Musto Construction Permit

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedMarch 10, 2011
Docket132-7-09 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of Musto Construction Permit (Musto Construction Permit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Musto Construction Permit, (Vt. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION

} In re Musto Construction Permit } Docket No. 132-7-09 Vtec (Appeal of Hignite) } }

Decision and Order on Motions to Alter, Amend, and Clarify

Appellant Carolyn K. Hignite appealed from a decision of the Development

Review Board (DRB) of the Town of Castleton, granting approval to Appellee-

Applicants David and Martha Musto to construct a year-round residence. Appellant

is represented by Mark L. Sperry, Esq.; Appellee-Applicants (Applicants) are

represented by Gary R. Kupferer, Esq. and Timothy Budd, Esq.; and Interested Party

Allan Keyes, Esq., an attorney licensed in Vermont, entered an appearance

representing himself. The Town of Castleton did not enter an appearance in this

matter.

The Court issued a decision on the merits of the case on January 27, 2011 (the

January Decision), concluding that the proposed house could not be approved under

§ 709(A)(3) of the Zoning Ordinance because substantial portions of the proposed

house would extend into areas of the setbacks that are not now occupied by the

existing nonconforming structure. Both Appellant and Applicants moved to alter

and amend the opinion.

Standard Applicable to Motions to Alter or Amend

Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which is substantially identical to

Federal Rule 59(e), “gives the court broad power to alter or amend a judgment on

motion within ten days after entry thereof.” Drumheller v. Drumheller, 2009 VT 23,

1 ¶ 28 (citing V.R.C.P. 59, Reporter's Notes). Rule 59(e) is a codification of the trial

court's “inherent power to open and correct, modify, or vacate its judgments.” Id.

(citing West v. West, 131 Vt. 621, 623 (1973)); see also In re Benning Accessory Use

Permit, 184-9-09 Vtec, slip op. at 2 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. June 16, 2010) (Wright, J.)

(considering a “request for clarification” as a motion to alter or amend under

V.R.C.P. 59(e)).

A Rule 59(e) motion “allows the trial court to revise its initial judgment if

necessary to relieve a party against the unjust operation of the record resulting from

the mistake or inadvertence of the court and not the fault or neglect of a party.”

Rubin v. Sterling Enterprises, Inc., 164 Vt. 582, 588 (1996) (citing In re Kostenblatt,

161 Vt. 292, 302 (1994)). More specifically, the limited functions of a motion to alter

or amend a judgment are “to correct manifest errors of law or fact on which the

decision was based, to allow the moving party to present newly discovered or

previously unavailable evidence, to prevent manifest injustice, or to respond to an

intervening change in the controlling law.” In re Vanishing Brook Subdivision, No.

223-10-07 Vtec, slip op. at 4 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. July 10, 2008) (Wright, J.) (quoting 11

Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995));

see also Appeal of Van Nostrand, Nos. 209-11-04 & 101-5-05 Vtec, slip op. at 4 (Vt.

Envtl. Ct. Dec. 11, 2006) (Durkin, J.). Rule 59(e) should not be used to “relitigate old

matters or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior

to entry of the judgment.” South Village Communities, LLC, No. 74-4-05 Vtec, slip

op. at 2 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. Sept. 14, 2006) (Durkin, J.) (quoting Wright, Miller, & Kane

§ 2810.1). The movant’s mere disagreement with the Court’s decision is not grounds

for reconsideration. In re Boutin PRD Amendment, No. 93-4-06 Vtec, slip op. at 2

(Vt. Envtl. Ct. May 18, 2007) (Wright, J.).

2 Applicants’ Motion to Amend or Clarify the Judgment

Applicants ask the Court to amend, to clarify or to “supplement” its decision

by “confirming” their understanding that a proposal that would be three stories in

height, but not larger in extent than the footprint of the existing structure, would be

eligible for approval under § 709(A)(3).

In ruling that certain portions of the proposed new house do not comply with

§709(A)(3), the Court stated that:

[w]hile certain areas of the volume of the proposed new house—those below the ground surface, those within what would have been a second story above the existing house, and those complying with the setbacks—would be eligible for consideration under § 709, other areas of the volume of the proposed new house violate § 709(A)(3). January Decision at 8.

This statement does not rule that the described areas of the proposed house

would be approved; it merely states that they could be considered under § 709.

Specifically, the Court has not ruled, and does not have before it, whether or how

§ 709(B) may be applied to an addition of a second story if a full basement is also

being installed below the non-conforming structure; nor does it have before it what

standards would be applicable in a DRB decision under that section.

Applicants’ request essentially asks the Court to decide whether a

hypothetical alternative proposal consisting of three stories, but not larger in

footprint than the footprint of the existing house, would be eligible for approval

under § 709. The Vermont Constitution prohibits the Court from issuing advisory

opinions; the Court does not give “solicited legal advice in anticipation of issues,”

that is, before those issues are ripe for the Court’s consideration in a proper appeal.

Baker v. Town of Goshen, 169 Vt. 145, 151–52 (1999) (quoting Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt.

119, 121 (1977)). It is for the DRB in the first instance, and not for the Court, to

consider the issues that divide the parties. See In re Maple Tree Place, 156 Vt. 494,

3 500 (1991) (“addressing new issues never presented to the [DRB] and on which

interested persons have never spoken in the local process” is beyond the permissible

role of the court as an appellate tribunal).

Applicants are essentially asking the Court to advise them on how to design a

house that could be approved under the Zoning Ordinance. Until such a proposal

has been presented to and ruled on by the DRB, it is not before this Court for its

consideration. Any opinion given by the Court on such a hypothetical proposal

would be an impermissible advisory opinion in the procedural posture of the

present appeal. The Court therefore declines to ‘alter’ or to ‘clarify’ (or to

”supplement”) its decision as requested by Applicants.

Appellant’s Motion to Alter and Amend

Appellant asks the Court to alter or amend its decision with respect to one

legal issue and two factual findings; the Court will address each issue or finding in

turn.

Section 709

Appellant has moved for the Court to alter its determination that the

proposed structure can be considered for approval within the scope of § 709(A).

Section 709(A) requires that a nonconforming structure “[s]hall not be moved,

enlarged, altered, extended, reconstructed or restored” except upon approval of the

DRB (and hence of this Court in this de novo appeal). Appellant instead argues that,

to be considered under this section, a proposal must fall under one but not more

than one of the listed actions. Appellant’s Mot. to Alter and Amend at 1. Appellant

argues that the proposal cannot be considered under § 709(A) because the Court

concluded that the proposal involved both reconstruction (“the building of a

replacement structure within the footprint and volume of the existing structure”)

and enlargement or extension (“the enlargement or expansion of the existing

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Related

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