Mutual Fire Insurance Co. of Montgomery County v. Pickett

83 A. 1097, 117 Md. 638, 1912 Md. LEXIS 131

• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
• Decided: March 26, 1912
• Status: Published

Opinion

ThoMas, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appeal in this case is from a judgment recovered on a fire insurance policy issued by the appellant and covering property owned by the appellee.

The property, which consisted of a stock of goods in a “general store” kept by the appellee at Florence, Maryland, was entirely destroyed by fire on the 12th of March, 1909, and the insured and insurance company being unable to agree on the amount of the loss, suit was brought on the policy in the Circuit Court for Howard County. The case, at the instance of the defendant, was sent to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for trial, and the plaintiff recovered in that Court a verdict and judgment for the full amount of the insurance and interest.

The record contains but one exception and it relates to the ruling of the Court below on the prayers, and in our view of the case, it is only necessary to determine on this appeal whether there was sufficient evidence to show that the plaintiff fairly complied with the condition of the policy which provided that “whenever required, the assured or person claiming shall produce and exhibit the books of account, bills of purchase, or duplicates thereof, and other vouchers to the insurers or their specially authorized agent, in support of the claim, and permit extracts and copies thereof to be made; and also exhibit to any person or persons named by this company, and permit to he examined by them, any property damaged on which any loss is claimed, and shall also, if required, submit to an examination or examinations under oath by the agent or attorney of this company, and answer all questions touching his, her or their knowledge of anything relating to such loss or damage, and subscribe and make oath to such examination, the same being reduced to writing. And until such proofs, examinations, declarations, certificates and exhibitions are produced and permitted by the claimant (when required) as above, the loss shall not be payable.”

It appears from the testimony of the plaintiff that his books and papers were also destroyed, but that he made out an itemized list of the things in the store “two weeks after the fire, when it was fresh .in his memory.” The defendant was not satisfied with the proof of loss presented by the plaintiff, and wrote him requesting duplicate bills of all purchases made by him within nine months before the fire. In reply to this demand of the company the plaintiff sent the defendant a number of bills from merchants with whom he had been dealing, but, according to his own testimony, in a great number of instances, he not only failed to produce bills of articles purchased within the specified time, but made no effort to secure or furnish them. For instance, he states he bought axle grease from the Standard Oil Company; that the company’s wagon came to his store every two weeks; that he “bought some things from the Standard Oil Company within nine months but did not furnish any bills to defendant and does not know whether he made an effort to do so.” Again he^ states that he had in his store at the time of the fire about three hundred pounds of meat; that he • bought meat from a number of persons named by him who lived in the neighborhood, and from whom he thinks he could bave gotten bills for tlie meat purchased if be asked for them; tbat be furnished a bill from Knoop Bros., but did not furnish bills from tbe others from whom be purchased meat within tbe nine months; that he did not try to get a bill for meat purchased from Mr. Driver; tbat he bought fresh meat from Mr. Condon in February, 1909, but did not furnish any bill from him; that he did not get them from any customers “that he was taking things from in trade, did not try to get them and did not go to them.” He says further that he had on hand at the time of the lire five or six hundred pounds of coffee and tea, hut did not “furnish hills for coffee and tea because he did not think to get those hills.”

It does not appear what the bills or proof of loss furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant amounted to, but it does appear that, in addition to the items we have already referred to, much of the property purchased by the plaintiff within nine months before tbe fire, wbicli was said to have been destroyed and for which plaintiff sought to recover, was not covered by tbe bills produced, and tbe evidence fails to show that he made any effort to secure hills for such property, or that it was impossible for Mm to obtain them.

Tbe plaintiff’s first prayer required the jury to find that he furnished duplicate hills of all purchases made by him within nine months prior to the twelfth of March, 1909, the date of the fire, as far as it was possible for him to do so under all the circumstances of the case. The defendant specially excepted to this prayer on the ground that there was no evidence in the case to show that the plaintiff did furnish duplicate hills of purchases made within the specified time as far as it was possible for him to do so, and by its second prayer requested the Court below to instruct the jury that under the condition of the policy referred to it was the duty of the plaintiff, when required by the defendant, to produce to the company duplicates of his bills of purchase, before the loss could he payable; that the plaintiff was required by tbe defendant to furnish duplicate bills of purchase made by Mm within nine months before the fire; that it indisputably appears from the evidence that he did not produoe to the defendant a number of said bills or duplicates thereof, and that he has not shown that it was ■impossible for him to do so> and that, therefore, their verdict should be for the defendant.

The evidence in the case to which we have alluded shows that the learned Court below erred in overruling the exception and rejecting the prayer referred to.

