PFA was not needed where both parties had
agreed they were not interested in living together in the future. See
Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant argues that the only remedy needed for a
-3- J-A32028-16
cessation of abuse was an order directing the parties to quit the shared
domicile, with a provision that Appellant was not to have contact with
Appellee. Id. at 19.
In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court's legal
conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion. Hood-O'Hara v.
Wills, 873 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. Super. 2005). When a claim is presented
that the evidence is not sufficient to support a PFA order,
we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner, and granting her the benefit of all reasonable inferences, determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ferri v. Ferri, 854 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. Super. 2004). We “defer[] to the
credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who appeared
before it.” Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The Protection from Abuse Act is designed “to bring about a cessation
of abuse of the plaintiff.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108. It defines “abuse” as “(i)
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury; [or] (ii) placing
another in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury.” Id. at § 6102. The
trial court has discretion in choosing between remedies afforded by the Act.
See Commonwealth v. Snell, 737 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 1999).
As noted above, Appellant claims that he is attacking the sufficiency of
the evidence. However, his argument does not address the sufficiency of
the evidence in any meaningful way. Instead, he argues that the entry of a
three-year PFA was unwarranted and an abuse of discretion, and a less
-4- J-A32028-16
restrictive remedy should have been implemented, as he stands to lose his
job. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. This is not an attack on the sufficiency
of the evidence so much as it is the appropriateness of the remedy. Further,
Appellant does not cite to any authority to support this position.
Accordingly, we find that Appellant has waived his arguments on appeal.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c); see also Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d
732, 748 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“[T]he argument portion of an appellate brief
must be developed with a pertinent discussion of the point which includes
citations to the relevant authority.”)
Even if we were not to find waiver, Appellant’s attacks on the
sufficiency of the evidence are meritless. Appellee testified that Appellant
punched her in the side of the face; pulled Appellee by her hair; slammed
Appellee’s head against a bench; kicked Appellee in the head, side, and ribs;
broke her phone to prevent her from calling for help; and choked her until
she almost lost consciousness. The injuries were severe enough that
Appellee sought medical attention and was discharged from the emergency
room with a diagnosis of closed head trauma, and further suffered cuts on
her fingers, rug burn on her arm, a bruised eye, and a “red line” through her
eye. Further, Appellee testified to prior instances of abuse where Appellant
had punched her in the head. The trial court found her testimony credible.
This evidence was sufficient to find that Appellant had abused Appellee
per the requirements of the act. See Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 723-25 (noting
that evidence sufficient for entry of PFA where defendant hit petitioner on
-5- J-A32028-16
several occasion, petitioner testified to existence of bruises and indications
of abuse on petitioner’s body, and defendant repeatedly threatened
petitioner); see also Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050, 1058-59 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (finding that arm pain lasting several days after altercation,
which was not the first instance of abuse, justified entry of PFA);
Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding
that Appellee had proven by preponderance of the evidence that: 1)
Appellant had abused her, and 2) Appellee suffered bodily injury in the
process. This warranted issuance of a protection from abuse order. See
Ferri, 854 A.2d at 602; Raker, 847 A.2d at 724.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 3/9/2017
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