Mutual Benefit Loan & Building Co. v. Lynch

30 Misc. 499, 63 N.Y.S. 835
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 15, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 30 Misc. 499 (Mutual Benefit Loan & Building Co. v. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mutual Benefit Loan & Building Co. v. Lynch, 30 Misc. 499, 63 N.Y.S. 835 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1900).

Opinion

Marean, J.

The plaintiff is a building and mutual loan association having its offices in the Mechanics’ Bank Building in Brooklyn. It was incorporated in 1893 pursuant to article V, of chapter 689 of the Laws of 1892. Article V was amended by chapter 705 of the Laws-of 1894. By the latter act associations already organized were permitted to reincorpórate under it (§§ 192, 193*), but the plaintiff has not availed itself of that permission. Nevertheless, the recital in the amended act of the subject and purpose of such associations must be regarded as applying to those already formed. Section 171 of the amended law is as follows: “The object and purpose of such associations shall be to encourage industry, frugality, home building and savings among its members, the accumulation of savings, the loaning of such accumulation to its members,” etc.

By section 170 it was provided that every such association thereafter incorporated should have as part of its name the words “ Co-operative Barings and Loan Association.”

The central idea of the association contemplated by the Legislature was co-operation.among people of small means. The statute of 1892, as well as that of 1894, contemplated an association of persons to whom the obligation of a small weekly or monthly contribution would be a stimulus to continuous saving. Vol. 2, Laws of 1892, p. 1914, subd. 11. It contemplated the accumulation by such contributions of a fund, to be increased by legitimate interest, and which might be borrowed by members of the association to aid them in procuring modest homes. It contemplated the possible payment of some amount in excess of legal interest called a premium, not for the purpose of larger profit by the association and those interested in its funds, but as an unavoidable means of determining which of the members should have the loan; and it was [501]*501provided that the payment of such premiums should not be deemed a violation of any statute against usury. The encouragement of frugality and saving, the accumulation of a fund by periodic small contributions and the increase by lawful interest of the fund thus accumulated, which should constitute a borrowing fund within the reach of members, at substantially legitimate rates, were the objects of the legislation in question. The permission to pay and receive a premium above legal interest was an unfortunate but unavoidable incident of the scheme, never intended to be perverted into a license to carry on a business consisting mainly of the loaning of large capital at usurious rates; It was never intended to create corporations which, representing already accumulated capital, should have a monopoly of the business of usury. The evils and oppressions of usury are none the less shocking because the payer has a remote fractional interest in the fund to which the usury when paid is added.

The statute of 1892 does not permit the issuing of what, in the plaintiff’s certificate of incorporation, and in its by-laws, are termed income shares and prepaid shares. The issuing of such shares is a departure from the whole spirit and purpose of the law; it provides a means of immediately realizing, out of the stores of wealth, a capital without limit, with which to enter the loan market, and at the same time attracts to the subscription for installment shares, not those thrifty and industrious persons whose purpose is primarily to save, but a class of needy borrowers ready to pay usury. Thus what was intended to be a co-operative savings and loan association is perverted into an association for the loaning of already accumulated capital at usurious rates to all comers who are willing to cover up the usury by an acceptance of installment shares. That is the character in which the plaintiff presents itself. It is doubtful, therefore, if the plaintiff is in any case entitled to the protection against the usury laws given by the law of 1892. It is only the painful savings of frugality accumulated by periodic contributions which may be loaned at a premium without falling under the condemnation of the usury laws.

The defendant in this case was in search of a loan on mortgage, her property being already encumbered by a mortgage of $2,500. She went to a loan broker, where she signed a written application for a loan, addressed to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, a few days later, loaned her $500 at 24 per cent, interest per annum, payable [502]*502monthly in advance. She did not wish to become a member of the association. She did not know that she had become a member of it, bnt on the closing of the loan, at the plaintiff’s office, she signed, unconsciously, with the bond and mortgage, an application for membership, and was given a certificate for fifteen shares of installment stock in the association.

If the main purpose in such a case is the obtaining of the loan on the part of the borrower, and the making of the loan on the part of the company, and the issue and taking of the shares is only resorted to in order to avoid the usury laws, the loan is usurious if more than six per cent, is exacted, and all obligations for its payment are void. That such is the character of the transaction is a conclusion that cannot be escaped in any case where a person, not a member, applies to the association for a loan which is made to him at a usurious rate in connection with the issuing to him of a certificate of shares. The issuing of the shares constituting the borrower a member of the association is a mere cover for the usury, as plain matter of fact, and it is time it should be so declared.

The plaintiff, at the time of the delivery of the certificate of shares, and the closing of the loan, further exacted from her, and deducted and kept out of. the amount loaned, forty-five dollars, six months dues at fifty cents a month, on each of the fifteen shares then issued to her. She was not, even if she had become a hona fide member on that day, under any obligation to pay these dues, and the exaction and payment thereof in itself tainted the loan with usury. Their payment was exacted in consideration of the loan, in addition to legal interest and to the other usury.

It is true this forty-five dollars dues was credited to the defendant as invested capital in the account opened with her, and was in part payable back to her in case she should pay off the mortgage and withdraw from membership. But it was payable back without interest for a period, and at four per cent, during another period, and at five per cent, during a further period, and only with certain deductions for expenses. By-laws, art. IY, § 3. So that in any event the payment of these dues was a matter of value to the plaintiff, and of prejudice to the defendant.

But it is not necessary to hunt for usury in this transaction with a candle. Every tissue of it is rotten with usury.

The character of the business done by the plaintiff is as follows: It issues its shares from time to time without any limit to persons [503]*503desiring them. Such shares do not mean when issued, an interest in existing assets, if any, of the company. The holder of installment shares pays into the treasury of the association certain sums monthly called dues, and an account is opened with him in which • he is credited with the amounts so paid. If his shares are Prepaid Shares ” or “ Income Shares ” he pays in at once a fixed sum in lieu of all dues, which is put to his credit, fifty-three dollars on income shares, and sixty-five dollars on prepaid shares. Thus a capital is created to be manipulated for a profit, by loaning it to members.

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Related

Anonymous
34 Misc. 109 (New York Supreme Court, 1901)

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Bluebook (online)
30 Misc. 499, 63 N.Y.S. 835, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mutual-benefit-loan-building-co-v-lynch-nysupct-1900.