The condition of the policy with which we are here dealing, was construed by this Court in the case of Farmers Fire Ins. Co. v. Mispelhorn, 50 Md. 180. In that case Judge Alve-y said: “The insured was not only bound to produce and exhibit to the company or its agents, upon being required to do so, the bills or purchase, if Vithin his power or control, but if they were destroyed, as he himself proved, he was bound to produce duplicates thereof, if it was possible for him so to do. And it was no excuse for his failure to produce such duplicates that they were not in his possession or at his command at the time of the demand made; if they could have been had by application to those who could have furnished them, he was bound to secure and exhibit them as required. Compliance with this condition, if required by the company, was indispensable to the insured’s right of action, and there is no answer to the objection that he failed to comply, unless he could show, either that compliance had been waived, or that performance of the condition had become impossible without fault of his own.” It is true that, notwithstanding the plaintiff stated'that- he told the agent of the company that he could not get the duplicates required, and further stated that he did not furnish them, and did not apply to anyone from whom he purchased goods to furnish him duplicate bills of purchase, the Court, in reversing the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, said that there were some circumstances before the jury reflecting upon the question of the inability of the plaintiff to gratify the-demand of the defendant, and that the prayer of 'the defendant should not have Bought to withdraw that question from the jury. That case was before this Court again (53 Md. 415) on appeal from adjudgment in favor of the defendant, and the same learned judge, in approving the rejection of plaintiff’s third, fourth and fifth prayers, then said: “Whether it was possible or impossible for the plaintiff to produce duplicate bills of purchase, was purely a question of facts to be determined by the jury from all of the evidence before them; and though it might be found that it was impossible to produce duplicate bills of purchase of a certain class, that fact did not excuse the non-production of those that could have been obtained by a bona fide effort on his part. The plaintiff could not be relieved from the duty imposed upon Mm by the contract, by simply sending out his wife to procure duplicate bills from parties with whom she had been in the habit of dealing; nor could he meet the requirement of the condition in the policy, by showing that he supposed or believed that duplicate bills could not be obtained. The burden of proof was upon him to show that it was not possible for him to comply with the terms of the condition, by the use of all reasonable means within his power.”

In the case at bar, the plaintiff not only failed to meet the burden of proof that was upon him to show that it was impossible for him to comply with the terms of the policy, hut he states that he could have gotten some of the bills if he had asked for them, and that he did not try, made no effort and did not think to get others.

The object of the condition of the policy in question is to protect the insurer, by requiring the insured to produce the means by which the insurance company can test the accuracy of the proof of loss furnished by him. It does not exact from the insured anything unreasonable or impossible, and until he can show that lie has complied with a demand to furnish bills of purchase, or duplicates thereof, or that it was not possible for him to do so by the use of all reasonable means within his power, he can not maintain an action on the policy, unless the insurance company has waived its demand. By the terms of the contract upon wbicb tbe insured in tbis case relies, tbe loss is not payable until tbe condition bas been complied witb or is waived or shown to be impossible to be performed. Therefore, in order to make out a case tbe insured was required to show, either that be bad complied witb tbe condition; that it was not possible for him to do so, or that it bad been waived by the insured, and upon bis failure to meet tbis burden upon him tbe defendant was entitled to a verdict in its favor;

There may be cases where the insured can not, by tbe use of such reasonable means as are within bis power, secure bills of purchase or duplicates thereof, and when that is shown to be tbe case, it is a sufficient excuse for a failure to comply witb a demand for them under a provision like tbe one in question. Mispelhorn v. Farmers’ Fire Ins. Co., supra;; Coleman v. N. Y. Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 177 Pa. St., 35 Atl. 729. But where a party who bas deliberately entered into a contract invokes tbe jurisdiction of a Court to enforce it, be must show compliance witb its terms, or some valid ground for bis failure to do so, otherwise judgment will be entered against him.

In the case of O’Brien v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 108, the Court, speaking of a similar provision in a fire insurance policy, said: “A full compliance witb tbis condition was indispensable to a right of action upon tbe policy, unless a compliance was impossible or was waived by the insurers.” In tbe case of Logan v. Royal Ins. Co., 162 Pa. St. 357, 29 Atl. 710, Chief Justice Steeritt said: “In tbe case at bar, tbe plaintiff not only failed to show that be could not procure tbe duplicate bills demanded, but proved by bis own testimony, most conclusively, that be never made tbe slightest effort to obtain them. * * * It follows from what bas been said that there was no testimony to warrant tbe instructions contained in those portions of tbe charge recited in tbe second and third specifications; and, in view of tbe plaintiff’s own testimony that be made no effort to comply witb tbe just and reasonable demand of tbe company, tbe learned trial Judge should have directed a verdict for the defendant, as requested in its sixth point.”

Because of the failure of the plaintiff to furnish duplicates of the bills of purchase and his failure to show or to produce evidence tending to show that it was not possible for Mm to do so, the judgment of the Court below in his favor must be reversed.

Judgment reversed, with costs.