United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-6277.
T.A. MUSICK and James Character, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
April 23, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (Nos. CV 94-PT-1132-M, CV 94-PT-1348-M), Robert B. Propst, Judge.
Before KRAVITCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The plaintiffs, T.A. Musick and James Character, appeal from
the district court's order granting the defendant, Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., summary judgment. In 1994, almost four years after
Goodyear had laid them off from their jobs, the plaintiffs filed
suits claiming that the lay-offs were motivated by Goodyear's
desire to deprive them of retirement benefits, in violation of
section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140. They sought back pay and benefits as
well as retirement eligibility credit for the time they were
laid-off. The district court determined that a two-year statute of
limitations was applicable to the plaintiffs' lawsuits and
dismissed them.
The plaintiffs concede that they filed their lawsuits more
than two years after their claims accrued (on the date of the
lay-offs). But they contend that a six-year statute of limitations
governs section 510 actions in Alabama. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court was correct in
determining that a two-year statute of limitations is applicable to
section 510 actions brought in Alabama, at least insofar as back
pay, back benefits, and retirement eligibility credit are the
remedies sought.1
I.
Until 1990, the plaintiffs worked as schedulers, a salaried
position, at Goodyear's tire manufacturing plant in Gadsden. The
plaintiffs participated in Goodyear's retirement plan for salaried
employees. Under that plan, an employee is eligible for full
retirement benefits when: (a) he reaches age 55 and has 10 years
of service; or (b) he has 30 years of service, regardless of age.
The plan is governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. In early
1990, Goodyear notified a number of workers, including the
plaintiffs, that due to a reduction in force they would be laid-off
from work. At that time, Musick was 50 years old, and had been
employed by Goodyear for 19 years, 10 months. Character was 45
years old, and had been employed by Goodyear for 25 years, 6
months.
In April of 1994, Character was recalled to work at Goodyear's
Gadsden plant. Musick was recalled in August of 1994. However,
they were not given credit, for purposes of calculating retirement
eligibility, for the time they were laid-off. Consequently, the
plaintiffs' retirement eligibility dates were approximately four
1 As explained in note 2 on p. 1710, infra, this case does not involve any prayer for reinstatement, so we have no occasion to decide whether a different statute of limitations might apply to such a remedy. years later than they would have been but for the lay-offs.
II.
In early 1994, Musick and Character commenced separate actions
against Goodyear. Each alleged that Goodyear laid him off, failed
to transfer him to another department, and failed to recall him to
work in a timely fashion, all with the specific intent to deny him
retirement and fringe benefits to which he was entitled under his
ERISA plan. Each sought to recover past wages, benefits, and
retirement eligibility credit equal to the length of time he was
laid-off.
The district court consolidated the plaintiffs' cases.
Goodyear moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
plaintiffs' actions were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. The district court agreed with Goodyear that the
plaintiffs' section 510 claims are governed by a two-year statute
of limitations. Applying that two-year limitations period, the
district court held that claims arising from the plaintiffs'
lay-offs were time-barred because Musick was laid-off four years
before commencing his action, and Character was laid-off more than
three and one half years before commencing his action.
III.
ERISA does not contain a statute of limitations for section
510 actions. E.g., Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237,
1241 (11th Cir.1989). Because Congress has not established a time
limitation for such actions, "the settled practice has been to
adopt a state time limitation as federal law." Id. "When adopting
a state statute of limitations, we first determine the essential nature of the claim under federal law and then focus on the period
applicable to such a claim under the most analogous state law
claim." Id. The district court followed this course, and we
review its analysis de novo. Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d
157, 159 (11th Cir.1992).
"In selecting the state statute of limitations most
appropriate to the federal cause of action, federal courts must
first "characterize the essence of the claim in the pending case.'
" Id. (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268, 105 S.Ct.
1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). Characterization of the
essential nature of an ERISA action is a matter of federal law.
Id. This Court has characterized an ERISA section 510 claim for
these purposes on two occasions, establishing the applicable state
law statute of limitations for section 510 claims brought in
Georgia and Florida. We have yet to establish the applicable state
law statute of limitations for claims brought in Alabama. In doing
so now, we will adopt or borrow the statute of limitations Alabama
law provides for the most analogous state law cause of action. Our
previous decisions in which we have performed the same task in
Georgia and Florida cases provide useful guidance for deciding
which Alabama cause of action is most analogous to an ERISA section
510 claim.
In Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237, 1241 (11th
Cir.1989), the plaintiffs were former employees who sued their
employer under section 510 of ERISA, seeking back pay, front pay,
and reinstatement. The district court held that Georgia's two-year
statute of limitations for actions seeking recovery of wages governed the section 510 claims. Id. at 1239. We affirmed the
district court's holding insofar as the back pay remedy was
concerned. Id. at 1242.2
The Georgia statute of limitations applicable to wage claims
is entitled "Enforcement of rights under statutes, acts of
incorporation; recovery of wages, overtime, and damages."
