Mutual Life Insurance v. Tailored Woman, Inc.

283 A.D. 173, 126 N.Y.S.2d 573
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedDecember 31, 1953
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 283 A.D. 173 (Mutual Life Insurance v. Tailored Woman, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mutual Life Insurance v. Tailored Woman, Inc., 283 A.D. 173, 126 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1953).

Opinions

Peck, P. J.

Plaintiff has recovered judgment for an amount claimed as additional rental, being a percentage of sales, under a lease of store premises. The lease under which the claim is made was of the basement and first three floors of the building known as 742 5th Avenue at the corner of 5th Avenue and 57th Street. At the time of the making of the lease in 1939, defendant operated a nearby store where it sold women’s wearing apparel and accessories, including furs. The lease of the new premises was for the sale, display and manufacture of all kinds of women’s wearing apparel and accessories and contained a covenant by defendant that the store “ will at all times contain a stock of first class merchandise and the business will be conducted and maintained in a manner substantially similar to the Tenant’s present store at No. 729 Fifth Avenue ”. In addition to a fixed rental, the lease provided as additional rental for the payment of a sum equal to 4% of the gross receipts from all sales made “ on, in or from the demised premises

The leased premises were part of an eight-story building having entrances on both 5th Avenue and 57th Street. Four passenger elevators serviced the building. The tenant was given the exclusive use of the 5th Avenue entrance and two of the elevators. Accordingly, the elevator openings were arranged so that the two elevators set aside for defendant’s exclusive use would open only into the demised premises and the shafts were capped so that these elevators would not rise above the third floor. The other elevators in the building opened into a building lobby, with the entrance on 57th Street, and gave access to the upper floors.

In 1945 the tenant of the fifth floor who conducted a custom-made dressmaking business desired to vacate the premises. Defendant desired to lease this space to expand its business and establish a custom-made dress department. Plaintiff thus leased to defendant the fifth floor, and under the terms of the lease defendant was to occupy the premises for the sale of all types of women’s wearing apparel and accessories and as workrooms. The rent was a fixed amount. It was specifically provided that the landlord should not be entitled to any percentage of receipts from sales or services on the demised premises and that the lease should not have any “ effect ” on the 1939 lease of the basement and lower three floors. The lease provided that the landlord would maintain the existing elevator facilities, meaning as to this lease the public elevator service from the 57th Street lobby, which elevators were the [176]*176only ones which gave access to the fifth floor at that time. The lease also provided that the tenant should make no alterations in the demised premises without the landlord’s prior written consent.

Immediately after taking possession of the fifth floor, the defendant removed the caps on the elevators within its store and altered the fifth floor premises, without the written consent of the landlord, so that its private elevators opened into these premises and for all store operating purposes the fifth floor was integrated into defendant’s store.

The custom-made dress department taken over from the prior lessee was continued for a time but proved to be unsuccessful and was abandoned. The fur department, which had occupied cramped space on the second floor, was moved to the fifth floor and enlarged. Some workrooms were moved to the eighth floor, which defendant also leased at about this time. The space on the lower floors saved by the removal of the fur department and workrooms was used for the expansion of the coat and suit department, the lower-priced dress department and the bridal department. The business in all branches of the store increased substantially.

The controversy between the parties arose in the fall of 1946 when plaintiff claims it learned for the first time that it was not receiving its percentage from the sales of furs. It asserted its claim to a percentage of sales made on the fifth floor upon the ground that this floor had been so integrated into the main premises as to be covered by the percentage provisions of the main lease. Defendant insisted upon the separateness of fifth floor sales in accordance with the separate lease and the provision thereof that the landlord was not entitled to any percentage of fifth floor sales.

There is considerable dispute between the parties and in the testimony as to when plaintiff learned of the structural changes relating to the elevators and of the removal of the fur department to the fifth floor and of the fact that fur sales were no longer included in the report of sales for the purpose of fixing the percentage rental. Defendant claims that plaintiff learned of these facts shortly after the fifth floor lease was made and that there has been an accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff denies acquiring any significant knowledge in the matter until August, 1946.

We think that defendant has not made such a showing in respect to plaintiff’s knowledge as would support a defense of accord and satisfaction. We think it abundantly clear, however, [177]*177that plaintiff through its managing agent knew of the structural changes in the elevator shafts and the way the fifth floor business was conducted in relation to the store as a whole in time to be charged with acquiescence in the integration.! In the light of this knowledge, as well as the express provision" of the fifth floor lease which provided for conduct of the same kind of business on the fifth floor as in the rest of the store, we cannot accept plaintiff’s contention that it was the understanding that the fifth floor premises were to be operated separately with access only from the 57th Street entrance and by public elevators, and that no part or kind of business that had previously been conducted on the first three floors was to be conducted on the fifth floor.

The learned trial court held that, while there was no express provision in the main lease which prevented defendant from transferring its fur department to the fifth floor, the lease requirement that defendant should conduct its business in a manner substantially similar to that conducted at 729 5th Avenue meant that defendant would have a fur department in the main premises. The court held that if this obligation was not explicit it was implicit and that the removal of the fur department to the fifth floor was subversive of the spirit of the contract. Alternatively, the court found that the sales made on the fifth floor were made “ on, in or from the demised premises ” under the main lease. The court reached this conclusion from the facts that the two premises had been integrated and sales personnel on the lower floors were instructed to encourage customers to go to the fifth floor to purchase furs and commissions were paid to main premises sales people where they had any connection with fur sales on the fifth floor. The judgment entered held defendant liable for all sales made on the fifth floor, both of furs and of custom-made dresses which had never been part of the business conducted on the lower floors.

We are unable to agree with the findings and conclusions of the trial court. First, we do not regard the covenant in the main lease to conduct a business “in a manner substantially similar ” to another store to be a covenant that precisely the same merchandise will be sold in the two stores. The sense of the agreement was undoubtedly that indicated by the preceding words that the store would be a “ first class ” establishment of the same character and class as the other store.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
283 A.D. 173, 126 N.Y.S.2d 573, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mutual-life-insurance-v-tailored-woman-inc-nyappdiv-1953.