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (1982). That section provides that "all actions
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United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-6277.
T.A. MUSICK and James Character, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
April 23, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. (Nos. CV 94-PT-1132-M, CV 94-PT-1348-M), Robert B. Propst, Judge.
Before KRAVITCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The plaintiffs, T.A. Musick and James Character, appeal from
the district court's order granting the defendant, Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., summary judgment. In 1994, almost four years after
Goodyear had laid them off from their jobs, the plaintiffs filed
suits claiming that the lay-offs were motivated by Goodyear's
desire to deprive them of retirement benefits, in violation of
section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140. They sought back pay and benefits as
well as retirement eligibility credit for the time they were
laid-off. The district court determined that a two-year statute of
limitations was applicable to the plaintiffs' lawsuits and
dismissed them.
The plaintiffs concede that they filed their lawsuits more
than two years after their claims accrued (on the date of the
lay-offs). But they contend that a six-year statute of limitations
governs section 510 actions in Alabama. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court was correct in
determining that a two-year statute of limitations is applicable to
section 510 actions brought in Alabama, at least insofar as back
pay, back benefits, and retirement eligibility credit are the
remedies sought.1
I.
Until 1990, the plaintiffs worked as schedulers, a salaried
position, at Goodyear's tire manufacturing plant in Gadsden. The
plaintiffs participated in Goodyear's retirement plan for salaried
employees. Under that plan, an employee is eligible for full
retirement benefits when: (a) he reaches age 55 and has 10 years
of service; or (b) he has 30 years of service, regardless of age.
The plan is governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. In early
1990, Goodyear notified a number of workers, including the
plaintiffs, that due to a reduction in force they would be laid-off
from work. At that time, Musick was 50 years old, and had been
employed by Goodyear for 19 years, 10 months. Character was 45
years old, and had been employed by Goodyear for 25 years, 6
months.
In April of 1994, Character was recalled to work at Goodyear's
Gadsden plant. Musick was recalled in August of 1994. However,
they were not given credit, for purposes of calculating retirement
eligibility, for the time they were laid-off. Consequently, the
plaintiffs' retirement eligibility dates were approximately four
1 As explained in note 2 on p. 1710, infra, this case does not involve any prayer for reinstatement, so we have no occasion to decide whether a different statute of limitations might apply to such a remedy. years later than they would have been but for the lay-offs.
II.
In early 1994, Musick and Character commenced separate actions
against Goodyear. Each alleged that Goodyear laid him off, failed
to transfer him to another department, and failed to recall him to
work in a timely fashion, all with the specific intent to deny him
retirement and fringe benefits to which he was entitled under his
ERISA plan. Each sought to recover past wages, benefits, and
retirement eligibility credit equal to the length of time he was
laid-off.
The district court consolidated the plaintiffs' cases.
Goodyear moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
plaintiffs' actions were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. The district court agreed with Goodyear that the
plaintiffs' section 510 claims are governed by a two-year statute
of limitations. Applying that two-year limitations period, the
district court held that claims arising from the plaintiffs'
lay-offs were time-barred because Musick was laid-off four years
before commencing his action, and Character was laid-off more than
three and one half years before commencing his action.
III.
ERISA does not contain a statute of limitations for section
510 actions. E.g., Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237,
1241 (11th Cir.1989). Because Congress has not established a time
limitation for such actions, "the settled practice has been to
adopt a state time limitation as federal law." Id. "When adopting
a state statute of limitations, we first determine the essential nature of the claim under federal law and then focus on the period
applicable to such a claim under the most analogous state law
claim." Id. The district court followed this course, and we
review its analysis de novo. Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d
157, 159 (11th Cir.1992).
"In selecting the state statute of limitations most
appropriate to the federal cause of action, federal courts must
first "characterize the essence of the claim in the pending case.'
" Id. (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268, 105 S.Ct.
1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). Characterization of the
essential nature of an ERISA action is a matter of federal law.
Id. This Court has characterized an ERISA section 510 claim for
these purposes on two occasions, establishing the applicable state
law statute of limitations for section 510 claims brought in
Georgia and Florida. We have yet to establish the applicable state
law statute of limitations for claims brought in Alabama. In doing
so now, we will adopt or borrow the statute of limitations Alabama
law provides for the most analogous state law cause of action. Our
previous decisions in which we have performed the same task in
Georgia and Florida cases provide useful guidance for deciding
which Alabama cause of action is most analogous to an ERISA section
510 claim.
In Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237, 1241 (11th
Cir.1989), the plaintiffs were former employees who sued their
employer under section 510 of ERISA, seeking back pay, front pay,
and reinstatement. The district court held that Georgia's two-year
statute of limitations for actions seeking recovery of wages governed the section 510 claims. Id. at 1239. We affirmed the
district court's holding insofar as the back pay remedy was
concerned. Id. at 1242.2
The Georgia statute of limitations applicable to wage claims
is entitled "Enforcement of rights under statutes, acts of
incorporation; recovery of wages, overtime, and damages."
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (1982). That section provides that "all actions
for the recovery of wages, overtime, or damages and penalties
accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime
shall be brought within two years after the right of action has
accrued." Id. In upholding the application of that statute of
limitations to the plaintiffs' section 510 claims in Clark, we
reasoned that "[t]he focus of this statute much more narrowly and
specifically contemplates the action now before us than does the
general language of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 governing contract actions.
Therefore, the two-year limitations period ... is the most
analogous statute of limitations and governs appellants' claims."
Clark, 865 F.2d at 1242.
In Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 158 (11th Cir.1992),
the plaintiff sued her deceased husband's former employer, alleging
2 As to the employees' section 510 claims for reinstatement, however, this Court reversed, and held that Georgia's 20-year statute of limitations applicable to claims for equitable enforcement of statutory rights was applicable. Clark, 865 F.2d at 1242.
In this case, we have no occasion to determine which Alabama statute of limitations is applicable to a section 510 claim for reinstatement, because neither plaintiff in this case was seeking reinstatement at the time the district court dismissed the lawsuits. By that time, both plaintiffs had been called back to work, thus mooting any reinstatement remedy. that the employer discharged her husband because he had refused to
surrender medical and disability benefits to which he was entitled
under his employee benefits plan. The plaintiff sought recovery of
lost wages and benefits, as well as injunctive relief. The
district court dismissed the plaintiff's section 510 claim, relying
on Clark and holding that Florida's two-year statute of limitations
governing actions for the recovery of wages barred the plaintiff's
claims. We reversed the district court's holding in Byrd. In
doing so, we characterized the essential nature of the plaintiff's
section 510 claim as one for benefits denied by wrongful discharge.
Id. at 159. Based on that characterization, we reasoned that
"Florida Statute § 440.205 is most closely analogous to § 510 of
ERISA in that it prohibits the discharge of an employee in
retaliation for the employee's claim or attempted claim for
compensation under Florida workers' compensation law." Id. A
four-year statute of limitations governed claims under section
440.205. Id. at 160.
We concluded in Byrd that the district court, in determining
the most closely analogous Florida cause of action, had erred by
relying on Clark 's analysis of Georgia law. Id. Causes of action
sometimes vary from state to state, as do statutes of limitation.
Alabama, like Florida, has a provision in its worker's compensation
statutes addressing retaliatory discharge. Section 25-5-11.1 of
the Alabama Code provides that "[n]o employee shall be terminated
by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or
maintained any action against the employer to recover workers'
compensation benefits under this chapter." The Alabama Supreme Court has held that claims brought under that section are subject
to the two-year statute of limitations found in section 6-2-38.
ConAgra, Inc. v. Adams, 638 So.2d 752, 753-54 (Ala.1994).
Likewise, Alabama has a statute of limitations for the recovery of
wages that is materially identical to the Georgia provision applied
in Clark. Section 6-2-38(m) of the Alabama Code provides: "All
actions for the recovery of wages, overtime, damages, fees, or
penalties accruing under the laws respecting payment of wages,
overtime, damages, fees, and penalties must be brought within two
years."
There is no provision of Alabama law more closely analogous
to a section 510 action than those two provisions; therefore, the
more analogous of those two Alabama provisions is the one that
determines the statute of limitations period for section 510 ERISA
claims in Alabama. The plaintiffs argue that Alabama's general
six-year statute of limitations governing "[a]ctions upon any
simple contract or specialty not enumerated [specifically],"
Ala.Code § 6-2-34(9), should govern section 510 actions in Alabama.
We reject this argument for the same reason we rejected it in
Clark: other provisions of state law "more narrowly and
specifically contemplate[ ] the [section 510] action now before us
than does the general language" of the state's statute of
limitations generally governing contract actions. 865 F.2d at
1242.
Because the two provisions of Alabama law most analogous to a
section 510 ERISA action—one for wages, the other for retaliatory
discharge—both have a two-year statute of limitations, we need not decide which is more analogous. Either way, there is a two-year
statute of limitations for filing section 510 claims in Alabama.
Accordingly, the district court correctly held that the plaintiffs'
lawsuits, which were filed more than two years after the alleged
section 510 claims accrued, are time-barred.
AFFIRMED.